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Abstract 
Williams syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder of known genetic 
origin.  A characteristically uneven cognitive profile in WS, with a marked contrast 
between poor small-scale visuospatial ability relative to stronger verbal ability, is well 
documented.  Recent findings demonstrate visuospatial deficits pervade to large-scale 
navigation abilities in this group.  Experimental studies presented in this thesis 
investigate the nature of large-scale visuospatial impairment in WS at the level of 
behaviour, as well as the genetic contributions to the WS visuospatial profile.  As an 
important basis on which to understand the nature of atypical development in WS, the 
thesis also examines the development of large-scale spatial cognition in typically-
developing (TD) children.  Developmental changes in the use of different spatial frames 
of reference to mentally represent spatial information both on small-scale tasks and 
during navigation in large-scale virtual environments were observed in TD children 
between 6 and 8 years of age, with an adult-like pattern of performance acquired 
between 8 and 10 years. The findings in TD children provide novel insight into the 
nature of processes underlying the use of different aspects of spatial knowledge for 
navigation.  In WS, impairments in both egocentric and allocentric spatial reference 
frames result in severe detriment to spatial processing at both small- and large scales. 
However, the data suggest that not all aspects of large-scale spatial knowledge are 
equally impaired in WS, highlighting the multifaceted nature of visuospatial cognition, 
and extending our understanding of the profile of relative strengths and weaknesses 
within the visuospatial cognitive domain in this disorder.  An examination of the genetic 
contribution to the WS visuospatial phenotype from two individuals with partial WS 
genetic deletions further highlights the diverse nature of visuospatial cognition. These 
findings provide insight both into the dynamic development of visuospatial cognition in 
typical development, and the atypical visuospatial phenotype in WS.   
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Chapter 1 
Literature review and introduction to thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
The development of successful navigation skills in humans is imperative to 
learning how to negotiate our way around novel and diverse environments.  Moreover, 
the need to acquire accurate and efficient large-scale spatial abilities becomes 
increasingly important throughout development in the pursuit of independent living.  
This is particularly pertinent to individuals with learning disabilities who are often not 
afforded the same level of autonomy or opportunities for independence as typical 
children and adults, especially in relation to travel and navigating around their 
environments.  Williams syndrome (WS) is a relatively rare neurodevelopmental 
disorder, often resulting in mild to moderate learning disability.  Characterised by an 
uneven cognitive profile, serious impairments on visuospatial tasks in WS are often 
reported in comparison to relatively proficient performance in other cognitive domains 
such as language and face processing (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai, & St. George, 
2000) – for a more extensive overview, see 1.5.  Research examining visuospatial skills 
in WS has focussed predominantly on performance on small-scale spatial tasks.  
However, more recent findings suggest that such difficulties may have possible 
implications for large-scale navigation in this group (e.g., Nardini, Atkinson, Braddick, 
& Burgess, 2008).  For individuals with WS, impaired navigation abilities may have 
profound ramifications on their confidence and quality of life, and may contribute to 
mental health difficulties such as depression and anxiety that are commonly associated 
with the disorder (Howlin, Elison, Udwin, & Stinton, 2010; Howlin & Udwin, 2006).   
The processes by which typically developing (TD) children and adults interact 
with their surroundings, and are able to encode, store, and recall spatial information for 
use in any given space has been a matter of some debate within the literature.  Of 
particular interest has been the nature and development of different spatial frames of 
reference underlying human spatial cognition, the ability to encode spatial relationships 
between different environmental features, and even whether individuals can form 
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holistic mental representations or ‘cognitive maps’ of spatial layouts.  An examination 
of the typical development of these abilities throughout this thesis therefore provides an 
essential basis on which to understand the nature of atypical development of 
visuospatial cognition in individuals with WS.  For the most part, this thesis examines 
the nature of large-scale spatial cognition in WS compared to typically developing (TD) 
children.  However, some elements of small-scale spatial knowledge are also assessed 
in these groups, by way of examining the extent to which performance on tasks at 
different spatial scales can predict performance at other scales, and to provide 
discussion regarding the multifaceted nature of human visuospatial cognition. 
Differences exist in the processes involved in acquiring spatial information from 
small- compared to large-scale space (Ittelson, 1973).  Spatial knowledge of a large-
scale environment requires multiple observations from different vantage points, as the 
environment and locations within it cannot be observed from one single position.  
Surveillance of large-scale space therefore necessitates movement and active 
participation (Kuipers, 1978, 1982).  This is contrasted with small-scale spatial 
knowledge, which refers to an understanding of space that can be experienced in full 
from a single vantage point, without the need for a change of observer location.  
Different spatial scales are therefore defined by the different perceptual and motoric 
processes involved in exploration, and not necessarily by the relative size of space.  
Researchers have suggested that a number of distinct underlying cognitive processes 
and neural structures may be involved in learning and performance on spatial tasks of 
different scales (Allen, Kirasic, Dobson, Long, & Beck, 1996; Freundschuh & 
Egenhofer, 1997; Hardwick, McIntyre, & Pick, 1976; Siegel, Herman, Allen, & Kirasic, 
1979; Tversky, Bauer Morrison, Franklin, & Bryant, 1999; Zacks, Mires, Tversky, & 
Hazeltine, 2000).  Conversely, others have identified a considerable amount of shared 
variance between small and large-scale spatial learning, suggestive of overlapping 
processes involved in developing spatial representations across different sized 
environments (e.g., Hegarty, Montello, Richardson, Ishikawa, & Lovelace, 2006).   
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In the typical population, notable individual differences exist in spatial 
navigational abilities, including differences in preferred use of strategies to acquire and 
use spatial information (Hirtle & Hudson, 1991; D. R. Montello & Pick, 1993; 
Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001; Wolbers & Hegarty, 2010).  This introductory chapter will 
discuss the literature examining the development and use of different types of spatial 
cognitive strategies and spatial frames of reference that underlie different aspects of 
large-scale spatial knowledge.  An additional discussion of the neural correlates of these 
different aspects of spatial cognition will also be presented.  The consideration of large-
scale spatial cognition in typical development will allow insight into the factors 
underlying changes in spatial knowledge throughout ontogeny and the individual 
differences seen in navigational abilities in typical children and adults.   
Examining these areas of the literature will provide an important basis on which 
to begin to understand the specific nature of large-scale spatial difficulties in WS and 
the implications of this for the following research.  This chapter will also underline the 
visuospatial cognitive profile associated with WS, highlighting the particular small- and 
large-scale visuospatial deficits already identified in individuals with this disorder.  
Prominent theories of spatial cognitive difficulties in WS will be discussed, with 
reference to known structural and functional abnormalities in WS in cortical regions 
associated with spatial cognition.  The implications of visuospatial difficulties in WS for 
large-scale navigation will be discussed, providing the basis for the subsequent research 
hypotheses considered throughout this thesis.  
 
1.2 Typical development of large-scale spatial cognition 
1.2.1. Stage theories of large-scale spatial learning  
Two prominent theoretical frameworks regarding the development of large-scale 
spatial knowledge that have been significantly influential in the field of cognitive 
psychology are those of Piaget and Inhelder (1967) and Siegel and White (1975).  
Despite critical evaluation, these theories have provided a robust basis on which the 
majority of research in this area has been set.  Piaget and Inhelder (1967) proposed that 
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during the early stages of a child’s conceptualisation of space, a child relies only on 
their primitive understanding of topological relationships between a limited number of 
objects or landmarks, whilst disregarding metric relations; for instance, having an 
understanding of the order of a route, but without an understanding of the spacing 
between objects on the route or length of the route.  In the second stage of spatial 
knowledge development, Piaget described the addition of projective understanding, 
where the child becomes able to infer object relations that are dependent on the 
individual’s viewpoint.  Piaget then stated that it is not until a child is older, by 9 to 10 
years of age that they are able to grasp Euclidean concepts, where object locations are 
coded metrically.  Within this perspective, Piaget claimed that progress should be 
considered as relative to the maturation of general cognitive abilities and constrained by 
a child’s stage of ontological development (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967). 
Based on this Piagetian view, Siegel and White (1975) proposed a hierarchical 
model in which the development of spatial cognition transitions from ‘landmark 
knowledge’ to ‘route knowledge’ and finally to the development of ‘configurational 
knowledge’ or a ‘cognitive map’ of an environment.  Other terms have also been used 
throughout the literature to denote the mental representation associated with 
configurational knowledge, including ‘survey’, ‘global’, ‘relational’, ‘holistic’ 
‘viewpoint-independent’, or ‘allocentric’ knowledge.  Although these terms will be used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis, ‘survey’ and ‘allocentric’ knowledge will be 
primarily used to refer to the mental representation of an environment and the spatial 
frame of reference associated with this representation, respectively.  For further 
descriptions of these terms, see Glossary. 
Within Siegel and White’s (1975) framework, ‘landmark knowledge’ 
predominantly relates to understanding perceptual information about individual 
locations, objects, or scenes. ‘Route knowledge’ on the other hand refers to the 
knowledge of the temporal, goal-directed and sequential order of landmarks within a 
given route.  In the third stage, mental representations of clusters of landmarks are 
acquired, leading to an enduring and viewpoint-independent representation in which an 
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individual develops an understanding of the spatial relationships between places.  Here, 
the spatial relationships learnt are between different environmental locations, 
irrespective of the navigator’s perspective (hence termed ‘viewpoint-independent’). 
As an expansion to Piaget’s theory regarding the development of children’s 
spatial knowledge, Siegel and White (1975) proposed that learning occurs both 
ontogenetically as a child develops, and microgenetically through repeated experience 
within an environment.  Thus, this framework suggests that children and adults both 
conform to the same sequence of learning in the development of organised spatial 
mental representations.  Two claims of this theoretical framework therefore suggest that, 
firstly, young children are not able to develop relational/configurational knowledge of 
an environment and, secondly, the development of such knowledge in older children 
and adults may only occur through repeated experience in an environment.  These 
claims have been examined extensively in the literature, with varying results.  
In support of this framework, a number of studies have found that very young 
children do not immediately form survey representations of space (Anooshian & Nelson, 
1987; Cousins, Siegel, & Maxwell, 1983; Herman, Shiraki, & Miller, 1985).  For 
example, Cousins et al. (1983) found that whilst children aged between 7 and 11 years 
were all able to successfully and efficiently navigate through novel routes, only older 
children were able to infer spatial relations between locations, and therefore succeed on 
cognitive mapping tasks.  Similarly, others have shown that an ability to select 
landmarks precedes the ability to identify and select route information (Allen, Kirasic, 
Siegel, & Herman, 1979; Cornell, Heth, & Broda, 1989).  In a study of the underlying 
abilities that facilitate age-related changes in spatial knowledge, Allen and Ondracek 
(1995) found that landmark knowledge was associated with the development of 
recognition-in-context memory (the ability to recognise features when presented within 
their original learning context), and route knowledge was related to the emergence of 
paired-associative learning (the ability to learn pairs of items so that the presentation of 
one evokes recall of the other).  Thus, in line with a Piagetian-style framework, this 
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suggests that spatial learning is mediated by the emergence of a number of low-level 
cognitive abilities across development. 
Siegel and White’s (1975) theoretical framework asserts that more complex 
spatial representations can ensue, not only throughout development, but also from 
increased experience within an environment.  This is seen in typical adults, where 
mental representations of well-travelled layouts are found to be more detailed and 
integrated than those of less traversed areas (Golledge & Spector, 1978).  Indeed, the 
use of computational modelling has also demonstrated a positive relationship between 
the amount of experience in an environment and the development of more complex 
survey representations (Kuipers, Tecuci, & Stankiewicz, 2003).  Similarly, 
configurational knowledge in adults is disrupted following disorientation in a novel 
environment, but not in an overlearned, familiar environment (Holmes & Sholl, 2005).  
In contrast to a rigid stage theory however, this study does indicate that, in typical adults, 
some relational information is coded immediately in a novel environment, albeit 
vulnerable to disruption following a change of viewpoint. 
In developmental studies, both an increased familiarity of an environment and 
the provision of landmarks have been shown to enhance spatial representations in 
children as young as 5 years of age (Siegel & Schadler, 1977).  Here, children were 
asked to create models of their classrooms following varied extents of experience (i.e., 
at the beginning or end of the school year).  The authors found that increased experience 
in an environment facilitated understanding of the positions of individual objects 
(‘absolute accuracy’), but was not sufficient to develop an understanding of the 
interrelations between objects (‘local relational accuracy’).  This relational accuracy 
was however found to increase with the provision of landmarks (where a few landmark 
cues were provided in the model).  These effects were found to be independent of 
maturational factors.  Of note however is that this study did not take into account the 
possibility that children younger than 5 years may already be able to encode spatial-
relational information from the environment; particularly as, on small-scale spatial tasks, 
relational knowledge may be attained by very young children (Bushnell, McKenzie, 
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Lawrence, & Connell, 1995; Huttenlocher, Newcombe, & Sandberg, 1994; Landau, 
Gleitman, & Spelke, 1981; Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000).  
Annoshian and Young (1981) found that some children have advanced spatial 
knowledge, particularly of their own neighbourhood.  This again suggests that 
experience is an important facilitator of the development of complex spatial mental 
representations in children.  The authors found that children aged 7–14 years had all 
developed spatial knowledge of the location of landmarks in a familiar environment.  
However, improvements could be seen with age in the accuracy of pointing to the same 
landmarks from different locations.  This implies that although experience is an 
important factor, the development of more complex spatial representations is further 
dependent on age.  In a later study, Anooshian and Nelson (1987) examined children’s 
knowledge of directional relationships between different landmarks in their 
neighbourhood and whether performance was related to the extent of experience 
navigating in that area.  The findings showed that, unlike the findings of Anooshian and 
Young (1981), children aged 10 and 12 years were poorer at estimating the direction of 
landmarks from unfamiliar compared to familiar reference points.  These findings 
support the hypothesis that posits children’s spatial-relational knowledge begins to 
develop at about 10 years of age, and requires familiarity of the given space (Siegel & 
White, 1975).  However, even 10 year-olds in this study had good directional 
knowledge and it may be that this is evident in children below this age.  Indeed, when 
children as young as 5-6 years of age are supported to evaluate and reflect on 
‘Euclidean’ concepts of space, they are able to develop more holistic representations of 
their environments (Davis & Hyun, 2005).  This supports counter-arguments which 
suggest it is not the case that young children are unable to construct relational concepts 
of space, but that the ability to integrate and synthesise spatial information undergoes a 
more protracted course of development (Clements & Battista, 1992).    
Even though familiarity in an environment has been shown to play a key role in 
the development of detailed spatial knowledge in school-aged children, there is also 
empirical support for even earlier development of spatial relational knowledge in 3-4 
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year olds (Conning & Byrne, 1984).  This study examined the idea that cognitive map 
knowledge of an environment may actually occur, firstly as topological ‘network maps’ 
that are void of distance knowledge or relative bearings, and secondly, as ‘vector maps’, 
which are representations of the environment that involve encoding of distance and 
direction information.  Conning and Byrne (1984) examined preschool children’s ability 
to point to out-of-sight locations in familiar and novel contexts.  If children were found 
to point to locations using a ‘crow-flight’ method, this was taken to indicate the 
presence of ‘vector map’ knowledge, opposed to pointing towards the path down which 
one would need to travel to reach the location, indicative of only ‘network map’ 
understanding.  The results showed that in a novel environment, children were unlikely 
to show vector knowledge.  However, in a familiar context such as the home, many 3 
and 4 year-olds showed evidence of accurate vector knowledge, which could be 
considered as similar to Piagetian Euclidean awareness or relational knowledge.  Thus, 
it was concluded that in young children, the type of spatial knowledge expressed is 
situation dependent, unlike that proposed by a relatively inflexible stage theory.  
Instead of the ability to gradually develop survey knowledge of an environment, 
Pick (1972) proposed that young children’s understanding of a spatial layout is 
comprised of a number of small representations that are poorly integrated.  In one study, 
Kosslyn, Pick, and Fariello (1974) found that, when asked to judge distances between 
objects located in a space that was subdivided into quadrants by 2 transparent and 2 
opaque barriers, adults perceived locations separated by opaque barriers as further apart.  
Children, on the other hand, overestimated distance judgements between both types of 
barriers, suggesting that their representations of the individual quadrants were poorly 
integrated into a holistic cognitive map.  The authors concluded from this, in support of 
a Piagetian viewpoint, that children are influenced by the concept of functional distance 
(judgements concerning the length of time it would take to traverse from A to B, for 
example) to a greater extent than adults, who would be more likely to take into account 
the metric properties of different layouts.  However, in replicating this study, 
Newcombe and Liben (1982) found that children showed no developmental difference 
in the way in which they estimated distances, including between opaque and transparent 
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barriers.  Newcombe and Liben (1982) concluded that the problems children show on 
Kosslyn’s original task may be due to difficulties in rank ordering (when asked to rank 
in order the closeness of objects) and not distance judgements.  This was seen as 
children had a greater tendency than adults to group their rankings by quadrant. 
It is evident therefore that spatial abilities of young children do develop and 
become more fine-tuned with age, but also with increased familiarity in an environment.  
For example, when children between 5 and 13 years of age were asked to point to 
landmarks within their school, a difference in accuracy was found that was dependent 
on age, gender, and experience, but with the largest difference seen in 10-11 year-olds 
outperforming 7 year-olds (Lehnung, Leplow, Haaland, Mehdorn, & Ferstl, 2003).  The 
specific spatial skills expressed in young children may be dependent on the type of 
space and the procedures used to measure and elicit spatial knowledge.  In particular, 
the size of space may play an important role in the type of spatial representation elicited.  
When asked to navigate through four to six rooms and determine which object would be 
in an adjacent room, children aged 3-5 years were unable to make spatial inferences 
(Hazen, Lockman, & Pick, 1978); however, in a later study when the size of space was 
reduced and children were given fewer cognitive demands, children as young as 3 years 
were able to infer spatial relationships accurately (Hazen, 1982).  The authors concluded 
from this that young children’s ability to understand spatial relationships and develop a 
basic survey representation of an environment is dependent on both the size of space 
and the cognitive load required for the task.  Similarly, Herman, Shiraki and Miller 
(1985) found that in a very large environment, 5 year-olds were more able to point to 
imperceptible locations than 3 year-olds even when information-processing demands 
were significantly reduced and the environment was familiar to all children. 
1.2.2 Beyond stage theories 
Even within typical development, refinement of spatial knowledge seems 
complex and is dependent on multiple factors.  Theoretical frameworks that propose a 
stage-like process of learning are typically generalised to adults.  It is considered that by 
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adulthood, individuals would have developed the ability to utilise each type of spatial 
navigation knowledge; however, it is proposed that in novel environments, a similar 
trajectory of knowledge acquisition will occur, with each stage learned individually and 
in order.  Despite the influential nature of Siegel and White’s (1975) stage theory, little 
consensus is found within the literature as to the acquisition of spatial knowledge in 
adults.  Indeed, recent research in typical adults has cast doubt on the transitional nature 
of spatial knowledge.  
In adults, the type of spatial mental representation that develops from experience 
in an environment may to some extent rely on the nature of the spatial information that 
is encoded during the learning phase.  In line with this, adults who receive spatial 
information from consistently switching perspectives (route or survey perspectives), are 
able to develop ‘perspective-free’, viewpoint-independent mental representations, 
demonstrating an ability to understand the interrelationships between places in an 
environment from all viewpoints, regardless of whether that viewpoint has been 
previously experienced (Lee & Tversky, 2005).  In two experiments, Taylor, Naylor, 
and Chechile (1999) asked adult participants to learn information about either an 
environmental layout (survey goal) or the fastest route through the environment (route 
goal).  Within these groups, participants were either asked to learn from a map or by 
navigating a route (two learning conditions).  Results indicated that both the spatial goal 
and learning condition (why and how information is learned) influence the 
representation of the spatial perspective that develops and spatial knowledge outcome.  
For instance, map-learners performed more accurately than route-learners on survey-
knowledge tasks, whereas route-learners presented with superior route-perspective 
knowledge.  When the spatial goal was to learn the environmental layout (survey goal), 
this also positively influenced performance on the relative spatial knowledge task, 
regardless of the learning condition.  In a later study, Brunyé and Taylor (2008) found 
that when adult participants are only given ‘route’ descriptions to learn a spatial layout, 
extensive experience is needed in order to develop a more global mental representation, 
or ‘cognitive map’ of the environment.  Conversely, such extensive experience and time 
was not required for participants who learnt the spatial layout using more spatial-
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relational descriptions.  This indicates that developing a holistic mental model of space 
from a route description is more time consuming than when learning from a survey 
description.  This may be due to survey descriptions of environments being more 
likened to map-like learning, which contains important viewpoint-independent details.  
Importantly, results of this study also showed that after only one session of learning 
route descriptions, adults were able to make inferences about the spatial layout and 
relationships within the environment, albeit not to the level of those in the survey-
description condition.  This is a phenomenon that would not be predicted by stage 
theories of spatial learning that propose a gradual transition from route to survey 
knowledge.  The authors surmised that learning from route descriptions only requires 
the use of a basic egocentric spatial frame of reference (understanding the location of 
environmental features in relation to the self), which is thought to be required for 
landmark and route knowledge.  In contrast, they suggest a more complex allocentric 
frame of reference (understanding the interrelationships between environmental 
features), which is required for survey knowledge, is used during learning of an 
environment through global or map-type descriptions.  It should be noted that this 
research was conducted with adult participants.  Given that children are able to use an 
egocentric frame of reference earlier in development than an allocentric one (Nardini, 
Burgess, Breckenridge, & Atkinson, 2006; Nardini, Thomas, Knowland, Braddick, & 
Atkinson, 2009; Piaget & Inhelder, 1967), this may have important implications for the 
use of these different spatial representations and understanding of large-scale space 
throughout development.  The development of these different spatial frames of 
reference will be discussed later in more detail (see 1.2.3). 
From research with adults it has been argued that original frameworks, which 
propose a sequential learning trajectory of navigational knowledge (e.g., Siegel & 
White, 1975), do not provide an explanation for the mechanisms by which one develops 
from one stage to the next (D. R. Montello, 1998).  For instance, while familiarity in an 
environment does clearly play an important role in gaining more robust spatial 
representations, it may not independently facilitate the development of a global spatial-
relational understanding as stage theories would suggest (D. R. Montello, Hegarty, 
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Richardson, & Waller, 2004).  Montello (1998) argued that, in typical adults, 
configurational knowledge of distance and direction may be ascertained very early in 
the learning of a novel environment.  This implies that no stage exists in which adults 
solely encode and store landmark knowledge or topographical relations.  Montello 
(1998) also argued that, with increasing familiarity in an environment, there is a 
quantitative and continuous increase in spatial knowledge, in contrast to the proposed 
qualitative transitional shift.  Moar and Carleton (1982) similarly argued that in adults 
an initial understanding, or schemata, of individual routes may not be necessary for 
survey knowledge.  The authors found that during the early stages of navigation in a 
novel environment, adults were able to form integrated cognitive maps (survey 
knowledge) using information from intersecting networks of routes and not just through 
learning single routes independently.  This supports the proposition that the 
development of survey knowledge may be less stage-like than suggested by Siegel and 
White, with individual routes not necessarily learned in isolation, but simultaneously. 
In a longitudinal study, Ishikawa and Montello (2006) examined how spatial 
knowledge of an environment develops over time in adults.  The findings showed that 
even though landmark and route knowledge were both gained after the first exposure to 
the environment, participants also exhibited some degree of metric knowledge during 
the early stages of learning.  The study also highlighted large individual differences in 
the pattern of learning, with individuals who showed good performance in the first 
sessions continuing to be good throughout the trial, and poorer early performers 
remaining poor throughout, with no significant improvement from beginning to end.  
These findings imply that instead of a ‘progression’ from one stage to the next 
occurring in a fixed order and driven by familiarity, the accuracy of configurational 
knowledge may principally be down to individual differences.  Others have similarly 
argued that navigational performance is influenced by individual differences in 
information processing and variability in brain microstructure (Wolbers & Hegarty, 
2010).  Consequently, if individual differences are the key to the extent of learning then 
it may be that poor navigators can be trained to develop more complex survey 
knowledge.  
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It is worth noting here that in contrast to the majority of the aforementioned 
research, others have even argued that there is little convincing evidence that adults are 
able to develop global ‘cognitive maps’ that contain integrated metric information about 
distances, angles and the interrelationships within a given environment (e.g., Foo, 
Warren, Duchon, & Tarr, 2005; Moeser, 1988).  In four experiments, Foo and 
colleagues (2005) examined the process by which adults could determine novel 
shortcuts in medium-sized environments.  The results showed that even though 
participants were able to learn two paths of a triangular route, their ability to then 
determine the novel shortcut down the third path was variable.  When landmarks were 
stable, and therefore reliable, adults were able to make use of these to perform more 
accurate shortcuts.  However, in conditions where landmarks were not available, and 
participants should supposedly rely on metrically-based survey knowledge, shortcuts 
taken were often erroneous.  Importantly, the findings did show that in the absence or 
unreliability of landmarks, a more basic form of relational knowledge could be used and, 
alongside landmark knowledge, is acquired early on in the learning phase.  Therefore, 
the relational knowledge that did develop was argued to be rudimentary and lacking 
Euclidean information.  Foo et al. (2005) found that by covertly moving the location of 
landmarks, participants incorrectly continued to use these to find a novel shortcut.  
However, it should be noted that the nature of the experiment may have led participants 
to believe that they should follow the landmarks.  In addition, some participants noticed 
the landmark shift, suggesting that these individuals must have had a certain amount of 
accurate metric and relational knowledge in order to determine this change, even if the 
metric information could not be used to accurately guide navigation. 
In light of such behavioural studies, and alongside results of neuroimaging 
research, a more recent attempt to develop a framework of understanding spatial 
navigation aims to take into consideration the connection between brain and behaviour 
(Chrastil, 2013).  In particular, Chrastil has proposed an extension to the current 
framework to include a further form of spatial knowledge; graph knowledge, which is 
positioned between route and survey knowledge.  Here, graph knowledge is reported to 
incorporate the sequential information and place-action associations of a route, with 
 27 
some information about how locations are connected, but does not necessitate the path 
integration (metric knowledge) of survey representations.  Within this new taxonomy, 
the four types of spatial knowledge are therefore seen to include seven distinct and yet 
often over-lapping cognitive processes, some of which also include a number of sub-
processes; displayed in 1.2.2.1 Table 1. 
The proposed taxonomy by Chrastil (2013) advocates for the fluidity of spatial 
knowledge via the over-lapping nature of the processes and sub-processes.  The author 
acknowledges that even with the development of this extended framework, there exists 
little consensus as to the neural correlates of each level of spatial knowledge.  Indeed, 
although some mapping exists between preferential activation in certain brain regions 
and each aspect of spatial cognition, it is likely that multiple brain regions are involved 
in each process, dependent on factors such as (but not limited to) the nature of the task 
demands, what is attended to in the environment, and individual variability.  
Furthermore, the main categories of spatial knowledge that are distinguishable at the 
behavioural level are not necessarily always found to have distinct neural correlates 
(although see, Shelton & Gabrieli, 2002; Wolbers & Buchel, 2005; Wolbers, Weiller, & 
Büchel, 2004).  Instead, Chrastil (2013) proposes that neural correlates of the cognitive 
processes and sub-processes are more easily identifiable and distinct.  This will be taken 
into account throughout this thesis in discussions regarding brain-behaviour correlations 
of spatial cognition.  The neural basis of large-scale spatial cognition is discussed 
further in 1.4.   
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1.2.2.1 Table 1. A taxonomy of spatial knowledge (from Chrastil, 2013) 
 Landmark Route Graph Survey 
1 Place recognition 
Scenes and views 
Place recognition 
Scenes and views 
Place recognition 
Scenes and views 
Place within larger 
environment 
Place recognition 
Scenes and views 
Place within larger 
environment 
2  Sequence learning Sequence learning  
3 Identifying decision 
points 
Identifying decision 
points 
Identifying decision 
points 
 
4  Response learning   
5  Forming 
associations 
Forming 
associations 
 
6   Locating the goal 
Relate goal and 
current location 
Transformation 
between ego- and 
allocentric 
perspectives 
Locating the goal 
Relate goal and 
current location 
Transformation 
between ego- and 
allocentric 
perspectives 
7    Path integration 
The four categories of spatial knowledge are divided into seven cognitive processes, some of 
which are further divided into sub-processes (italics).  
 
To conclude, the studies discussed above suggest that the acquisition of spatial 
navigational knowledge in typical adults, should not be thought of as clearly defined 
stages.  Indeed, neither should all individuals be considered able to employ clear way-
finding strategies in all navigational situations.  It may even be that, for some 
individuals, spatial relational knowledge remains imprecise and incomplete (Gärling & 
Golledge, 2000), particularly in poor navigators.  These studies however only provide 
insight into the process by which adults learn to navigate novel environments and do 
not offer an explanation for spatial learning across development.  In the literature, some 
parallels have been proposed between the ontogenetic development of large-scale 
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spatial knowledge in children and the microgenetic development of such knowledge in a 
novel environment in adults.  However, differences lie in the nature of influences that 
drive each type of development, and little can be reasoned about stage changes in 
children based on adult performance.  That said, the developmental literature discussed 
earlier similarly suggests that the learning of landmark, route and survey knowledge 
may not always progress in a static order.  Although behavioural frameworks may be 
useful for understanding the different classifications of large-scale spatial knowledge in 
children, there may be a number of factors (both maturational and environmental) that 
influence the acquisition of navigational knowledge.  
1.2.3 Development of spatial frames of reference 
The research discussed above has for the most part focussed on typical adults 
and the neural underpinnings of different aspects of large-scale spatial cognition.  With 
regards to the underlying processes involved in the use of different aspects of spatial 
navigational knowledge, recent research has examined the different spatial frames of 
reference used for mentally representing spatial information.  An examination of 
changes with development in the ability to use different spatial frames of reference may 
provide an important basis on which to understand the processes that underlie the ability 
to use different aspects of large-scale spatial knowledge from landmark to survey 
knowledge with age.   
  Spatial frames of reference refer to the particular relational systems or 
‘orientation frames’ used to define the relative positions of objects and/or the self in 
space (Kuipers, 1978).  In the literature, predominantly two main terms are used to 
classify types of spatial reference frames or strategies used for goal-orientated 
navigation, namely ‘egocentric’ (also sometimes called idiothetic) and ‘allocentric’ 
(sometimes termed allothetic) reference frames (Klatzky, 1998; Maguire et al., 1998).  
An egocentric frame of reference refers to the understanding of locations in space with 
respect to the particular perspective of the navigator, and involves the use of body-
centred coordinates.  In relation to categories of spatial navigation, route knowledge is 
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concomitant with the use of an egocentric frame of reference, given the need to 
understand the location of the self in relation to specific viewpoints and landmarks 
when making decisions throughout a route.  Conversely, an allocentric frame of 
reference relates to a framework that is external to the perceiver and independent of his 
or her own position.  This usually refers to the knowledge of the spatial relationships 
between independent objects or elements within an environment.  Survey knowledge 
would therefore be considered allocentric, and ‘viewpoint-independent’, given the need 
to understand the location of landmarks relative to other environmental locations, 
regardless of whether they had been previously viewed by the navigator from any given 
location.  
Research into animal spatial navigation and orientation has been used to gain 
insight into human navigation and the use of different spatial frames of reference.  Non-
human species such as ants (Collett & Collett, 2000; Müller & Wehner, 1988) and bees 
(Dyer, Berry, & Richard, 1993) have been found to predominantly use path integration 
systems, which allow for complex navigational capabilities.  During the process of path 
integration, an animal moves through its environment, maintaining a continuously 
updated egocentric representation of their location relative to the position of a chosen 
object or their home that is used as a vector point (Müller & Wehner, 1988).  This also 
enables the specification of distance and direction information.   
Wang and Spelke (2002), proposed that representations underlying the majority 
of human spatial behaviour are “momentary, egocentric, and limited” (R. F. Wang & 
Spelke, 2002 pg. 376).  The authors suggest that humans use egocentric ‘place 
recognition’ and ‘path integration’ strategies, and an allocentric ‘geometric module’ for 
re-orientation that uses environmental surface structure information but does not hold 
information about the spatial properties of landmarks.  Here, place recognition is 
considered a viewpoint-dependent strategy by which an individual is thought to 
recognise landmarks and scenes by matching their current view to a ‘snap-shot’ 
representation stored in memory.  This is in line with the cognitive process proposed by 
Chrastil (2013), underlying all aspects of spatial knowledge.  In contrast with Wang and 
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Spelke’s model however, in humans the use of path integration in large-scale space has 
been found to be minimal, possibly due to the increased difficulty in continually 
estimating one’s position as the size of space increases (Waller, Loomis, & Steck, 2003).  
That said, grid cells and heading-direction cells in the human entorhinal cortex are 
thought to support the encoding of metric information associated with the process of 
path integration (Doeller, Barry, & Burgess, 2010; Jacobs, Kahana, Ekstrom, Mollison, 
& Fried, 2010; Taube, 1998).   
More recently and in contrast with Wang and Spelke, Burgess (2006) proposed a 
‘two-system’ model in which egocentric and allocentric representations exist in parallel 
and may cooperate with each other in some situations when employed simultaneously.  
This is observable in typical adults, who are able to acquire egocentric and allocentric 
representations simultaneously when navigating in a new environment and can 
subsequently apply the use of each spatial frame of reference spontaneously when 
required (Iglói, Zaoui, Berthoz, & Rondi-Reig, 2009).  Similarly, Mou and colleagues 
(2004) have advocated for the existence of two subsystems within human spatial 
cognition; an egocentric and an environmental subsystem, similar to the often-named 
allocentric processing system.  This model suggests that adults are able to form 
enduring representations of inter-object spatial relationships, by employment of an 
environmental subsystem, that can be used to keep track of their location and to locate 
objects around them (Mou et al., 2004).  As such, perceptual-level egocentric 
representations (the egocentric subsystem) would only be put into use when the 
individual is oriented in line with an array and when spatial representations within the 
environmental (or allocentric) subsystem are inaccurately formed or indiscriminate.  
This is supported by evidence from adults when learning the layout of a novel 
environment (Mou, McNamara, Rump, & Xiao, 2006).  Results of a further study by 
Mou and colleagues (2008) indicate that scene recognition may be ‘intrinsic-orientation-
dependent’ and not exclusively ‘viewpoint-dependent’ as advocated by Wang and 
Spelke (2002).  This was shown in a group of adults, as recognition of a scene was 
easier when two out of three objects were presented on the intrinsic-direction line (a 
mental representation of the layout of objects from an alternative orientation to the 
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participant’s viewing position) than when two out of three were presented along the 
participant’s original viewpoint line during the learning phase.   
It is now well understood, therefore, that in typical adults different spatial 
reference frames may function in parallel (Iglói et al., 2009; Nadel & Hardt, 2004).  
Although there remains some debate regarding the specific nature of spatial frames of 
reference used by adults during navigation, the superseding conclusion from the 
majority of leading models is that adults have the ability to develop both a basic body-
centred mental representation of space that is dependent on one’s viewpoint, and that of 
a more complex mental representation that integrates the interrelationships within a 
particular environment.  The existence of these different processes have been supported 
not only through experimental tasks, but also by functional brain imaging techniques, 
which have identified associations between activity in different brain regions during 
tasks that elicit the use of these different spatial frames of reference, and will be 
discussed further in 1.4.  
 Research into whether children and adults perform similarly on such spatial 
tasks however, is minimal.  Understanding the specific way in which the use of spatial 
frames of reference develop throughout infancy and early childhood may have 
important implications for determining the processes by which children interpret and 
solve both small- and large-scale spatial tasks.   
As discussed in 1.2.1, according to the views of Piaget & Inhelder (1967), in 
early cognitive development children are bound by body-centred egocentric coding 
systems, with a later shift to external, allocentric reference systems.  This shift with age 
has been supported in a number of developmental studies (e.g. Acredolo, 1978).  
However, this matter has been contentious within the literature and a number of authors 
have argued that different spatial frames of reference may undergo more complex 
developmental trajectories (e.g. Nardini et al., 2006).  In contrast to the idea of a later 
developmental shift to the use of allocentric representations, during small-scale tasks, 
infants as young as 4 months old have been shown to use external, object-centred 
frames of reference to code the location of an object (Bremner, Bryant, & Mareschal, 
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2006).  Between the ages of 12-16 months, infants become even more able to integrate 
metric information in their spatial coding (Acredolo, Adams, & Goodwyn, 1984; 
Newcombe, Huttenlocher, Drummey, & Wiley, 1998).  This may be indicative of a 
developmental increase in the ability to apply more appropriate spatial frames of 
reference to encode spatial information in different tasks. 
On small-scale tasks, children have been found to be flexible in their coding of 
spatial locations from a young age (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000; Uttal, Sandstrom, 
& Newcombe, 2006), with children as young as 4 years able to use knowledge of either 
the relationship between two landmarks as the basis for spatial coding when locating a 
hidden object, or distance and direction information between an object and a single 
landmark.  In addition, by 4-5 years of age, children show signs of being able to switch 
from an egocentric to an allocentric frame of reference when required, demonstrated by 
their ability to use the order of landmarks in a model to determine the location of hidden 
objects (Kannass, Plumert, McDermott, Moore, & Durich, 2004).  Therefore, instead of 
a decisive shift from simple egocentric to more complex allocentric representations 
through early development, it may be that the nature of spatial coding changes, with 
allocentric coding being more successfully and appropriately applied to guide 
navigation with increasing age.  Thus, with development, children may acquire even 
greater flexibility in applying the appropriate spatial-coding strategy (Uttal et al., 2006). 
Nardini and colleagues (2006; 2009) have provided important insight into the 
development of spatial frames of reference.  Using an array of cups on a moveable 
board that were surrounded by toys with fixed locations for use as potential landmarks, 
Nardini et al. (2006) tested children aged 3-6 years on their ability to recall the location 
of an object placed under one of the cups in a number of different rotation conditions.  
Spatial frames of reference that were available to support performance were 
manipulated on the basis of either a rotation of the array, or a movement of the 
participant to a new viewpoint (including control conditions of a rotation of ‘both’ or 
‘neither’).  Findings showed that children between 3 and 6 years were able to use an 
egocentric representation to solve the ‘neither-move’ (neither the array nor the 
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participant moves) and ‘both-move’ conditions.   The use of a room or environmental 
frame of reference was also evident by 3 years of age, with an advantage for ‘child-
move’ over ‘array-move’ conditions, thus suggesting that children at this young age are 
not as purely egocentric as originally proposed by Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967).  
When both body- and room-based frames of reference were available, this resulted in an 
additive effect meaning that they were able to utilise the information from both.  
However, the ability to recall locations when only the array was moved (viewpoint-
independent), and thus requiring the use of spatial relations intrinsic to the array, 
showed a more protracted course of development, with this ability not emerging until 5 
years of age.  
This later emergence of ‘viewpoint-independent’ processing in spatial memory 
has been supported further (Nardini et al., 2009).  Here however, 5 year olds were only 
able to employ viewpoint-independent recall when details about self-movement or 
indirect visual cues were presented. This provides support for the hypothesis that there 
may be a developmental change from a reliance on the use of viewpoint-dependent to 
viewpoint-independent representations, with greater flexibility in the use of the latter 
between the ages of 6 and 8 years.  The study showed that a process for recalling the 
location of a hidden object that will be based on the structural information of the layout 
develops later than a process that uses view-matching and self-motion. 
Despite these findings on small-scale tasks, little is understood about the use and 
significance of different frames of reference during navigation in large-scale space 
(McNamara, Rump, & Werner, 2003), and certainly throughout development.  In 
response to this, Bullens and colleagues (Bullens, Iglói, Berthoz, Postma, & Rondi-Reig, 
2010) examined the ontogenetic development of the spontaneous use of sequential 
egocentric and allocentric strategies during navigation.  Using a virtual StarMaze task, 
the authors showed that, for the most part, children between 5 and 10 years 
spontaneously employed a sequential egocentric strategy, rather than an allocentric 
strategy, during the task when allowed to use a spontaneous strategy.  However, in a 
task where the use of an allocentric strategy was imposed, even the younger children 
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were able to perform well on the task.  Additionally, children showed a progressive use 
of a spontaneous allocentric strategy across the age range, with performance comparable 
to adults (Iglói et al., 2009) by 10 years of age.  This supports a differential pattern of 
spontaneous use of egocentric and allocentric strategies between the ages of 5 and 10 
years, with the ability to develop complex representations of an environment to guide 
navigation occurring from 10 years of age.  
 
1.3 The relationship between small- and large-scale spatial abilities 
1.3.1 Small-scale mental rotation and large-scale navigation in adults 
It is clear from the literature that there may be differences in the use of 
environmental features such as landmarks and spatial frames of reference both across 
development and between individuals.  However, the nature of the cognitive processes 
that underlie individual differences in navigational and way-finding abilities is not well 
understood.  A number of studies have shown that some adult navigators prefer to use 
global, allocentric representations of space, whereas others continue to use landmark-
based strategies even in highly familiar environments (Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001), and 
without significant detriment to way-finding (Passini, 1984).  Indeed, while some adult 
navigators rely on the use of response strategies to recall a known route, others prefer to 
use complex spatial-relational strategies that afford the use of novel short-cuts 
(Marchette, Bakker, & Shelton, 2011).  Moreover, others report the ability to flexibly 
shift between these strategies (Wolbers & Hegarty, 2010).   
Researchers have sought to understand whether these different preferences are 
related to differences in underlying spatial processing.  For example, studies in typical 
adults have identified a relationship between the type of spatial information that is 
encoded and performance on other spatial tasks such as the ability to mentally rotate 
geometric shapes, or to imagine one’s self moving through an environment (Palermo, 
Iaria, & Guariglia, 2008; Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001, 2006; Shelton & Gabrieli, 2004).  
In one study, Palermo and colleagues (2008) examined the relationship between mental 
rotation skills and how rapidly participants were able to develop a cognitive map of an 
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environment, and also how well they were able to use this representation in subsequent 
way-finding trials.  Findings showed that the ability to quickly develop an 
understanding of the spatial relationships between landmarks was positively correlated 
with the ability to perform simple mental rotations.  However, mental rotation abilities 
were not related to the ability to use an already developed cognitive map for the purpose 
of subsequent orientation.   
Other studies have shown that adults with poor mental rotation skills prefer to 
adopt a representation of space based on landmark or route information, whereas 
individuals with superior mental rotation abilities have a preference for more global 
relational representations (Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001, 2006).  In a study examining 
gender differences in navigation, mental rotation skills were found to be significantly 
correlated with way-finding but were not as necessary for way-finding in females as 
they were for males (Malinowski, 2001).  Malinowski and colleagues concluded that 
this may be due to a greater reliance on landmarks in females, whereas males tend to 
use more global, configurational strategies that would require mental rotation skills; a 
finding previously posited by Dabbs, Chang, Strong, and Milun (1998).   
Differential patterns of neural activity have been identified for route and 
configurational learning (Shelton & Gabrieli, 2002) and also for retrieval following 
route and configurational encoding (Mellet et al., 2000).  Shelton and Gabrieli (2004) 
examined the extent to which individual differences in mental rotation skills are related 
to the ability to form representations of survey or route information at the neural level.  
Their findings showed that mental rotation ability positively correlated with decreased 
activation during survey encoding in anterior cingulate, frontal, and parietal regions, but 
not with activation changes during route encoding.  This suggests that the processes 
associated with activation in these regions may be used more efficiently for survey 
learning in individuals with superior mental rotation ability.  As such, individuals with 
poorer mental rotation abilities may rely on additional or alternative and more 
inefficient processing for both route and survey encoding.  These findings provide 
interesting insight into how differential brain activation as a function of small-scale 
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spatial skills such as mental rotation may be associated with diverse information 
processing strategies.  
1.3.2 Small-scale spatial abilities and navigation in typical development 
In developmental research, it has remained a matter of debate whether small-
scale spatial abilities, such as mental rotation, correspond to or even predict abilities 
required for spatial navigation and orientation in large-scale space (Allen et al., 1996; 
Hegarty & Waller, 2005; Quaiser-Pohl, Lehmann, & Eid, 2004).  Notably, Quaiser-Pohl 
et al. (2004) examined the relationship between the ability to form large-scale spatial 
representations and small-scale spatial abilities in children aged 7-12 years.  By 
comparing standardized tests of spatial abilities such as Piaget’s ‘Water-Level task’ and 
the ‘Mental Rotations test’ with environmental navigation abilities and cognitive 
mapping skills, the authors did not find any substantial correlations.  This suggests that 
large-scale spatial knowledge may be independent from small-scale spatial abilities in 
children, indicating that a distinction should be made between these constructs.  For this 
reason, it may be inaccurate to assume that children who present with poor small-scale 
spatial skills would also be impaired in large-scale way-finding tasks, and vice-versa.  
However, this study did not examine the changes that may occur with age in the 
relationship between small and large-scale spatial skills.  It could be that an increased 
ability to use alternative spatial frames of reference with development and more mature 
navigational strategies may correspond more to small-scale spatial abilities. 
 Although other research has also found no relationship between small and 
large-scale spatial abilities, even in adults (Hegarty & Waller, 2005), this may be a 
reflection of the measures used in these studies and the specific spatial constructs 
examined in both the small- and large-scale tasks.  Using alternative measures, other 
authors have identified relationships between small- and large-scale spatial abilities 
(Bryant, 1982; Fenner, Heathcote, & Jerrams-Smith, 2000; Purser et al., 2012)  
Fenner et al. (2000) studied age-related changes in the cognitive underpinnings 
of way-finding behaviours; examining whether environmental knowledge was related to 
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visuospatial abilities (as measured by mental-rotation, visualisation, Corsi block, and 
paper-folding tasks) and verbal abilities (including verbal reasoning, comprehension, 
and knowledge), and whether this relationship was constant across development.  
Findings showed that children with high levels of visuospatial abilities performed better 
on way-finding tasks than children with poorer visuospatial skills.  However, this was 
only found for younger children aged 5-6 years, and not for children aged 9-10 years.  
In contrast, no effect of verbal ability in either age group was identified, indicating that 
verbal processing may not be imperative to successful way-finding.  Therefore, 
although visuospatial abilities may be important for way-finding at 5-6 years of age, 
there may be differences in the underlying cognitive processes that are important for 
spatial navigation abilities at different developmental time-points. 
Underlying cognitive processes associated with large-scale spatial abilities may 
therefore be diverse and shift according to task demands.  The following section 
discusses two types of mental transformation abilities that have been shown to relate to 
different aspects of large-scale spatial knowledge.  An examination of these different 
abilities will provide a basis on which to understand the different processes that may be 
related to diverse aspects of navigational ability both in adults and across development.  
1.3.3 Two types of small-scale mental transformation 
In the renowned work by Piaget and Inhelder (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967, 1971), a 
distinction was theorised between a child’s ability to mentally rotate an object or array 
to an alternative imagined position, and the ability to determine the perspective of an 
array of objects from an alternative imagined viewpoint.  A number of other authors 
have similarly identified a dissociation between object-based (or array-centred) and 
body-based (or ‘visual perspective-taking’) mental transformations (Hegarty & Waller, 
2004; Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973; Simons & Wang, 1998; Wraga, Creem, & Proffitt, 
1999; Zacks et al., 2000).  
These two types of imagined rotation differ in the coordinate spatial frames of 
reference that are mentally manipulated in order to obtain the final imagined perspective.  
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In object-based (OB) mental rotation, the imagined position of an object or array can be 
mentally rotated relative to either an environment- (centred on relationships between 
features within an environment) or an OB frame of reference (centred on the 
relationship between features within the rotating object), whilst one’s body-based 
(egocentric) frame of reference remains stable.  OB mental rotations therefore require 
the use of an allocentric spatial representation (an understanding of the constancy of the 
spatial relationships within in the array or object to be rotated).  This allows an 
individual to imagine what an object would look like at alternative orientations, without 
the need for actual or imagined self-movement.  In contrast, during visual perspective-
taking (VPT) tasks, an individual imagines their own body-based (egocentric) rotation 
or movement within or around an array or environment relative to a fixed allocentric 
frame of reference.  VPT transformations therefore involve spatial updating of the 
location of the self within a fixed environment.  This allows an individual to imagine 
what a scene would look like from an alternative viewpoint.   
Although performance on these two types of mental transformation are highly 
correlated (Hegarty & Waller, 2004), a measurable distinction between OB mental 
rotation and VPT is supported by neuroimaging data.  That is to say, in adults, OB and 
VPT tasks are associated with increased activity in two discrete yet overlapping neural 
systems (Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks, Ollinger, Sheridan, & Tversky, 2002; Zacks, Rypma, 
Gabrieli, Tversky, & Glover, 1999).  This suggests that these aspects of spatial 
cognition are dissociable both at the behavioural and neural level.  Research examining 
the neural bases of these abilities and the changing nature of OB mental rotation and 
VPT throughout development will be discussed in more detail in study 1 (see chapter 2). 
1.3.4 Object-based rotation, visual perspective-taking, and navigation 
Research into the relationship between mental transformation and navigational 
abilities has focused for the most part on OB mental rotation (Hegarty & Waller, 2005; 
Palermo et al., 2008).  However, little acknowledgement has been given to the role of 
VPT abilities as a function of large-scale spatial knowledge (Kozhevnikov, Motes, 
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Rasch, & Blajenkova, 2006).  Defining the differences between these types of mental 
transformation abilities in the way that they relate to different aspects of navigation may 
help to highlight the multifaceted nature of large-scale spatial cognition. 
With a measurable distinction between OB and VPT rotation evident in the 
literature, Kozhevnikov and colleagues (2006) sought to examine this further in relation 
to large-scale navigation abilities.  In this study, the authors compared performance in 
typical adults on a number of navigational tasks, including retracing routes, finding 
short-cuts, pointing to occluded locations, and drawing the route on a map, with small-
scale perspective-taking, array-rotation, and object-rotation tasks.  The results showed 
that, in typical adults, VPT ability uniquely predicted navigational task performance, 
which required participants to accurately encode the spatial relationships between 
objects with respect to their own body-based frame of reference.  For example, VPT 
was particularly related to the ability to determine a short-cut and the ability to update 
one’s location following a detour.  Perspective-taking ability was also correlated with 
the ability to accurately point to hidden locations from different places within a familiar 
environment. 
It is not clear from this whether this would be a robust pattern across 
development.  Children have difficulties in spontaneously applying an allocentric 
strategy in navigation until about 5-7 years of age (Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010).  It may 
be that this is related to a difficulty in the use of viewpoint-independent representations 
needed for mental transformation tasks at this age.  Therefore, children who have 
difficulties in VPT may also show poorer performance on tasks that entail determining 
novel short-cuts and pointing tasks that indicate the development of spatial-relational 
understanding.  This will be examined in chapter 4.  
1.4 Neural correlates of large-scale spatial knowledge 
An examination of the neural foundations of large-scale spatial knowledge 
provides an important basis on which to examine the development of different spatial 
cognitive processes and sub-processes (Chrastil, 2013) in both TD children and 
individuals with WS.  Research including neuroimaging, single-cell recordings and 
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lesion studies has identified a network of brain regions that subserve spatial information 
processing, including the hippocampus, parahippocampal region, entorhinal and 
retrosplenial cortices, the posterior cingulate, and precuneus (Burgess, 2008).  
Successful performance on large-scale spatial navigation tasks may therefore be 
dependent on the integrity of cortical structures such as the medial temporal lobe, which 
undergo a protracted course of development throughout childhood (Ghetti, DeMaster, 
Yonelinas, & Bunge, 2010; Gogtay et al., 2006).  Indeed, Overman, Pate, Moore, and 
Peuster (1996) argued that as spatial relational tasks are not performed accurately until 
the age of 7, this suggests that the medial temporal lobe and related cognitive abilities 
may not have developed fully until this point. 
From animal research, the discovery of place cells in the hippocampus (O'Keefe 
& Nadel, 1978), grid cells in the medial entorhinal cortex (Hafting, Fyhn, Molden, 
Moser, & Moser, 2005), and head direction cells in structures within the limbic network 
known as the Papez circuit (Taube, 1998) indicate the existence of an intrinsic neural 
network involved in allocentric navigation and the formation of survey representations 
of large-scale space (Jeffery & Burgess, 2006).  Specifically, studies of spatial 
processing in rats (R. G. M. Morris, Garrud, Rawlins, & O'Keefe, 1982; O'Keefe & 
Nadel, 1978) and humans (Maguire, Burgess, & O'Keefe, 1999; Pigott & Milner, 1993) 
have identified the hippocampus as playing a key role in large-scale navigation, and 
particularly allocentric processing (Burgess, Maguire, & O'Keefe, 2002; O'Keefe & 
Nadel, 1978).  In contrast to this, Eichenbaum and colleagues (Eichenbaum, 2000; 
Eichenbaum, Dudchenko, Wood, Shapiro, & Tanila, 1999) argued that the hippocampus 
may just be involved in general relational processing and not solely involved in spatial 
information.  However, neuroimaging data has shown that in adults, hippocampal 
activation is only driven by spatial relational processing and not by relational 
processing demands in other domains (Kumaran & Maguire, 2005). This provides 
support for the role of the hippocampus in the development of survey representations of 
large-scale space in humans.  
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Specific developmental differences in the formation of the hippocampus have 
been identified.  For instance, a reduction in the volume of the anterior hippocampus 
can be seen between the ages of 4 and 25 years, whilst the volume of the posterior 
hippocampus increases throughout this period (Gogtay et al., 2006).  This may have 
important implications across childhood for the development of spatial processing 
abilities that depend on these different hippocampal regions.  For instance, during the 
formation of survey knowledge, the anterior hippocampus plays a crucial role, whereas 
the posterior hippocampus is implicated in the retrieval and employment of these survey 
representations to be able to navigate within an environment (Iaria, Chen, Guariglia, 
Ptito, & Petrides, 2007).  Thus, later maturation of the posterior hippocampal cortex 
may be related to developmental differences in the ability to retrieve survey-type 
representations for use during navigation.  Iaria and colleagues (2007) also found that 
during the retrieval of a previously formed ‘cognitive map’, brain areas that were 
preferentially activated included the retrosplenial cortex, bilateral parahippocampal 
cortex and right posterior hippocampus, equally.  These cortical regions likewise 
undergo a protracted course of development (Ghetti et al., 2010).   Further to this, 
findings from a neuroimaging study with TD adolescents and adults suggests that the 
maturation of allocentric spatial coding is in line with age-related functional changes to 
a left-lateralised neural network that subserves verbal abilities (Pine et al., 2002).  This 
indicates that the development of other cognitive skills including language may also 
serve to facilitate the use of more complex spatial representations.  As mentioned earlier, 
Fenner et al. (2000) found that verbal ability was not related to navigational abilities in 
children below 10 years.  However, neuroimaging findings hint that this may not be the 
case for later in development. 
The parahippocampal region and retrosplenial cortex (located in cingulate cortex) 
have been shown to be distinct and yet complimentary in human navigation, and 
provide important inputs into neighbouring hippocampal and entorhinal cortices 
(Epstein, 2008).  In a review of the literature, Epstein (2008) argued that the 
parahippocampus is involved in the learning of the topographical information of a novel 
environment and the encoding of spatial information in a viewpoint-dependent frame of 
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reference.  Indeed, during navigation in a virtual maze where all landmarks and 
intersections were designed to look identical from any approach and so participants had 
to rely solely on egocentric representations, the parahippocampal cortex was 
preferentially activated (Weniger et al., 2010).  Weniger and colleagues (2010) also 
concluded that the parahippocampal cortex may be involved in the translation between 
egocentric and allocentric spatial memory in the construction of stable survey 
representations.  
As discussed in 1.2.3, adult spatial navigation is flexible and dynamic, with the 
capacity to switch between allocentric and egocentric representations depending on the 
task at hand (Iglói et al., 2009).  This ability to switch between using different spatial 
frames of reference may occur gradually throughout childhood in relation to the 
maturation of the hippocampus and associated areas.  The retrosplenial cortex has also 
been identified as having a role in updating an individual’s location and viewpoint used, 
by translating between the spatial frames of reference employed during a task (Byrne, 
Becker, & Burgess, 2007; Iaria et al., 2007).  For example, this area manages inputs 
from both egocentric and allocentric reference frames (Maguire, 2001), transforming 
information from an egocentric frame of reference supported by the parietal cortex, 
caudate and parahippocampal regions (Weniger, Ruhleder, Wolf, Lange, & Irle, 2009; 
Weniger et al., 2010), to an allocentric reference frame supported by the hippocampus 
(Burgess, Maguire, Spiers, & O'Keefe, 2001).  Chrastil (2013) argues that this 
transformation between egocentric and allocentric representations relates to an 
understanding of how certain locations fit within the context of the larger environment 
(i.e., knowledge of relative directions and distances of other locations), a cognitive sub-
process characteristic of both graph and survey knowledge (see 1.2.2.1 Table 1). 
The development of graph and survey representations of an environment when 
learning a new route from an egocentric perspective may therefore rely on the 
transformation of egocentric spatial information, into the use of an allocentric reference 
frame, dependent on these cortical regions.  Using a virtual-reality paradigm, Wolbers 
and Buchel (2005) found a distinct dissociation between the hippocampus and 
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retrosplenial cortex but with both areas suggested to be involved in reorientation.  The 
results showed that activity in the hippocampus was related to the amount of spatial 
relational information acquired, regardless of whether this occurred in an early or later 
stage of learning.  The retrosplenial cortex however, was employed throughout the 
learning phase, integrating egocentric spatial information and self-motion cues 
increasingly across learning sessions.  This parallels behavioural measures of increased 
survey knowledge with experience in an environment.  
The use of either an egocentric or allocentric strategy for navigation in a large-
scale environment is therefore supported by different patterns of cortical activation. 
Furthermore, using fMRI, Jordan et al. (2004) found preferential activation of the 
medial temporal areas, parahippocampus, hippocampus, and thalamus in individuals 
who used an allocentric strategy during navigation in a virtual environment, but not 
those using an egocentric strategy.  The authors concluded that this is implicative of a 
memory and attention processing network that is specifically involved in the encoding 
and retrieval of spatial-relational knowledge such as involved in graph and survey 
representations.  
Neuroimaging studies with adults have also given light to the neural processes 
involved in the encoding of spatial information and use of specific environmental 
information during navigation and way-finding.  In particular, research into the neural 
correlates of landmark use has provided important insight into large-scale spatial 
processing.  Such findings parallel behavioural data that suggests landmarks at decision 
points facilitate navigation along newly learned routes (Jansen-Osmann, 2002; Janzen & 
Weststeijn, 2007).  Using a virtual environment route-learning paradigm, fMRI results 
have shown preferential cortical activation in the parahippocampal place area (posterior 
parahippocampal gyrus) for landmarks at decision points compared to those at non-
decision points (Janzen & Weststeijn, 2007).  In addition, in a real-world experiment, 
this increased activation at decision-points was only found for areas of a route that were 
unfamiliar to participants prior to the study (Schinazi & Epstein, 2010).  Also, increased 
activation in the retrosplenial cortex during the processing of direction information was 
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found at these decision points; activation that was similarly more prominent along 
newly learned sections of a route (Schinazi & Epstein, 2010).  This cortical network 
may therefore be particularly involved in spatial learning in novel environments.   
The above findings indicate that, certainly in typical adults, neural correlates of 
route knowledge are dependent on factors such as familiarity of the environment.  
Indeed, successful adult navigators show preferential activation of the anterior right 
hippocampus when determining a novel route between known landmarks, but the head 
of the right caudate is preferentially activated when following a well-learned route 
(Hartley, Maguire, Spiers, & Burgess, 2003).  This is in agreement with findings of 
different neural representations for response learning and place learning in rats (Tolman, 
Ritchie, & Kalish, 1946).  The study by Hartley et al. (2003) also showed that whilst 
following a well-learned route, navigators activate a neural network that is separate 
from medial temporal lobe structures, supported instead by the parietal cortex and 
caudate.  This indicates that once a route is well rehearsed, an action-based 
representation of the environment is typically used, reducing the cognitive load.  This is 
seemingly in contrast with a stage-like process of navigational learning (Siegel & White, 
1975), which emphasises that egocentric associative-based learning occurs before route 
and survey learning.  This instead demonstrated that the acquisition of some aspects of 
spatial knowledge may occur at similar time-points during learning.   
As mentioned previously, in a review of the neuroimaging studies into human 
spatial navigation, Chrastil (2013) suggests that the neural correlates of spatial memory 
do not neatly align with each main category of landmark, route, graph or survey 
knowledge.  Instead, the data suggest that more distinct mappings may exist between 
neural activity and the underlying cognitive processes and sub-processes involved (as 
outlined in Chrastil’s 2013 taxonomy presented in 1.2.2.1 Table 1).  In summary, the 
author underlines that in typical adults, the learning of scenes and views (a cognitive 
process that is involved in each main category of spatial knowledge) is supported by the 
parahippocampal place area (e.g., Maguire, Frackowiak, & Frith, 1997).  However, 
when a navigator places landmarks within the context of the larger environment, as seen 
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in graph and survey knowledge, this is likely supported by retrosplenial (e.g., Epstein & 
Higgins, 2007) and hippocampal (e.g., Burwell, Saddoris, Bucci, & Wiig, 2004; Doeller, 
King, & Burgess, 2008) activity.  The hippocampus is further implicated in spatial 
sequential learning (e.g., Maguire et al., 1997), which is an element of both route and 
graph knowledge.  Furthermore, parietal brain regions and the caudate are associated 
with habitual response-learning (Hartley et al., 2003) and egocentric spatial 
representations (Galati et al., 2000; Shelton & Gabrieli, 2002, 2004).  Allocentric and 
metric representations for survey knowledge on the other hand involve entorhinal 
(Spiers & Maguire, 2007) and hippocampal (Morgan, Macevoy, Aguirre, & Epstein, 
2011) regions.  As such, each category of spatial knowledge that can be defined 
distinctively at the behavioural level is likely to involve a number of different brain 
regions, depending on the task at hand.  Likewise, individual cortical regions may be 
involved in multiple aspects of spatial knowledge.  These findings have important 
implications for research examining the acquisition of large-scale spatial knowledge 
both in TD children and individuals with WS.  In particular, behavioural measures of 
large-scale navigational abilities should take into account the possible neural correlates 
of learning, consolidation and retrieval, with respect to the dynamic process of typical 
brain development and the possible cascading effects of atypical cortical maturation.  
 
1.5 Williams syndrome 
1.5.1 WS genotype and phenotype 
Williams syndrome (WS) is a relatively rare autosomal dominant disorder 
arising from a submicroscopic deletion on the long arm of chromosome 7, at locus 
7q11.23 (Frangiskakis et al., 1996; Osborne, 2012); a hemizygotic deletion involving 
approximately 27-28 genes (Koehler, Pabst, Pober, & Kozel, 2014; Schubert, 2009).  
This typically results in a deletion spanning some 1.55 to 1.84 megabases of genomic 
DNA (Antonell et al., 2010; Bayés, Magano, Rivera, Flores, & Pérez Jurado, 2003; 
Pober, 2010; Schubert, 2009; Tassabehji et al., 1999) (see 6.1 for further details).  
Differing prevalence rates of WS have been reported, although it is understood to be 
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estimated as occurring between one in every 7,500 (Strømme, Bjømstad, & Ramstad, 
2002) and 20,000 (C. A. Morris & Mervis, 1999) live births. WS is sometimes also 
referred to as Williams-Beuren syndrome; however, the term WS will be used hereafter 
throughout this thesis. 
The distinctive WS phenotype typically comprises vascular stenosis, connective-
tissue abnormalities, and a characteristic craniofacial dysmorphology that includes a 
flattening of the nasal bridge, broadening of the nose and anteverted nostrils, long 
philtrum, wide mouth with full lips, small jaw, and a prominent supraorbital ridge 
(Donnai & Karmiloff-Smith, 2000; Ferrero et al., 2007; C.A. Morris, 2011; C.A. Morris, 
Demsey, Leonard, Dilts, & Blackburn, 1988).  Individuals with WS are also often 
reported to experience hyperacusis (over-sensitivity to certain frequencies), and 
phonophobia (fear of loud or sudden noises) (Gothelf, Farber, Raveh, Apter, & Attias, 
2006; Johnson, Comeau, & Clarke, 2001).  Infantile hypercalcemia, related to 
significantly high levels of blood calcium, is also common in WS (Kruse, Pankau, 
Gosch, & Wohlfahrt, 1992).  Other medical complications include abnormalities of the 
musculoskeletal, renal and endocrine systems (C.A. Morris et al., 1988), dental 
problems (malocclusion), and joint impediments (Kaplan, Kirschner, Watters, & Costa, 
1989).  These characteristics are indicative that WS is a progressive and multi-system 
disorder.  In addition to the physiological characteristics, at the behavioural level, 
individuals with WS present with a hypersociable disposition (Arnold, Yule, & Martin, 
1985), social and emotional atypicalities (Davies, Udwin, & Howlin, 1998) and mild to 
moderate learning disability (Howlin et al., 2010).  
Diagnosis of WS is based on phenotypical information and confirmed by genetic 
testing.  Early identification of WS can initially follow the detection of cardiac 
abnormalities (predominantly in the form of supravalvar aortic stenosis [SVAS], in 
around 75% of cases (Bruno, Rossi, Thüer, Córdoba, & Alday, 2003)), or of the atypical 
WS facial physiognomy (Preus, 1984).  Genetic diagnosis is then confirmed by a 
fluorescence in-situ hybridization (FISH) test for the deletion of the elastin gene (ELN) 
from the middle of the WS critical region at 7q11.23 (Curran et al., 1993; Ewart, Jin, 
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Atkinson, Morris, & Keating, 1994).  ELN has been found to play a critical role in the 
regulation of arterial morphogenesis (Li et al., 1998) and the deletion of one ELN allele 
can be detected in 96 percent of patients presenting with WS (Lowery et al., 1995).  
Other DNA-based diagnostic techniques are also available, such as array-comparative 
genomic hybridisation, although the FISH test is most commonly used. 
WS is associated with a distinctively uneven cognitive, behavioural and 
neuroanatomical profile, characterised by relative strengths and weaknesses within and 
across different cognitive domains (Bellugi et al., 2000; Bellugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 
1994; Martens, Wilson, & Reutens, 2008).  Individuals with this disorder therefore 
provide important insight into human cognition.  In relation to the uneven profile, WS is 
typically associated with profound impairments in visuospatial, numerical and planning 
abilities contrasting with relatively good verbal abilities, face processing skills, and 
elevated levels of sociability (e.g. J. Atkinson et al., 2001; Bellugi et al., 2000; Bellugi 
et al., 1994).  Even within a single cognitive domain seemingly divergent abilities can 
appear.  For instance, impairments that have been identified in auditory long-term 
memory are seen to occur alongside relative good auditory short-term memory abilities 
(Vicari, Brizzolara, Carlesimo, Pezzini, & Volterra, 1996).  
Most commonly reported in WS is a dissociation between verbal and non-verbal 
abilities, with poor visuospatial cognition occurring alongside relatively proficient 
linguistic processing (Arnold et al., 1985; Bellugi et al., 1994; Rossen, Bihrle, Klima, 
Bellugi, & Jones, 1996).  However, it is important to note that linguistic abilities in WS 
are not ‘intact’, but emerge only as a relative strength (Karmiloff-Smith, Brown, Grice, 
& Paterson, 2003; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1997).  Indeed, children with WS often 
present with a neuropsychological profile of strengths and weaknesses even within the 
language domain, with stark contrasts found between aspects of comprehension and 
production (Pezzini, Vicari, Volterra, Milani, & Ossella, 1999).  It has been suggested 
that the often-cited distinction between verbal and spatial abilities may be due to a non-
linear development of different cognitive functions in WS, with verbal abilities 
developing at a faster rate than non-verbal abilities (Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1998).  
 49 
This would therefore result in a more distinct contrast between these abilities with 
increasing maturation.  Furthermore, language abilities in WS may be considered 
atypical due to development occurring under differential constraints to that in typically 
developing individuals (Thomas et al., 2001).  In their study, Thomas and colleagues 
found that children with WS showed a greater reliance on phonological representations 
and relatively poor use of semantics in early development, which is likely to result in an 
atypical developmental trajectory. 
Given the known genetic origin in WS, research into the disorder has provided 
important insight into genotype-phenotype interactions and the nature of gene 
expression.  This is particularly so in relation to the way in which certain genes are 
expressed in the brain.  Recent research developments using animal knockout models 
and the examination of individuals with atypical or partial deletions within the WS 
critical region have provided some insight into the contribution of individual genes from 
the 7q11.23 locus to the complex WS phenotypic profile (e.g. X. Meng et al., 1998; 
Osborne, 2010).  Currently however, only the ELN gene has been linked explicitly with 
a particular phenotypic expression in WS, namely the presence of SVAS (Osborne, 
2012; Pober, 2010).  Other clear one-to-one genetic and phenotypic correlations remain 
elusive.  That said, hemizygosity (where only one of a gene pair is present) for genes at 
the telomeric end of the WS critical region such as GTF2IRD1 and GTF2I, and CLIP2, 
may greatly contribute to the presentation of a number of the characteristic WS features 
(Vandeweyer, Van der Aa, Reyniers, & Kooy, 2012).  For instance, GTF2IRD1 has 
been proposed to play a significant role in the syndrome-specific craniofacial features 
(Tassabehji et al., 2005), and GTF2I in the associated intellectual disability in WS (C.A. 
Morris et al., 2003).  Given also that these general transcription factors (GTFs) regulate 
the expression of other genes, their deletion is likely to be particularly significant in 
phenotypic expression across development. 
An in-depth phenotyping of the visuospatial domain in individuals with differing 
partial WS genetic deletions may provide further insight into the genotypic relations to 
the WS visuospatial cognitive profile.  The contribution of differential gene expression 
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to the visuospatial cognitive phenotype in WS is discussed further in study 5 (see 
chapter 6). 
1.5.2 Small-scale visuospatial cognition in WS 
Difficulties in WS on small-scale (table-top) visuospatial tasks are well 
documented in the literature (e.g., Bellugi, Sabo, & Vaid, 1988; Hoffman, Landau, & 
Pagani, 2003).  Largely, visuospatial impairments have been demonstrated with the use 
of standardised construction tasks such as the Block Design (e.g., Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children; Wechsler, 1949) or Pattern Construction (Differential Ability Scales; 
Elliott, 1990), which require an individual to reconstruct two-dimensional designs using 
three-dimensional blocks with solid-coloured or two-coloured (diagonally or vertically 
divided) surfaces.  These are used as proxies for everyday visuospatial construction 
involved in undertakings such as tying shoe laces, laying a table, or assembling flat-
pack furniture.  Individuals with WS are found to perform at or below the bottom of the 
typical range on such tasks (Mervis, Robinson, & Pani, 1999), in line with TD 4 year-
olds (J. Atkinson et al., 2001). 
A number of explanations as to the possible cognitive processes or aberrant 
functions underlying poor visuospatial construction performance have been put forward.  
Findings suggest that these difficulties do not result solely from early sensory visual 
impairments such as strabismus or poor visual acuity (J. Atkinson et al., 2001), or from 
motor difficulties (Bellugi et al., 2000), although these are commonly reported in WS.  
Early explanations of visuospatial impairments pointed to a preference in WS to process 
‘local’ elements at the expense of processing ‘global’ information (Bellugi et al., 1994).  
However, more recent research has consistently indicated that local and global 
perceptual processing in WS are similarly impaired (Deruelle, Rondan, Mancini, & 
Livet, 2006; Farran & Jarrold, 2003; Hoffman et al., 2003; Pani, Mervis, & Robinson, 
1999).  Moreover, differential processing biases in WS have been shown to arise from 
the type of processing demands of the task, with a local processing bias evident in 
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drawing tasks, but with no bias of processing in perceptual and identification tasks 
(Farran, Jarrold, & Gathercole, 2003).  
The pattern of visuospatial deficits in WS has been partly attributed to 
impairments identified in dorsal stream structure and function; the dorsal stream deficit 
hypothesis (J. Atkinson et al., 2001; J. Atkinson et al., 2003; J. Atkinson et al., 1997).  
In typical adults the dorsal cortical visual system is involved in processing and encoding 
the spatial location of objects and visually guided actions (Felleman & Van Essen, 
1991), in contrast to the ventral visual stream that supports perceptual object recognition 
(Goodale & Milner, 1992).  Although this cortical vulnerability is not unique to WS, 
poor performance on measures of dorsal stream functioning in comparison to relatively 
good performance on ventral stream measures has provided important insight into the 
possible underlying neural basis of such contrasting difficulties in WS (J. Atkinson et al., 
1997).   
Findings from neuroanatomical research such as reduced volumes of grey matter 
in an area of the superior temporal lobe in WS (Eckert et al., 2005) and reduced sulcal 
depth in parietal regions (Kippenhan et al., 2005) further advocates a dorsal stream 
dysfunction in WS.  In addition, abnormalities of the intraparietal sulcus have been 
implicated (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004); although, these findings suggest that this 
may only lead to a selective impairment in dorsal stream functions, resulting in a lesser 
impact on other dorsal stream processes (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004; Meyer-
Lindenberg, Mervis, & Berman, 2006).  Similarly on behavioural tasks, Stinton, Farran, 
and Courbois (2008) found that atypical dorsal stream processing is fractionated in WS, 
with some processes less affected than others.  As stated above, a dorsal-stream 
dysfunction is not specific to WS and has been implicated in other disorders (J. 
Atkinson & Braddick, 2011; Braddick, Atkinson, & Wattam-Bell, 2003).  As such, the 
dorsal stream deficit hypothesis may not wholly explain the idiosyncratic pattern of 
visuospatial impairments in this disorder.  A more detailed examination of the specific 
cognitive difficulties typically expressed in WS, and how this relates to known 
underlying deficits in cortical functioning is therefore required.  
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Difficulties in mental imagery have been implicated as one factor underlying 
poor performance on visuospatial tasks in WS (Farran, Jarrold, & Gathercole, 2001).  
Using the Children’s Embedded Figures Test and a Squares Task, Farran and colleagues 
found that individuals with WS processed local and global perceptual information in a 
manner comparable to that of typically developing (TD) individuals.  A difference 
between the groups, however, was shown on a mental rotation task, with the WS group 
demonstrating significantly poorer mental image transformation abilities than the TD 
group.  Farran and Jarrold (2004) concluded that such difficulties may be related to a 
deficit in the perceptual processing of orientation.  Their findings indicated that 
individuals with WS do not necessarily have difficulties with all types of image 
transformation, as performance on a transformation of size task - which does not 
include the demands of orientation - was found to be comparable to that of a non-verbal 
mental age-matched TD group.   
In support of Farran and colleagues, Vicari, Bellucci, and Carlesimo (2006) 
found that, although no difference was evident between individuals with WS and TD 
controls on tasks requiring the mental visualisation of objects, the WS group scored 
significantly below the TD group on tasks that required spatial manipulation and 
rotation of the images.  Moreover, in contrast to performance in TD children (Courbois, 
2000; Courbois, Oross, & Clerc, 2007), such difficulties in mental rotation in WS were 
not found to be remediated through the addition of a salient component in the stimuli 
(Stinton et al., 2008).  Thus, even when stimuli include conspicuous cues such as 
including one section larger than another, this may not lead to greater accuracy in 
individuals in WS, suggestive of divergent spatial processing abilities in this group.  Of 
note however, it may be that a dorsal stream impairment in WS contributes to mental 
rotation difficulties, given the relationship between dorsal steam functioning and mental 
transformation in typical adults (Podzebenko, Egan, & Watson, 2002). 
Research examining atypical processing that may underlie some of the spatial 
difficulties in WS has more recently examined the use of spatial reference systems on 
small-scale tasks.  For example, Nardini and colleagues (2008) examined the 
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development of spatial frames of reference in WS on a spatial array task used 
previously with TD children (Nardini et al., 2006).  It was found that children with WS 
showed delayed development of spatial coding compared to controls.  Similar to TD 
children, older individuals with WS (aged 26-42 years) showed the additive effect of 
using both body- and environment-based frames of reference when both were available.  
However, the results highlighted that individuals with WS had more difficulties in using 
local landmarks in array-based representations (when asked to relocate a hidden object 
following a rotation of the array), an ability that occurs by 5 years of age in TD children 
(Nardini et al., 2006).  The authors suggested that a difficulty in using the intrinsic 
relationships between landmarks appropriately may account at least in part for the 
spatial deficits associated with WS.  Such difficulties in the use of landmarks and spatial 
frames of reference in WS on small-scale tasks may also provide relevant insight into 
the difficulties in large-scale navigation and the development of functional mental 
representations of spatial layouts in WS. 
1.5.3 Large-scale visuospatial cognition in WS 
Despite the profusion of research that has enhanced our understanding of small-
scale visuospatial difficulties in WS, there is a relative scarcity of research into large-
scale spatial abilities in this group.  Difficulties in small-scale spatial cognition in WS 
are considered to extend to particular problems in spatial navigation based on parental 
reports of problems with way-finding (J. Atkinson et al., 2001; Farran, Blades, Boucher, 
& Tranter, 2010).  Given the specific difficulties on table-top spatial tasks, it is 
conceivable that individuals with WS would also display difficulties on large-scale tasks, 
particularly those requiring the use of similar spatial strategies and frames of reference 
as used in small-scale tasks such as mental rotation tasks.  Indeed, as mentioned above, 
mental transformation abilities and the use of different spatial frames of reference on 
small-scale tasks are related to large-scale spatial navigation and way-finding abilities in 
TD children (Fenner et al., 2000) and adults (Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  
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Real-world route learning studies have been used to examine some aspects of 
large-scale spatial cognition in WS.  In one study, Farran et al. (2010) compared 
individuals with WS to a group with moderate learning difficulties (MLD) and TD 
children.  The data showed that although the WS and MLD groups were able to learn a 
sequence of landmarks in a novel environment and accurately retrace their route, they 
had difficulties developing a survey representation of space, which requires an 
understanding of the environmental spatial relationships.  It is not clear, however, 
whether difficulties in spatial knowledge were due to poor cognitive abilities alone, or 
whether individuals with WS display syndrome-specific deficits on some large-scale 
navigation tasks.  Moreover, it is uncertain whether the lack of survey knowledge in 
these groups was due, at least in part, to the limited experience within the environment. 
This may be important given that in typical development, environmental familiarity can 
facilitate learning of spatial relationships and the subsequent development of survey 
knowledge (Anooshian & Nelson, 1987).  In a more recent comparison of a WS group 
and TD children aged 6-9 years in a virtual environment, Farran, Courbois, Van 
Herwegen, and Blades (2012) found that individuals with WS made significantly more 
errors learning a route than TD children. On a test of landmark recall following learning, 
the WS group showed a similar differentiation between junction and path landmarks as 
TD children (with superior recall of junction landmarks), but this was positively related 
to the level of nonverbal ability.  This is indicative of an atypical developmental 
pathway in WS.   
As suggested above, large-scale spatial difficulties in WS may be related to 
impaired mental transformation abilities (Stinton et al., 2008) and difficulties in 
developing a viewpoint-independent representation of space (Nardini et al., 2008).  
Whilst the ability to use an egocentric representation of space would allow accurate 
route learning to occur, this would not lead to the development of a viewpoint-
independent, survey representation of one’s environment, which requires allocentric 
spatial coding.   
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Neuroimaging studies with individuals with WS have consistently identified 
atypical structure and functioning of the parietal lobe regions (Eckert et al., 2005; 
Kippenhan et al., 2005; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004).  Abnormal structure and 
functioning of the hippocampal formation has also been found in WS (Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2005).  Given the role of these regions in the use of egocentric (e.g., 
Shelton & Gabrieli, 2002, 2004) and allocentric mental representations (e.g., Iglói, 
Doeller, Berthoz, Rondi-Reig, & Burgess, 2010; Morgan et al., 2011), respectively, it 
can be inferred that individuals with this disorder would have difficulties on tasks that 
require the use of these spatial frames of reference and depend on the integrity of these 
regions. 
The abovementioned behavioural studies alongside neuroimaging data provide 
insight into the specific large-scale visuospatial difficulties that may arise in individuals 
with WS.  A main strand of enquiry in this thesis will therefore be to further examine 
the specific difficulties in large-scale spatial processing in this group, particularly the 
extent to which navigational abilities are related to different mental transformation skills 
and the use of different spatial frames of reference. 
1.6 The use of virtual environments to examine spatial navigation 
Research into large-scale spatial abilities has previously relied on the 
examination of navigation in real-world environments.  However, more recently the use 
of virtual environments (VEs) have provided a positive alternative, allowing for 
controlled manipulation of an environment and permitting the navigator to traverse 
layouts multiple times, without fatigue or real-world distractions (Richardson, Montello, 
& Hegarty, 1999).  This is particularly important given the known physical difficulties 
associated with WS, such as cardiovascular disease and joint limitations. Similarly, 
elevated levels of anxiety in WS (Dykens, 2003) may impede real-world navigation 
(Hund & Minarik, 2006), a difficulty that could be alleviated somewhat in VEs that 
serve to eliminate environmental hazards and reduce unsolicited sounds and distractions.  
When navigating through a VE compared to a real one, behavioural performance 
is largely equivalent (Mellet et al., 2010), and similar cognitive mechanisms underlie 
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learning to orientate (Richardson et al., 1999).  Others have found that survey 
knowledge acquired from VE navigation is comparable to that acquired in the real 
world (Regian & Yadrick, 1994; Ruddle, Payne, & Jones, 1997).  However, despite 
showing substantial shared neural activation, some differences are seen in neural 
activity for VE versus real-world learning (Mellet et al., 2010).  This has been attributed 
to the cortical activity associated with finger and hand movements required to navigate 
VEs (Mellet et al., 2010).   
Some limitations of VEs however include that of a restricted field of vision, 
such that peripheral information is mostly imperceptible.  This is particularly so for 
desktop VEs compared to more immersive head-mounted VE displays.  Moreover, VE 
navigation does not allow for the acquisition of head-direction or proprioceptive 
information, which provide important feedback during the development of survey 
knowledge and path integration in particular (Ekstrom, 2010; Maguire et al., 1999).  
VEs also only support the use of the visual modality, making it difficult to account for 
multisensory interactions during navigation (Péruch & Gaunet, 1998).  Despite this, 
studies in typical development and individuals with physical disabilities show that 
information learnt from VEs can transfer successfully to real-world comparisons 
(Bailey & Witmer, 1994; Farrell et al., 2003; Foreman, Stanton, Wilson, & Duffy, 2003; 
Rose et al., 2000; Wallet, Sauzéon, Rodrigues, & NKaoua, 2009; Wilson, Foreman, & 
Tlauka, 1996).  For instance, individuals who have learned routes (Waller, Montello, 
Richardson, & Hegarty, 2002) or spatial relationships (Richardson et al., 1999) in a VE 
are not only able to apply the learnt knowledge in the VE itself, but more successfully 
follow equivalent routes and identify spatial relationships in the real-world.  The 
examination of whether strategies from training environmental learning in WS using 
VEs is transferable to real-world scenarios is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, 
this demonstrates that VEs can be taken as suitable equivalents to real-world tasks for 
the studies presented here, and provide a unique opportunity to study spatial abilities in 
WS following extended experience in an environment. 
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1.7 Conclusions and thesis directions 
In typical development, the acquisition of spatial knowledge in large-scale space 
has been a matter of debate for decades.  Research with typical adults has demonstrated 
that the formation of a mental representation of space that includes knowledge of 
landmarks, routes and spatial-relational properties may not result from a stage-like 
process as hypothesised by hierarchical theorists (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967; Siegel & 
White, 1975).  The findings from developmental studies however, have been conflicting 
and have often depended on the type of measures used and spatial processes examined.  
TD children may be more able to develop spatial relational knowledge earlier than the 
stage theories suggest, however research has indicated an important role of familiarity 
in an environment, the size of space and the changing role of landmarks for facilitating 
navigation throughout development.   
In typical adults, a positive relationship has been shown between mental rotation 
and navigation abilities, especially in the use of survey representations of an 
environment (Palermo et al., 2008; Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001).  Later development of 
mental rotation abilities in typically developing children (Childs & Polich, 1979; 
Marmor, 1975; Piaget & Inhelder, 1971) and the ability to appropriately apply a 
viewpoint-independent representation of one’s environment (Nardini et al., 2006; 
Nardini et al., 2009) may, therefore, be related to the changes in navigational abilities 
and particularly spatial-relational knowledge seen across childhood.  Similarly, 
difficulties in individuals with WS on mental rotation tasks (e.g., Vicari et al., 2006) and 
in the use of viewpoint-independent processing (Nardini et al., 2008) may contribute to 
the reported difficulties in navigation and the subsequent development of spatial-
relational knowledge in this group. 
At the cortical level, the ability to form holistic survey representations of one’s 
environment may rely on the integrity of the hippocampus and surrounding brain 
regions that are known to subserve spatial cognition and navigation (Burgess, 2008; 
Burgess et al., 2002).  Thus, the protracted maturation of these cortical areas in typical 
development may initiate an improved ability to spontaneously apply appropriate spatial 
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frames of reference in later childhood.  As such, in individuals with WS, atypical 
development of the hippocampal formation (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005) and of the 
dorsal stream pathway (J. Atkinson et al., 1997) may contribute greatly to the specific 
large-scale spatial difficulties evident in this group.  Although neuroplasticity in 
neurodevelopmental disorders should of course be considered, this underlines the 
possible neural correlates and low-level cognitive processes that are involved in the 
development of and difficulties in large-scale spatial cognition both in typically 
developing children and individuals with WS.  
The aim of this thesis is to further examine large-scale spatial learning in WS 
compared to TD children.  Within each experimental chapter, specific research 
questions and hypotheses will be presented for the corresponding study, the findings of 
which will be drawn together in the concluding chapter.  The ability to understand 
spatial relationships within an environment (necessary for proficient navigational 
abilities to develop), and the use of different spatial frames of reference in these groups 
will provide insight into the nature of large-scale spatial cognition in both typical and 
atypical development.  The use of both egocentric and allocentric spatial frames of 
reference in WS and how these are related to different aspects of spatial cognition will 
therefore be a main emphasis of this thesis.  An analysis of low-level cognitive abilities 
in WS such as mental transformation of the self and objects, and the relationship with 
performance on these tasks with large-scale navigational abilities may provide 
important insight into the specific spatial impairments in this group.  In addition to these 
studies, an examination of the candidate genes on the WS critical region of chromosome 
7 that are associated with different aspects of visuospatial ability in WS will be 
presented.  This will offer an insight into the relationships between the WS genotype 
and visuospatial cognitive phenotype, and also provide a more thorough examination of 
the nature of large-scale visuospatial abilities both in typical and atypical development.  
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Chapter 2 
Study 1: Small-scale mental rotation and visual perspective-taking in typical 
development and Williams syndrome 
2.1 Introduction 
Impaired large-scale visuospatial functioning in WS is often appraised as being 
an extension of small-scale spatial difficulties.  However, the extent to which variance 
in performance on small-scale tasks predicts large-scale spatial abilities is ambiguous.  
Moreover, little is known regarding whether tasks at different spatial scales share 
common underlying processes or neural correlates, particularly in individuals with 
atypical neurodevelopmental trajectories, and given the multifaceted nature of 
visuospatial cognition.  Indeed, even across typical development little is understood 
regarding the associations between different visuospatial functions.  In typical adults, 
the most robust associations between small and large-scale measures are between tasks 
that require imagined transformations of the position of objects or the self (e.g., Hegarty 
& Waller, 2005; Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  As a precursor to examining large-scale 
spatial difficulties in WS, therefore, the study presented in this chapter aimed to explore 
small-scale mental transformation abilities in individuals with WS and typically 
developing children between 5 and 10 years of age.       
 
2.1.1 Object-based (OB) vs. visual perspective-taking (VPT) abilities 
In the field of visuospatial cognition, a distinction can be made between 
performance on small-scale tasks that require object-based (OB) mental rotation and 
those requiring body-based (egocentric) visual perspective-taking (VPT) 
transformations (Hegarty & Waller, 2004; Zacks et al., 2000) (see 1.3.3). 
Assessments of OB mental rotation abilities typically requires participants to 
make same-different judgments between two images that are either identical or mirror-
images, one of which is rotated to different orientations (Shepard & Metzler, 1971).  
Results have shown that in adults, there is a linear increase in reaction time with 
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increased angular discrepancy between the two images (Shepard & Cooper, 1982; 
Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2002).  Thus, individuals take 
increasingly more time to mentally rotate images the further they are misaligned from 
an upright position in both clockwise and anti-clockwise directions.  In contrast, when 
adults are asked to perform imagined VPT transformations, this finding of a linear 
increase in response time with greater orientation is no longer observed (Amorim & 
Stucchi, 1997; Parsons, 1987; Wraga, Creem, & Proffitt, 2000; Zacks et al., 2000).  This 
indicates that adults may use a different cognitive strategy during VPT tasks to that 
employed in OB mental rotation, leading to better performance on these tasks.  It has 
been argued that this enhanced performance on VPT tasks in adults may be due to the 
ability to perform ‘blink transformations’ to immediately update ones location rather 
than through continuous transformation of the egocentric reference frame (Wraga et al., 
2000).  However, this is not seen to be the case for degrees of angular disparity greater 
than about 90° (Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Zacks & Michelon, 2005).  Others have 
noted that difficulties with OB rotation reflect the need to maintain the spatial 
relationships within the array, which may not be solely required during VPT tasks 
(Lambrey, Doeller, Berthoz, & Burgess, 2012).  Indeed, during VPT tasks, adults may 
have the additional potential of coding the static locations of array objects in relation to 
external landmarks whilst updating one’s egocentric reference frame, leading to 
enhanced performance compared to OB rotations (Burgess, Spiers, & Paleologou, 2004).    
 
2.1.2 Development of OB rotation and VPT abilities 
The emergence of mental rotation abilities across development has also been 
examined.  Piaget and Inhelder (1971) suggested that children develop the ability to 
solve VPT and OB mental rotation tasks at different ages, with the ability to perform 
OB tasks by 7-8 years and successful performance on VPT tasks developing later at 9-
10 years.  Piaget concluded that this difficulty in VPT tasks was partly a consequence of 
the child’s preponderance to respond ‘egocentrically’ (i.e., continuing to give an answer 
to a rotation task that is identical to that of their current position).  However, 
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performance on VPT tasks in children differs depending on the way in which such tasks 
are framed (for a review, see Newcombe & Frick, 2010).  For instance, Successful 
performance is observed earlier in development (around 4 years) if the child is asked to 
identify whether an individual who is standing at another location can see a given object, 
than if they are asked to state what a scene would look like from an alternative 
viewpoint (with success by 8-10 years of age) (Gzesh & Surber, 1985; Salatas & Flavell, 
1976).  Newcombe and Huttenlocher (1992) also found that 3 and 4 year-olds could 
succeed on VPT tasks when given questions that were related to identifying the 
locations of specific items from non-occupied perspectives, rather than asking 
participants to match alternative viewpoints from a range of pictures.  
Using a reaction time test, Marmor (1975) found that children as young as 5 
years are able to succeed on OB mental rotation tasks, and by 8 years are able to 
perform almost at an adult level.  In line with adult data (e.g., Shepard & Metzler, 1971; 
Zacks et al., 2002), reaction times were found to be slower for an increased angle of 
rotation for 5- and 8-year-olds.  Others have similarly indicated that children start to use 
OB mental rotation between 4 and 6 years (Estes, 1998; Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, 
Goldknopf, & Daly, 1990).  Together, these studies suggest that OB and VPT abilities 
emerge earlier than originally thought, with both becoming available from 
approximately four years of age. 
Roberts and Aman (1993) argued, however, that children below the age of 7 
years are not fully competent on VPT tasks.  That is, when determining left-right 
directions from non-occupied positions they tend to respond in line with, and ‘over-
extend’, their stationary egocentric left-right reference frames.  In children aged 7-8 
years, who were more able to correctly determine left-right directions from a non-
occupied position, a linear increase in reaction time was found with greater angularity 
between real and imagined viewpoints.  This is in contrast to typical adults, who do not 
demonstrate an angular discrepancy effect in VPT tasks (Wraga et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 
2000), and indicates that children may use a different technique, such as graduated 
imagined rotation of the self, whilst adults may be more able to use the relationships 
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between items in the array and external landmarks to support a more automatic updating 
of their body-based frame of reference (Wraga et al., 2000). 
Xistouri and Pitta-Pantazi (2006) also found a significant difference in the 
performance of children aged 9- and 12-years on a VPT task, demonstrating enhanced 
ability to rotate one’s egocentric frame of reference with increasing age.  Similarly, 
Epley and colleagues (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004) found that young children 
interpret VPT instructions egocentrically and have difficulty in rotating this frame of 
reference in order to complete these tasks. Interestingly however, they also found that 
adults initially interpret instructions egocentrically, but have a superior ability to adjust 
to using an appropriate strategy quickly and effectively.  Correspondingly, difficulties in 
inhibiting an egocentric response until later in development are likely related to 
protracted maturation of executive control (Diamond, 1990).  
 
2.1.3 Neurological distinction between OB rotations and VPT 
As mentioned in chapter 1, despite high correlations between performance on 
OB and VPT transformation tasks in adults (Hegarty & Waller, 2004), a measurable 
distinction between these transformation types has been demonstrated by neuroimaging 
data (e.g., Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998; Wraga, Shephard, Church, 
Inati, & Kosslyn, 2005; Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2002; Zacks et al., 1999).  For 
instance, Zacks, Vettel, and Michelon (2003) found that rotations of items in an array 
(OB) were associated with preferential activity in right interparietal sulcus and 
decreased activity in left temporo-parietal junction and superior temporal sulcus.  
Imagined rotations of the self (VPT), conversely, were associated with increased 
activation of left parieto-temporo-occipital junction and superior temporal sulcus.  More 
recently, when comparing a VPT with an OB task, Lambrey et al. (2012) found 
significantly greater activation of the parieto-occipital sulcus, including the retrosplenial 
cortex, and areas such as the left anterior hippocampus in VPT than OB rotation tasks.  
These areas are thought to be involved in transforming between egocentric to allocentric 
spatial representations (Vann, Aggleton, & Maguire, 2009), which may be important for 
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successful imagined self-rotations.  Thus, this region may be associated with an ability 
to update egocentric spatial locations (supported by the posterior parietal lobe) within 
an allocentric frame of reference (supported by hippocampal and medial temporal lobe 
structures) during VPT tasks (Lambrey et al., 2012). 
Neuroimaging research in WS has found a number of structural and functional 
abnormalities in cortical regions associated with visual-spatial processing.  In particular, 
impairment of the superior parietal lobule has been identified in WS (Eckert et al., 
2005), a region associated with OB rotation (e.g. Podzebenko et al., 2002).  Furthermore, 
atypical metabolism and function of the anterior hippocampus (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 
2005), and decreased parieto-occipital grey-matter concentration (Boddaert et al., 2006) 
have also been identified.  Given the role of these cortical regions in the spatial updating 
of one’s viewpoint following actual and imagined rotation (Burgess, 2008; Vann et al., 
2009), individuals with WS are likely to show poor performance on associated tasks.  
Therefore, although atypical dorsal stream functioning may go some way to explaining 
mental rotation difficulties in WS (J. Atkinson et al., 2003; Stinton et al., 2008), atypical 
processing and functioning of more widespread structures and their intercortical 
connectivity may further explain the specific pattern of spatial deficits observed in this 
disorder. 
 
2.1.4 OB and VPT abilities in WS 
To date, only a handful of studies of visuospatial abilities in WS have included 
tests of OB mental rotation (e.g., Farran et al., 2001; Vicari et al., 2006) (although see 
1.5.2 for a more detailed review of the literature).  Research into VPT abilities in WS 
and how performance across different spatial transformation tasks compares with that of 
TD individuals is also limited.  In one study, Farran et al. (2010) asked individuals with 
WS to state whether a picture of an animal placed between themselves and the examiner 
would appear the right-way-up or upside-down from the viewpoint of the examiner.  
Results yielded chance performance in the WS group, although questions only 
examined imagined self-rotation by 180°.   
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Detailed examination of performance on both OB and VPT tasks, which require 
imagined, rather than actual movement in WS, may provide further insight into the 
specific pattern of difficulties, and subsequently allow clearer conclusions to be drawn 
as to the nature of different aspects of visuospatial processing in this group.  The aim of 
this study was to therefore examine performance on OB and VPT tasks in individuals 
with WS compared to TD children between 5 and 10 years of age, and to examine 
changes in performance with increasing degrees of rotation across groups.  OB rotation 
tasks can either require an individual to imagine the rotation of a single object, or the 
rotation of an array of objects, and these are likely to rely on shared underlying 
mechanisms (Lambrey et al., 2012).  Similarly, VPT tasks can be separated into those 
that require the individual to imagine a displacement of the self to an unoccupied 
viewpoint around an array, or to imagine the rotation of the self within an array.  
Despite the overlapping underlying mechanisms involved in the two types of OB 
rotation and two VPT rotations, there may be different levels of difficulty and ranges in 
sensitivity across such tasks.  As such, this study used four separate rotation tasks (two 
OB and two VPT tasks) with the purpose of examining this range of abilities across 
each group.  
 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-eight typically developing (TD) children were recruited from three 
London primary schools.  Twenty-one participants with Williams Syndrome (WS) were 
recruited from the records of the Williams Syndrome Foundation, UK.  All WS 
participants had received a positive diagnosis of WS, based on a “fluorescence in-situ 
hybridisation” (FISH) test for deleted Elastin gene on chromosome 7, and phenotypic 
diagnosis by a clinician.  All TD participants were tested in a quiet room within their 
schools, whilst WS participants were tested either at their home or in a testing room at 
the Institute of Education, London.  Written informed consent was obtained from the 
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parents of all participants, and signed individual consent from participants with WS 
over 12 years of age. 
Due to difficulties in concentration, one TD 5 year-old and one WS participant 
were subsequently excluded from the analyses.  For analyses of performance across 
development, participants were separated into four TD age-groups; 5 years (N=16, 8 
males, Mean age (years; months) = 5;06, SD= 0;04, CA range = 5;01 – 6;01), 6 years 
(N=17, 11 males, Mage= 6;08, SD= 0;03, CA range = 6;02 – 7;05), 8 years (N=18, 10 
males, Mage= 8;03, SD= 0;05, CA range = 7;07 – 8;09), and 10 years (N=16, 9 males, 
Mage= 10;01, SD= 0;03, CA range = 9;06 – 10;09) and compared to the WS group 
(N=20, 10 males, Mage= 24;04, SD=10;06, CA range = 13;01 – 46;01).  Verbal and non-
verbal abilities were assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale-III (BPVS-III; 
Dunn, Dunn, Styles, & Sewell, 2009) and the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices 
(RCPM; Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003), respectively. 
 
2.2.2 Visual perspective-taking (VPT) Path  
The VPT path task was conducted to examine body-based rotation abilities.  In 
this task, participants were sat in front of a 2D map-like route presented on an A4 piece 
of paper on a table in front of them (2.2.2.1 Figure 1).  Participants were asked to 
imagine walking the route from start to finish.  Along the route were 20 decision points, 
with 10 left turns, and 10 right turns.  The route consisted of 5 turns at no imagined 
rotation (0°), 10 turns in which the participant must imagine themselves at 90° from 
their actual vantage point, and 5 turns at 180° (imagining looking directly behind their 
actual view).  At each turn the participant stated whether they would turn their body to 
the left or the right to continue down the path.  Given that young children and some 
individuals with WS have difficulties distinguishing their left from right sides (Landau 
& Hoffman, 2005), each participant was given a sticker on one hand (randomised left 
and right across participants) so that instead of declaring a left or right turn, they stated 
whether they would turn to their ‘sticker’ or ‘no-sticker’ side.  This was similar to a 
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method used by Newcombe and Huttenlocher (1992) with TD 3 and 4 year olds, which 
significantly improved performance on such tasks.  
 
2.2.2.1 Figure 1. Visual perspective-taking (VPT) path task 
 
2.2.3 Object-based (OB) monkey mental rotation  
The OB monkey task was used to examine the ability to mentally rotate a single 
image, based on the classic mental rotation paradigms used by Shepard and Metzler 
(1971) and Marmor (1975).  Participants were asked to view two cartoon monkeys 
above a horizontal line and one monkey below the line at varying degrees of rotation 
from upright (see 2.2.3.1 Figure 2).  Stimuli were presented on a 14” laptop computer 
screen.  Participants were asked to choose which of the two monkeys on the top 
matched the one underneath.  The monkeys all had one red hand pointing upwards 
above a tail, and one blue hand pointing downwards.  The incorrect monkey was always 
a mirror-image of the correct monkey so that verbal coding could not be used to solve 
the task (e.g., red hand is next to the tail).  Participants indicated their response by 
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pressing either the designated left button (covering keys ‘A, S, D, Z, and X’) or right 
button (covering keys ‘J, K, L, M and ,’) on the keyboard in front of them. 
The monkey task consisted of six practice trials (to indicate whether the 
participant understood the task) and 32 experimental trials (4 x 0° trials, 8 x 45° trials, 8 
x 90° trials, 8 x 135° trials, and 4 x 180° trials).  The 0° condition was used to indicate 
whether the participant understood the instructions and was able to correctly visually 
match the two correct monkeys. The test positions of the target monkey were 45°, 90°, 
135° and 180° clockwise rotations and -45°, -90°, -135° anticlockwise rotations.  For 
counterbalancing, half of the trials included a target monkey with the red hand to the 
right, and half with the target as the mirror image (red hand to the left).  Participant 
reaction times and number of correct trials for each degree of rotation from 0° were 
recorded. 
 
 
2.2.3.1 Figure 2. Object-based (OB) monkey mental rotation task: a) 0º control 
condition, b) 135º clockwise rotation condition 
 
2.2.4 Visual perspective-taking (VPT) circle  
The design of the VPT circle task was based on Newcombe and Huttenlocher 
(1992) and used to examine the ability to imagine the self rotating around an array.  In 
contrast to Newcombe and Huttenlocher (1992), a circular board was used instead of a 
square board to present the array of objects. This controlled for the use of a frame of 
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reference based on aligning the four sides of the board with the walls of the room or 
edges of the table (Kelly & McNamara, 2010; Shelton & McNamara, 2001).  
Participants were positioned in front of one of two white 13” circular arrays (A 
or B, see 2.2.4.1 Figure 3) of four 3D coloured clay objects.  Array A) contained a pig, a 
tree, a house, and a football.  Array B) contained a snail, a car, a traffic cone and a shoe.  
Participants were first asked to name each object to demonstrate that they knew the 
correct word for each and that each object was equally recognisable. 
Throughout the task, the participant was asked to imagine looking at the array 
from different viewpoints and asked a series of questions about the position of the 
different objects from the imagined perspectives.  For each imagined rotation condition, 
participants were asked “imagine you are standing here and looking this way (a red 
arrow was placed on the table to indicate imagined direction of gaze), which object is a) 
closest to you, b) furthest away from you, c) to your left and d) to your right.  Questions 
were presented in blocks for each rotation, but the order of questions varied randomly 
for each trial. 
All participants were tested on both arrays (A and B, separately) to measure 
mental rotation abilities at a variety of imagined displacements (45°, 90°, 135° and 180°, 
collapsed across clockwise and anti-clockwise rotations).  Two different arrays of 
objects were used as opposed to one array so that all orientations could be measured 
without introducing a high cognitive load of having too many objects on one array.  
Array A therefore allowed for imagined self-rotations of 90° and 180°, and Array B, for 
rotations of 45° and 135°.  The order of presentation of the two arrays (A or B first) was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
The test consisted of 32 trials (16 trials for each array): four 0° (control), eight 
90° rotation trials, four 180° rotation trials, eight 45° rotation trials and eight 135° 
rotation trials.  Therefore, this differed from the task used by Newcombe and 
Huttenlocher (1992) by including a greater number of angles of rotation, allowing for an 
analysis of the changes in the number of errors with increased rotation from 0°.  In 
addition, in the same way as in the VPT path task, one hand of each child was marked 
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with a sticker in order that they did not have to use the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’, which 
could have introduced a confound.  Instead, participants referred to their ‘sticker side’ 
and ‘no-sticker side’. 
 
 
2.2.4.1 Figure 3. Visual perspective-taking (VPT) circle task: A) for imagined rotations 
of 90° (standing in front of the tree or football), 180° (in front of the pig), or 0° control 
condition (in front of the house); B) for imagined rotations of 45° (in front of the shoe 
or traffic cone) and 135° (in front of the car or snail). 
 
2.2.5 Object-based circle 
Participants were positioned in front of an array (A or B, see 2.2.5.1 Figure 4) of 
four coloured shapes.  Participants were shown a central red arrow pointing towards one 
of the shapes in the array (e.g. a blue moon).  The participant was asked to imagine that 
the whole array was turned until the red arrow was pointing upwards and the object it 
was pointing to (e.g. the blue moon) was pointing at the top.  They were then asked to 
indicate in turn (using array C, see 2.2.5.1 Figure 4) where the other three objects would 
have moved to, given this rotation.  For example, the participant was asked “If I were to 
turn the circle of shapes around so that the red arrow is now pointing upwards and the 
blue moon is at the top, can you point the blue arrow to show me where the yellow 
square has moved to?”  Participants then moved the blue arrow on the blank circular 
board (C) to the required position.  
Across the two arrays (A and B), participants could be tested on the same 
degrees of mental rotation as in the VPT circle (45°, 90°, 135°, and 180°, collapsed 
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across clockwise and anti-clockwise rotations).  This test consisted of 24 trials: three at 
0° (control), six at 45° rotations, six 90° rotation trials, six 135° rotations, and three 
180° rotation trials.  The 0° control condition was used to determine whether the 
participant understood the instructions (e.g. that the blue arrow on the blank circle must 
point towards the position of the target object within array, despite the absence of the 
shapes).  A pilot study with six TD 5 year-olds showed that it was important to first 
demonstrate an actual rotation of the board so that the participant could grasp the 
concept of the whole array rotating.  This was done by briefly rotating array A to 45° 
clockwise and then anticlockwise whilst the experimenter said, “Look at what happens 
when I turn the circle, all the shapes move around”.  This small degree of rotation was 
chosen so that participants could not use their memory for the final location of shapes 
on experimental trials for this array.  
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2.2.5.1 Figure 4. Object-based (OB) circle task: A) imagined rotations of 90 (red arrow to green square or yellow moon) and 180 (red arrow to red 
triangle), B) imagined rotations of 45° (red arrow to blue moon or pink heart) and 135° (red arrow to yellow square or green circle); C) answer circle 
where participants move only the blue arrow to indicate where the other objects would move to following imagined rotations. 
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2.2.6 Order of task presentation 
All participants completed the BPVS-III and RCPM before any mental rotation 
measures.  Participants then received either the VPT path task or OB monkey task 
(counterbalanced across participants), followed by the two circle tasks.  The OB circle 
task was always conducted before the VPT circle as participants who are given a 
perspective-taking task first, have been found to make fewer errors on subsequent 
object-based tasks of similar content, but not vice-versa (Pellizzer, Bâ, Zanello, & 
Merlo, 2009).  All tasks were completed on the same day, with breaks given where 
necessary.  Total testing time was approximately 45 minutes.  However, when shorter 
testing sessions were required, two sessions were used (session 1: BPVS-III, RCPM; 
session 2: rotation tasks) spaced less than one month apart (Mean = 16.28 days [SD = 
16.99]). 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 BPVS-III and RCPM 
BPVS-III and RCPM data for WS and TD groups were normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05).  Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted 
separately for BPVS and RCPM scores, each with group (5 levels; 5y, 6y, 8y, 10y, and 
WS) as a between-subjects factor (see 2.3.1.1 Table 2).  This demonstrated an uneven 
cognitive profile in WS, characteristic of the disorder (Jarrold et al., 1998), with 
nonverbal abilities at a level no different from TD 5 and 6 year-olds and relatively 
higher verbal abilities at the level of TD 8 and 10 year-olds. 
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2.3.1.1 Table 2. Mean (SD) participant scores on BPVS-III and RCPM. 
 Group ANOVA Post-hoca 
 WS       
(N=20) 
5 years  
(N=16) 
6 years 
(N=17) 
8 years  
(N=18) 
10 years 
(N=16) 
F (df) p  
B
PV
S 
ra
w
b  
123.50 
(22.09) 
81.69 
(15.86) 
91.47 
(13.53) 
112.67 
(15.37) 
130.81 
(15.18) 
25.53 
(4, 86)   
< .001 5 = 6 <  8, 10, WS 
8 < 10 
WS = 8 and 10 
B
PV
S 
st
an
dc
 
- 
 
 
100.94 
(10.98) 
95.06 
(10.92) 
102.78 
(14.57) 
97.44 
(12.92) 
1.32 
(3, 66) 
.275 - 
R
C
PM
d  
18.05 
(4.56) 
19.62 
(4.50) 
23.65 
(4.99) 
28.12 
(4.89) 
30.38 
(3.12) 
24.29 
(2, 85) 
< .001 5 = 6 < 8 = 10 
WS < 6, 8, 10 
a Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests, ‘=’ refers to no significant difference at .05 level, and ‘<’ 
denotes p < .01; b BPVS-III: British Picture Vocabulary Scale-III raw scores, cBPVS-III 
standardised scores; c RCPM: Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) raw scores 
 
2.3.2 Visual perspective-taking (VPT) path 
Given the different number of trials across each degree of rotation within the 
VPT path task (5 rotations at 0°, 10 rotations at 90° and 5 rotations at 180°), total 
correct responses for each rotation were converted to percentage scores for analysis 
across groups.  For Mean percentage correct for each rotation across groups, see 2.3.2.1 
Figure 5a. 
Data were non-normally distributed for half of the variables in the TD and WS 
groups (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p< .05).  However, given the similar group sizes, lack of 
outliers in the data and that ANOVA can be robust to violations of normality 
assumptions, the results of parametric tests are reported.  Non-parametric equivalents of 
the following analyses were also conducted, with comparable results. 
 74 
To examine whether the performance in each group differed from chance (50%) 
on VPT path rotation trials, one-sample t-tests were conducted on the data.  On 90° 
trials, all groups except 5 year-olds scored significantly above chance: 6 years, t(15) = 
7.00, p< .001; 8 years, t(16) = 8.75, p< .001; 10 years, t(15) = 8.137, p< .001; WS, t(18) 
= 4.62, p< .001), and on 180° trials the 5 year-olds, t(13) = -5.591, p< .001, and WS 
groups, t(18) = -3.54, p= .002, scored significantly below chance, indicating the 
consistent use of a disadvantageous strategy at this angle of rotation in these two groups.  
Ten year-olds were the only group to score significantly above chance on 180° trials, 
t(15) = 2.45, p= .027.  Given this pattern of some groups performing above and others 
below chance, data were analysed further to examine group differences. 
A mixed ANOVA, with group as a between-participant factor (5 levels: 5y, 6y, 
8y, 10y, and WS) and rotation as within-participant factor (3 levels: 0°, 90°, and 180°) 
was conducted on the data.  Assumptions of sphericity were violated (Maulchley’s, 
p< .05); therefore Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests are reported (ɛ = .68).  There was 
a significant main effect of group, F(1, 77) = 10.60, p< .001, partial η2 = .36, with 
Tukey post-hoc tests showing that the WS group scored below 8 and 10 year-olds 
(p= .010 and p< .001, respectively), and 5 year-olds scored below 6, 8 and 10 year-olds 
(p= .033, p= .001 and p< .001, respectively).   A significant main effect of rotation was 
also found, reported as a linear contrast, F (1, 77) = 216.19, p< .001, partial η2 = .74, 
with Tukey-corrected pairwise comparisons revealing significant differences between 
all degrees of rotation (p< .001 for all). 
There was also a significant group by rotation interaction, F (8, 154) = 3.74, 
p= .003, partial η2 = .16.  To further examine the effect of rotation in each group, 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted (see 2.3.2.2 Table 3), showing least 
detriment with degree of rotation in TD 10 year-olds.  To examine differences between 
rotation trials across groups, one-way ANOVAs were conducted.  There was a 
significant difference across groups at 90°, F (4, 81) = 9.47, p< .001, and 180° rotations, 
F (4, 81) = 6.37, p< .001, with Tukey post-hoc tests revealing at 90°, 5 and WS scored 
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significantly below 8 and 10 year-olds (p< .05), and at 180°, 5 and WS scored 
significantly below 10 years (p< .05). 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Figure 5. Mean (SE) percentage correct at each degree of rotation across TD 
and WS groups on each mental transformation task, a) VPT path, b) OB monkey task, 
c) VPT circle task, d) OB circle task 
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2.3.2.2 Table 3. Statistical analyses of effect of rotation in each group on VPT path task 
 F df  p Partial η2  Post-hoca 
WS 87.27 (1,18) <.001 .83 0°>90°>180° 
5 years 114.18 (1,13) <.001 .89 0°>90°>180° 
6 years 43.36 (1,15) <.001 .74 0°>90°>180° 
8 years 28.89 (1,16) <.001 .64 0°>90°>180° 
10 years 7.98 (1,15) <.001 .35 0°>180° 
aLSD pairwise comparisons, ‘>’ denotes ‘significantly greater percentage correct’, at .05 level. 
 
2.3.3 OB monkey mental rotation 
2.3.3.1 Percentage correct. 
To examine differences across groups on number of correct responses in the 
monkey mental rotation task for each degree of rotation from upright, data were 
collapsed across equivalent clockwise and anti-clockwise degrees of rotation (e.g. 
collapsed all 45° and -45° rotation trials).  As the total number of trials differed for each 
degree of rotation (4 x 0° trials, 8 x 45° trials, 8 x 90° trials, 8 x 135° trials, and 4 x 180° 
trials), the Mean percentage of correct responses for each rotation was calculated.  
Following difficulties in completing the task correctly, one TD 6 year-old and one TD 8 
year-old was excluded from the analyses.   
For percentage of correct responses for each group across increasing degree of 
rotation, data met assumptions for normality for all variables in the WS group 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05), but not for the TD groups (p< .001).  However, given 
the similar group sizes, lack of outliers in the data and that ANOVA can be robust to 
violations of normality assumptions parametric analyses are reported.  Non-parametric 
equivalents for main effects of the following analyses were also conducted, with 
comparable results.  For percentage of correct scores for each degree of rotation in each 
group, see 2.3.2.1 Figure 5b. 
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To examine whether performance in each group differed from chance (50%), 
one-sample t-tests were conducted.  Results yielded significant above-chance 
performance in each TD group for 45° trials: 5 years, t(15)= 3.65, p=.002; 6 years, 
t(15)= 5.71, p< .001; 8 years, t(16)= 17.59, p< .001; and 10 years, t(15)= 14.35, 
p< .001, and 90° trials: 5 years, t(15)= 3.94, p=.001; 6 years, t(15)= 4.77, p< .001; 8 
years, t(16)= 19.79, p< .001; and 10 years, t(15)= 15.18, p< .001.  However, only 8 and 
10 year-old TD children performed significantly above chance on 135° trials, t(16)= 
9.41, p<.001 and t(15)= 9.93, p< .001, respectively; and 180° trials, t(16)= 3.78, 
p= .002 and t(15)= 7.06, p< .001, respectively.  In contrast to VPT path results, the WS 
group did not score significantly differently from chance on any rotation trials (p> .013 
for all), despite performing reliably above chance on 0° control trials, t(19) = 3.04, 
p= .007; demonstrating an ability to understand the task. 
A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted with a between-participant factor of 
group (5 levels: 5y, 6y, 8y, 10y, and WS) and within-participant factor of rotation (5 
levels: 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180°).  Assumptions of sphericity were violated 
(Mauchley’s, p< .05), therefore Huynh-Feldt corrected tests are reported (ɛ = .82).  
Results showed a significant main effect of group, F(4, 80) = 14.60, p< .001, partial η2 
= .42, with post-hoc Tukey tests showing that the WS group scored significantly below 
all TD groups (p< .01 for all).  In addition, 5 and 6 year-olds scored below 10 year-olds 
(p= .015 and p= .023, respectively), and no differences were found between any other 
TD groups (p> .05 for all). 
There was also a significant main effect of rotation, F(4, 320) = 19.92, p< .001, 
partial η2 = .19.  Post-hoc tests showed a greater percentage correct at 0° compared to 
45°, 135° and 180° (p< .01 for all).  A greater percentage correct was also found for 45° 
trials compared to 135° and 180° (p< .01 for both), and for 90° compared to 135° and 
180° (p< .01 for both).  No other significant differences were found (p> .05). 
A significant group by rotation interaction was also found, F(16, 320) = 2.49, 
p= .002, partial η2 = .11.  To examine this pattern further, repeated measures ANOVAs 
for the effect of rotation were conducted for each group separately (see 2.3.3.1.1 Table 
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4), showing an effect of rotation in the younger TD and the WS groups only, although 
significant differences between levels of rotation did not remain following pairwise 
comparisons in the WS group.  
One-way ANOVAs found a significant difference across groups at each degree 
of rotation (p= .001, for all).  Post-hoc tests found that on 0° trials WS group scored 
below all groups (p< .05); on 45° trials WS scored below 6, 8 and 10 year-olds (p< .05); 
on 90° trials WS group scored below all TD groups (p< .05); on 135° trials 5 and 6 
year-olds scored below 10 year-olds (p< .05), and WS were below 8 and 10 year-olds 
(p< .05); and on 180° trials 5 and 6 year-olds scored below 10 year-olds, and WS were 
below 8 and 10 years (p< .05 for all).  
 
2.3.3.1.1 Table 4. Statistical analyses of effect of rotation in each group on OB monkey 
task 
 F df  p Partial η2  Post-hoca 
WS 11.75 (1,19) =.003 .38 0°> 135° and 180°; 90° > 
135° 
5 years 50.68 (1,15) <.001 .77 0°> all; 45°> 135° and 180°; 
90°> 180° 
6 years 16.41 (1, 15) =.001 .52 0° and 45°> 135° and 180°; 
90° > 135° > 180° 
8 years 1.56 (1, 16) =.230 .09 - 
10 years .46 (1, 15) =.510 .03 - 
aLSD pairwise comparisons, ‘>’ denotes ‘significantly greater percentage correct’, at .05 level. 
 
2.3.3.2 Reaction times (RT). 
For Mean RT for each degree of rotation across groups, see 2.3.3.2.1 Figure 6.  
Data were normally distributed for four out of five variables in both TD and WS groups 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov; p> .05).  Therefore parametric analyses were performed on the 
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data.  A mixed ANOVA, with group as a between-participant factor  (5 levels: 5y, 6y, 
8y, 10y, and WS) and degree of rotation as a within-participant factor  (5 levels: 0°, 45°, 
90°, 135°, and 180°) was conducted.  Assumptions of sphericity were violated 
(Maulchley’s, p< .05); therefore Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests are reported 
(ɛ= .74).  This showed a significant main effect of group, F (4, 76) = 6.59, p< .001, 
partial η2 = .26.  Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests found significantly slower RTs for WS 
compared to 8 and 10 year-olds (p= .003 and p< .001, respectively).  No significant 
differences in RT were found between any other groups (p> .05).  There was also a 
significant main effect of rotation, F (4, 304) = 11.90, p< .001, partial η2 = .14.  
Pairwise comparisons found faster RT for 0° compared to 90°, 135°, and 180° (p< .010 
for all); for 45° compared to 90°, 135°, and 180° (p< .05 for all); and for 90° compared 
to 180°.    
In contrast to the scores for percentage correct, there was no significant group by 
rotation interaction (F<1), suggesting that although the performance in the WS and 
youngest two TD groups declined with increasing degrees of rotation, the same groups 
did not necessarily respond proportionally more slowly with increased rotation. 
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2.3.3.2.1 Figure 6. Mean (SE) reaction times for each degree of rotation on the object-
based (OB) monkey rotation task in each group 
 
2.3.4 Visual perspective-taking circle 
 2.3.4.1 Percentage correct. 
On control trials from own vantage point (no rotation), almost all participants 
performed perfectly, with only four participants making one error each (two 6 year-olds, 
one 10 year-old and one participant with WS).  One WS and one TD 5 year-old were 
unable to pass the control phase and were therefore not included in subsequent analyses.   
Correct responses could be divided into near-far trials (naming objects nearest 
and furthest, following imagined rotations) and left-right trials (naming objects to the 
left and right of the self, following imagined rotations).  To examine differences in 
performance on near-far compared to left-right trials, t-tests were conducted for WS and 
TD groups separately.  In both groups, participants showed significantly stronger 
performance on near-far than left-right trials; TD, (Mean near-far = 92.86%, Mean left-
 81 
right = 74.24%), t(65) = 5.527, p< .001; and WS, (Mean near-far = 59.77%, Mean left-
right = 33.45%), t(18) = 5.257, p< .001.  This could suggest that near-far trials are easier 
than left-right trials.  However, we suggest that responses on near-far trials could have 
been based on an alternative strategy that does not require mental rotation.  That is, 
participants might have made spatial judgements based on their understanding of 
distances between the target object and direction arrow, rather than using mental 
rotation.  To ensure that the data entered into analysis was a pure measure of mental 
rotation, all subsequent analyses on this task examined the effect of rotation on left-right 
trials only, as these could not be completed by an alternative strategy; these trials 
required the use of left-right body coordinates following imagined rotation of the self.   
Left-right trials were divided by degree of rotation (4 levels: 45°, 90°, 135° and 
180°), with data collapsed across equivalent clockwise and anti-clockwise degrees of 
rotation (e.g. imagined rotations -90° to the left and 90° to the right) for analysis.   For 
percentage correct on left-right trials across groups on the VPT circle task, see 2.3.2.1 
Figure 5c. 
Data showed that 8 and 10 year-olds scored highly across the task and were not 
affected by rotation, with ceiling performance on 0°, 45° and 90° trials.  In comparison, 
the 5 and 6 year-olds showed a decline in performance with increased rotation, and the 
WS group showed very poor performance on all rotation trials above 45°.   
To examine whether the performance in each group differed significantly from 
chance (25%), one-sample t-tests were conducted on the data.  Results indicate that, 
similar to performance on the OB monkey task, all TD groups scored significantly 
above chance on 45° trials: 5 years, t(14)= 4.84, p< .001; 6 years, t(16)= 7.49, p< .001; 
8 and 10 year-olds scored 100% correct.  The WS group also scored significantly above 
chance on 45° trials, t(18)= 5.11, p< .001.  On 90° trials, only 6, 8, and 10 year-olds 
scored significantly above chance: 6 years, t(16)= 4.92, p< .001; 8 years, t(17)= 18.22, 
p< .001; 10 year-olds scored 100% correct.  Only 8 and 10 year-old TD children 
performed significantly above chance on 135° trials: t(17)= 11.25, p<.001 and t(15)= 
7.889, p< .001, respectively, and 180° trials: t(17)= 5.23, p< .001 and t(15)= 4.47, 
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p< .001, respectively.  Scores in the WS group however, were not significantly different 
from chance for 90°, 135° or 180° trials (p> .013 for all). 
 The data did not meet assumptions for normality for any variables in TD or WS 
groups (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p< .01).  Therefore, data for each group were analysed 
using non-parametric tests.  Kruskal-Wallis test was carried out on percentage correct 
for left-right responses with a participant factor of group (5 levels: 5, 6, 8, 10 and WS) 
collapsed across all rotation trials and also for each degree of rotation separately. There 
was a significant difference across groups on percentage correct on all rotation trials 
(H(4) = 50.62, p< .001).  No significant difference was found across groups on 0° trials 
(H(4) = 4.00, p= .406), suggesting that all groups understood the task.  
Mann-Whitney post-hoc tests revealed that on 45° trials, the 5 and 6 year-olds 
and WS groups performed more poorly than the 8 and 10 year-old groups (p<.05 for 
all).  All other comparisons at 45° were not significant (p>.05).  On 90° trials, 5 year-
olds scored below 8 and 10 year-olds (p= .001), 6 years below 10 year-olds (p< .005), 
and WS below 6, 8 and 10 year-olds (p< .001 for all).  On 135° trials, 5 and 6 year-olds 
and WS groups performed significantly below 8 and 10 year-olds (p< .005 for all).  On 
180° trials, results demonstrated that 5 year-olds performed more poorly than 8 year-
olds (p< .005), and WS were reliably below 8 and 10 year-olds (p< .001). 
To examine the effect of rotation further, Friedman’s ANOVAs with a within-
participant factor of degree of rotation (5 levels: 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°) were 
conducted for all groups together, yielding a significant effect of degree of rotation, χ2(4) 
= 118.64, p< .001, due to fewer correct responses for increasing degrees of mental 
rotation.  Analyses for each group separately are displayed in 2.3.4.1.1 Table 5. 
 
 
 83 
 
2.3.4.1.1 Table 5. Statistical analyses of effect of rotation in each group on VPT circle 
task 
 χ2a df  p Post-hocb 
WS 48.21 4 <.001 0°> all  
5 years 24.82 4 <.001 0°>90°,135°,180°  
6 years 31.41 4 <.001 0°>90°>135°,180°; 45°>135°,180° 
8 years 11.40 4 =.022 NS 
10 years 14.57 4 =.006 NS 
aResults of non-parametric Friedman’s ANOVA; bWilcoxon pairwise comparisons. ‘NS’ 
denotes ‘no significant differences following pairwise comparisons (.01 significance level)’ 
 
2.3.4.2 Types of errors on VPT circle task. 
The different types of errors made on the VPT circle task were analysed to 
examine differences in strategies used and whether specific aspects of the tasks were 
more difficult for some groups.  Errors were separated into three categories, ‘egocentric’ 
(an answer from own vantage point), ‘reversal’ (switching left and right), and 
‘miscellaneous’ errors (all other errors).  Mean number of each error-type on left-right 
trials across groups were analysed (2.3.4.2.1 Figure 7).  Results from one-way 
ANOVAs showed a significant difference across groups on all types of error; 
‘egocentric’, F(4, 84) = 7.45, p< .001; ‘reversal’, F(4, 84) = 3.67, p= .009; and 
‘miscellaneous’, F(4, 84) = 10.02, p< .001.   
Further to this, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether there 
were differences across groups in the proportion of each error-type made (only in 
participants who made errors) (see 2.3.4.2.2 Table 6), showing that although the WS 
group were more likely to make egocentric and miscellaneous errors that 6-10 year-olds, 
they were less likely to make reversal errors than any TD groups. 
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2.3.4.2.1 Figure 7. Mean (SE) number of each type of error made on left-right trials on 
VPT circle task in each group. *significant difference between groups (p< .05), Tukey-
corrected. 
 
2.3.4.2.2 Table 6. Mean (SD) proportion of errors as each type on VPT circle across 
groups 
Group ANOVA  Post-hoca 
 
WS        5 yrs   6 yrs  8 yrs   10 yrs  F (df) p  
Eg
oc
en
tri
c 
42.1 
(28.2) 
21.2 
(31.1) 
16.1 
(32.5) 
0.0 0.0 4.63 (4, 58)  .003 WS > 6, 8 and 
10 
R
ev
er
sa
l 
31.2 
(28.2) 
66.1 
(40.9)  
78.4 
(36.8) 
100 100 9.79 (4, 58) < .001 WS < all TD 
groups 
M
is
c.
 26.7 
(24.1) 
12.7 
(26.3) 
5.6 
(7.0) 
0.0 0.0 4.30 (4, 58)  .004 WS > 6, 8 and 
10 
a Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests, ‘>’ denotes ‘significantly greater than’, at .05 level 
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2.3.5 Object-based circle 
2.3.5.1 Percentage correct. 
On control trials from own vantage point (no rotation), all participants 
performed faultlessly, except for one participant with WS who made one error.  This 
showed that all groups understood the task.   
Responses could be divided into far trials and left-right trials.  For consistency 
with the analysis performed on VPT circle task data, only responses to left-right trials 
were analysed.  For left-right transformation trials, participants were asked to point a 
blue arrow in the correct direction of a shape that was situated either to the left or right 
(-90° or +90°, respectively) of the shape that the red arrow was pointing to, e.g. when 
the red arrow pointed to the green square, only the responses to the position of the blue 
circle (left) and red triangle (right) were analysed (see 2.2.5.1 Figure 4a).  To examine 
the effect of rotation on correct responses, data were collapsed across equivalent 
clockwise and anti-clockwise degrees of rotation in the same way as for the VPT circle.  
For percentage correct across groups on the VPT circle task, see 2.3.2.1 Figure 5d. 
Data were normally distributed for OB circle variables in both TD and WS 
groups (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05) and so were analysed using parametric tests.  A 
mixed ANOVA with group as a between-participant factor (5 levels; 5, 6, 8, 10 and WS) 
and rotation as within-participant factor (5 levels: 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180°) was 
conducted.  There was a significant main effect of group, F(4, 79) = 14.92, p< .001, 
partial η2 = .43.  Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests found 5 year-old and WS groups scored 
significantly more poorly than 8 and 10 year-olds (p< .01 for all), and 6 year-olds 
scored below 10 year-olds (p= .001).  There were no other significant group differences 
(p> .05).   
There was also a significant main effect of rotation, reported as a linear contrast, 
F(1,79) = 137.24, p< .001, partial η2 = .64.  Pairwise comparisons found a significant 
difference between 0° (no rotation) and all other degrees of rotation (p< .001 for all).  
There were also significant differences between 45° and 135° rotations (p< .001), and 
90° and 135° rotations (p< .001).   
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A significant group by rotation interaction was also found, F(16, 316) = 3.17, 
p< .001, partial η2 = .14, demonstrating that, similar to the pattern observed for other 
rotation tasks, the effect of rotation differed across groups.  To further examine the 
effect of rotation in each group, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted (2.3.5.1.1 
Table 7).  Data showed that, in contrast to all TD groups, for whom no significant 
detriment to performance on 180° trials was found compared to other levels of rotation, 
a different pattern of performance was seen in WS. 
For each degree of rotation, one-way ANOVAs found a significant difference 
between groups for 90°, 135° and 180° rotations only (p< .001 for all), with post-hoc 
tests revealing for 90°, 5 < 10 years (p< .05) and WS< 6, 8 and 10 years (p< .05); for 
135°, 5 < 8 and 10 years (p< .05), 6 < 10 years (p< .05), and WS < 8 and 10 years 
(p< .05); and for 180° rotations, 5 and 6 < 10 (p< .05) and WS < 8 and 10 (p< .05).  
 
2.3.5.1.1 Table 7. Statistical analyses of effect of rotation in each group on OB circle 
task 
 F df  p Partial η2  Post-hoca 
WS 104.18 (1,16) <.001 .87 0°> all; 45°>135°,180° 
5 yrs 42.95 (1,14) <.001 .69 0°> all; 45°>135°, 90°>135°  
6 yrs 33.96 (1,16) <.001 .68 0°> all; 45°>135° 
8 yrs 12.06 (1,17) =.003 .42 0°> all 
10 yrs .48 (1,15) =.497 .03 - 
aLSD pairwise comparisons, ‘>’ denotes ‘significantly greater percentage correct’, at .05 level. 
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2.3.5.2 Types of errors on OB circle task. 
To examine errors on the OB circle task, errors were categorised into three 
distinct types, by the same method used in the VPT circle task.  Mean number of each 
type of error on left-right trials was calculated from the data and one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted to examine the differences in Mean number of each type of error across 
groups (see 2.3.5.2.1 Figure 8).  In line with the VPT circle, there was a significant 
difference in the number of each error type across groups: ‘egocentric’, F (4, 83) = 2.61, 
p= .042; ‘reversal’, F (4, 83) = 3.95, p= .006; and ‘miscellaneous’, F (4, 83) = 5.80, 
p< .001.   
In contrast to the differences in error types in the VPT circle, one-way ANOVAs 
conducted to examine differences across groups in the proportion of each error-type 
made found no significant difference across groups in the proportion of each error-type 
(2.3.5.2.2 Table 8).  This indicates that, unlike on the VPT circle, no group had a 
preponderance to make a specific type of error more than any other group on the OB 
circle task. 
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2.3.5.2.1 Figure 8. Mean (SE) number of each type of error made on left-right trials on 
OB circle task in each group. *significant difference between groups (p< .05), Tukey-
corrected: WS > 10 yrs (egocentric and misc.); 5 and 6 years > 10 yrs (reversal); 5 years 
> 8 and 10 yrs (misc.). 
 
2.3.5.2.2 Table 8. Mean (SD) proportion of errors as each type on OB circle task across 
groups 
 Group ANOVA 
 WS 5 years   6 years  8 years   10 years  F (df) p 
Egocentric 22.7 
(17.8) 
9.9 
(18.1) 
6.5 
(14.4) 
13.9 
(22.7) 
15.6 
(32.5) 
1.29 
(4, 73) 
 .284 
Reversal 33.0 
(16.3) 
39.2 
(28.7) 
59.5 
(34.8) 
52.3 
(38.5) 
40.9 
(42.2) 
1.64 
(4, 73) 
.174 
Miscellaneous 44.3 
(22.1) 
50.8 
(26.3) 
33.9 
(27.6) 
33.8 
(33.4) 
43.3 
(43.9) 
<1 .488 
 
 89 
2.3.6 Relationships between rotation tasks 
To examine the extent to which performance on the different transformation 
tasks were related in TD children and WS, particularly between the two VPT tasks and 
between the two OB tasks, correlations were conducted on the data.  a priori power 
analyses for correlations (α 0.05, effect size 0.50, 1-β at 0.8)  suggest a sample size of 
N= 21 per group.  Given the smaller group sizes in the TD groups, data were collapsed 
across age groups for correlational analyses.  Data were normally distributed for all 
variables in the WS group (Kolomogorov-Smirnov, p> .05 for all) and for two out of 
four variables in the TD group (collapsed across age groups).  However, for the purpose 
of comparability and interpretation of results, Pearsons r correlations were conducted 
both for TD and WS groups.  Participant data excluded from previous mental rotation 
analyses were not included in the correlations. 
In TD children, a significant positive relationship was found between percentage 
correct on the two VPT tasks (VPT path and VPT circle), r (62) = .44, p< .001, and a 
significant positive relationship between performance on the two OB tasks (monkey and 
OB circle), r (64) = .38, p= .002.  In addition, performance on the VPT circle and OB 
circle was positively correlated in the TD group, r (65) = .56, p< .001, although no 
significant association was found between the VPT path and OB monkey task, p> .05.  
In contrast, analyses from WS group data revealed that performance in this 
group was not consistent across rotation tasks, with no significant correlations between 
the two VPT tasks, r (19) = -.09, p= .686, or the two OB rotation tasks, r (19) = .42, 
p= .092; and no correlations between performances on any other mental rotation tasks 
(p> .05 for all).   
 
2.3.7 Relationships between age and mental transformation 
In the TD group (collapsed across groups), when controlling for BPVS scores, 
age was significantly correlated with performance on the VPT path, r (59) = .38, 
p= .002; VPT circle, r (59) = .32, p= .012; and OB circle, r (59) = .27, p= .038, but not 
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for the OB monkey task (p> .05).  When controlling for RCPM scores, age was only 
correlated with performance on the two VPT tasks; VPT path, r (58) = .37, p= .004; 
VPT circle, r (58) = .28, p= .030.   
In contrast to the pattern observed across TD children, in the WS group, 
performance on the OB monkey task was found to correlate significantly with 
chronological age, even when controlling for BPVS raw score, r (14) = .59, p= .016, 
and when controlling for RCPM, r (14) = .74, p= .001.  Thus, older individuals with 
WS performed at a higher level on this monkey rotation task than younger individuals, 
irrespective of performance on measures of verbal and non-verbal abilities.  No 
significant relationship was seen between chronological age and any of the other tasks 
in the WS group (p> .05 for all). 
 
2.3.8 Mental transformation and verbal and non-verbal abilities 
In the TD group (collapsed across groups), when controlling for age, all mental 
rotation tasks except VPT path, r (57) = .22, p = .093, were positively correlated with 
RCPM scores; OB monkey, r (57) = .37, p = .004; VPT circle, r (57) = .40, p= .002; 
OB circle, r (57) = .39, p = .002.  Also when controlling for age, results showed a 
significant relationship between BPVS raw score and OB monkey, r (57) = .29, p= .023. 
In the WS group, a significant positive correlation was found between 
performance on RCPM and OB circle task scores, r (17) = .69, p= .003, even when 
controlling for age, r (14) = .66, p= .006.  No other correlations were found between 
RCPM and rotation tasks for the WS group (p> .05 for all).   
Similar to TD groups, a significant positive correlation was found in the WS 
group between BPVS raw score and performance on the OB monkey task, r (19) = .59, 
p= .007, although this did not remain when controlling for chronological age r (16) 
= .38, p = .118.  No other correlations were found between BPVS and rotation tasks 
(p> .05 for all).   
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2.3.9. Effects of gender on mental transformation ability 
To examine whether there were gender differences in mental transformation 
ability in TD (collapsed across groups) and WS groups separately, mixed ANOVAs 
with between-participant factor of gender (2 levels: male, female) and within-participant 
factor of task (4 levels: VPT path, OB monkey, VPT circle, OB circle), were conducted. 
Results from the TD groups found no significant main effect of gender, F (1, 60) = .44, 
p= .51.  Similarly, no significant main effect of gender was found for WS groups across 
tasks, F (1, 15) = .85, p= .37.  
 
2.4 Discussion 
The study presented in this chapter examined object-based (OB) mental rotation 
and visual perspective-taking (VPT) abilities in individuals with WS compared to TD 
children aged 5-10 years.  Developmental changes were observed in both OB and VPT 
abilities across the TD age-ranges presented in this study, alongside severe impairments 
in mental transformation abilities in individuals with WS. 
 
2.4.1 Mental transformation abilities in typical development 
In line with previous studies (e.g., Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973; Newcombe & 
Huttenlocher, 1992; Xistouri & Pitta-Pantazi, 2006), the results indicate a significant 
improvement in both OB-rotation and VPT ability between the ages of 6 and 8 years in 
typical development, suggestive of similar developmental progression for both abilities.   
On one measure of OB mental rotation (OB monkey rotation), reaction time data 
yielded an effect of rotation across groups; however this was not indicative of a clear 
linear decline given that no significant differences were seen in rotations between 90° 
and 180°.  This is in contrast to the linear increase in reaction time with increased 
degree of rotation on OB mental rotation previously identified in adults (Shepard & 
Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Metzler, 1971) and children (Marmor, 1975); and may be a 
reflection of the sensitivity of the reaction-time measure used in the current study.  In 
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regards to percentage of correct responses however, performance was seen to decline 
with greater levels of imagined transformation in 5 and 6 year-olds.  This was not seen 
in 8 and10 year-olds, who showed near-ceiling performance on this task.    A similar 
pattern was observed in the OB circle task, with no effect of rotation seen above 45° in 
8 year-olds and no effect of rotation in 10 year-olds, due to consistently good 
performance across the task in older children.  These findings therefore provide a clear 
picture of changes in mental rotation performance with age in typical development.   
In contrast to OB mental rotation, a decline in performance with rotation on 
VPT tasks is often not reported in typical adults (e.g. Wraga et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 
2000).  However, such a decline has been identified in TD children (Roberts & Aman, 
1993).  Although Roberts and Aman (1993) examined reaction times, the present study 
demonstrates that a decline in performance with increased imagined rotation can also be 
observed in relation to accuracy on VPT tasks.  On the two VPT tasks, TD children 
under 8 years exhibited difficulties in determining left-right body coordinates (despite 
having eliminated any requirement to understand the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’) with 
increased misalignment from actual viewpoint.  In contrast, 10 year-olds (on the VPT 
path) and 8 and 10 year-olds (on VPT circle) showed no difference in accuracy between 
90° and 180° rotations, a pattern similar to that observed in typical adults.  This 
contributes to the literature in TD children, indicating that between 8 and 10 years of 
age, children may develop a more appropriate strategy for performing imagined 
transformations of the self to different locations, to be more in-line with strategies 
observed in typical adults (Wraga et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2000). 
 
2.4.2 Mental transformation abilities in Williams syndrome 
The results from the WS group data in this study were also in line with that of 
previous findings of poor mental rotation abilities in this group (Farran & Jarrold, 2004; 
Farran et al., 2001; Vicari et al., 2006).  In particular, when required to imagine the 
rotation of a single image (OB monkey rotation), despite demonstrating an 
understanding of the task on trials in the upright position, as a group, participants with 
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WS scored significantly below all TD groups, and performed at chance level on all 
degrees of rotation.  Given that performance in the WS group was significantly below 
all TD groups even on 0° trials, this suggests that difficulties in visual matching in WS 
may have contributed somewhat to these results.  However, an effect of rotation was 
still identified in the WS group, suggesting that, similar to the pattern observed in TD 5 
and 6 year-olds, some individuals with WS found the task increasingly more difficult 
with escalating degrees of rotation, i.e., they were able to use mental rotation. This is 
likely a reflection of higher levels of performance on this task with chronological age in 
WS participants, a finding discussed in more detail later.  Further to this, RT data 
demonstrated significantly slower response times in WS compared to TD 8 and 10 year-
olds, although this pattern may reflect slower motor abilities related to pressing the 
response buttons in WS rather than speed of mental rotation.  
This study also provided insight into VPT abilities in WS compared to TD 5-10 
year-olds.  Two VPT tasks were conducted to examine the ability to perform imagined 
movement of the self around a circular array and the ability to determine left-right body 
coordinates following imagined self-rotations to either 90° or 180° from actual 
viewpoint.  Participants with WS performed poorly on both VPT tasks, indicative of 
profound difficulties at all angles of imagined self-rotation, with performance at chance 
on rotations above 90° on the VPT circle task.  This is in line with previous research 
that indicated chance performance in WS when asked to imagine the perspective of 
another individual at 180° from own viewpoint (Farran et al., 2010).  The current results 
extend these findings, demonstrating difficulties in this group at even lesser degrees of 
imagined self-rotation.  On the VPT path task, scores in the WS group were not 
significantly different to that of TD 5 year-olds, albeit at a level above chance on trials 
requiring imagined rotation of the self by 90°.  One consideration is that it may have 
been possible to solve 90° trials by turning the head to look either to the left or right.  
This may explain above chance performance on these trials across groups.  This is 
supported by the results of the VPT circle task.  Here, given the extent of imagined self-
movement required for rotations greater than 45°, turning of the head may have only 
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supported performance on 45° trials. The results reflect this, with WS individuals 
scoring at chance level on trials 90° and above, and scoring below 6, 8, and 10 year-olds.   
At imagined self-rotations of 180° on the VPT path task, both TD 5 year-olds 
and participants with WS yielded scores significantly below chance, indicating that not 
only do young TD children and individuals with WS have profound difficulties in 
imagining turning the self by 180°, they demonstrated a similar preponderance to select 
an egocentric option (choosing the left or right that corresponded to their actual 
viewpoint).  Similarly, when asked to imagine the rotation of the self around an array of 
objects (VPT circle), performance in the WS group fell to chance level on trials that 
required imagined rotations greater than 45°, indicative of profound difficulties with 
such activities.     
 
2.4.3 Different patterns of performance in TD and WS groups 
The level of performance in individuals with WS both on OB and VPT tasks 
was in line with that of TD children of comparable non-verbal ability.  Although WS 
participants were no different from 8 and 10 year-olds on the test of verbal ability, they 
performed at the level of 5 and 6 year-olds on non-verbal cognition as measured by 
RCPM.  This pattern of poor non-verbal abilities in contrast with relatively good verbal 
skills is a typical finding for individuals with WS (Jarrold, Baddeley, Hewes, & Phillips, 
2001; Martens et al., 2008).  At first glance, performance on the transformation tasks in 
WS is therefore unsurprising, given that individuals with WS have often been found to 
perform at a similar level to TD children aged 4-6 years on a number of cognitive tasks 
including spatial (Nardini et al., 2008) and numerical abilities (Ansari, Donlan, & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2007).  However, in the current study, despite a similar level of 
performance in the WS group as 5 and 6 year-olds on most tasks, individuals with WS 
demonstrated an atypical pattern of performance. 
The observed pattern of performance in WS on OB and VPT tasks in this study 
may, therefore, reflect that of a divergent developmental trajectory rather than what 
could be simply accounted for by developmental delay.  This was reflected in part by 
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the types of errors made on the VPT circle task compared to TD groups.  On the VPT 
circle task, egocentric errors were the most prominent error type in individuals with WS, 
compared to left-right reversal errors making up the majority of errors in TD children.  
This prominence was not identified in the OB circle task, suggesting that imagined 
rotations of the self may present additional egocentric difficulties in WS that are not 
seen with imagined rotations of objects in a similar array.   
Mental rotation difficulties in WS have previously been attributed to deficits in 
the perceptual processing of spatial orientation (Farran & Jarrold, 2004), and are 
indicative of fractionated dorsal stream functions in this disorder.  Performance on OB 
rotations and VPT tasks likely recruit similar underlying neural mechanisms (Kosslyn et 
al., 1998; Lambrey et al., 2012; Wraga et al., 2005; Zacks et al., 2000; Zacks et al., 2002; 
Zacks et al., 1999).  As such, difficulties encoding an allocentric frame of reference for 
successful OB rotations may go hand in hand with difficulties in VPT, where an 
individual is required to consistently update their egocentric location within an 
allocentric reference frame.  Updating the location of the self during imagined rotations 
is thought to rely on the successful translation between egocentric parietal 
representations and allocentric hippocampal spatial codes (Burgess, 2008; Lambrey et 
al., 2012; Vann et al., 2009).   Accordingly, given that a number of additional cortical 
regions are involved in VPT tasks to those in OB rotations, deficits in dorsal stream 
functioning may be insufficient to explain the specific difficulties evident in both types 
of task.  The profound difficulty in updating one’s egocentric location on the VPT task 
in WS is therefore consistent with atypical processing in anterior hippocampal (Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2005) and parietal-occipital regions (Boddaert et al., 2006) in this 
group.  In addition, difficulties in updating the imagined location of the self may explain 
why individuals with WS were more likely to make egocentric than left-right reversal 
errors (as seen in TD children), in the current study.  
The large proportion of egocentric errors in WS is similar to findings that 
indicate young children interpret VPT instructions egocentrically and have difficulty in 
rotating this frame of reference in order to complete these tasks (Epley et al., 2004).  
 96 
Epley and colleagues also suggested that adults initially interpret instructions 
egocentrically, but have a superior ability to inhibit an egocentric response and adjust to 
using an appropriate strategy quickly and effectively.  Difficulties in inhibition have 
been reported in individuals with WS (Menghini, Addona, Costanzo, & Vicari, 2010), 
and as such, failures in self-rotation in WS may also reflect difficulties in suppressing 
an egocentric response.   
On the OB circle task, only the WS group demonstrated performance on 180° 
that was significantly below any other rotation trial.  This may have, like in the VPT 
circle task, reflected a different pattern of performance than seen in typical development.  
For instance, whereas some TD children may have been able to use an alternative 
strategy to support performance on 180° trials such as a verbal or ‘flipping’ strategy, 
individuals with WS did not demonstrate the ability to do so.   
 
2.4.4 Individual differences in WS 
A large amount of variability was observed in the performance of the WS group 
within each transformation task.  This may have reflected the ability of some 
individuals with WS to consistently mentally rotate both objects and themselves at a 
level similar to older typically developing children.  However, in the WS group no 
relationship was found between the 4 rotation tasks, suggesting large variability and an 
inconsistent pattern of performance in this group that may have been more attributable 
to noise.  This was in contrast to the TD group, who – as with earlier research in adults 
(Hegarty & Waller, 2004)- demonstrated relatively consistent levels of attainment 
across the majority of VPT and OB tasks, indicative of similar mechanisms underlying 
both self- and object-based rotations in typical development.  Despite this, a relationship 
was not identified between TD scores on the VPT path and monkey task, suggesting 
that an ability to rotate a single object may not be related to the ability to imagine one’s 
self turning within a path. 
Further examination into individual differences in performance on these tasks in 
WS found that OB rotation abilities as measured on the monkey task increased with 
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chronological age, even when controlling for verbal or non-verbal abilities.  This is 
contrasted with our findings in TD children, for whom OB mental rotation of a single 
image was positively related to verbal ability.  Thus, TD children who were able to 
apply verbal strategies during these tasks may have further supported their performance 
on the monkey task.  
In line with our findings of age in WS and OB mental rotation, in a study 
examining development trajectories of spatial reference frames in WS, Nardini et al. 
(2008) found that older WS participants aged 26-42 were the only WS group in their 
study to score above chance on a task requiring the ability to use an array-based spatial 
frame of reference (i.e. OB mental rotation).  Although this difference in ability between 
younger and older WS individuals remained marginal, this finding, alongside the 
present results, indicates that some older individuals with WS may have developed 
strategies to successfully complete OB rotation tasks that are independent of verbal or 
non-verbal development.  However this was only shown (in the present study) on a task 
involving the mental manipulation of a single object and no such relationship was 
evident between WS age and mental manipulation of multiple items in an array (OB 
circle).  It could be inferred from this that difficulties resulting from having an 
additional cognitive load of more than one object to mentally transform do not 
remediate with age in this group and is more associated with level of non-verbal 
cognition, as shown in the relationship between RCPM performance and OB array 
rotation.  In the WS group, age-related factors such as experience with tasks or games 
requiring mental rotation may have facilitated performance, as seen in TD adolescents 
(Okagaki & Frensch, 1994).  To address limitations of the current study, future research 
should therefore include, not only a greater age-range of individuals with WS, but also 
examine age-related differences in spatial performance, and assessments of experience 
with mental rotation tasks.  In addition, the use of tasks that examine performance 
across comparable degrees of rotation would allow clearer comparison of performance 
across different tasks in individuals with WS. 
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2.4.5 Small- and large-scale tasks 
The ability to update self-to-object representations is important for successful 
large-scale spatial navigation, and performance on such environmental learning tasks 
has been found to be associated with the ability to imagine one’s self rotating at a small 
scale (Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  The profound deficits on small-scale VPT tasks in 
WS therefore suggest that such strategies may not be available to support performance 
on navigational activities in the same way as TD children and adults. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
In sum, significant improvements in visuospatial tasks that involve mental 
transformation of objects or the self are seen between 6 and 8 years of age in typically 
developing children.  Moreover, near ceiling performance was seen by 10 years of age 
on the majority of tasks, indicating substantial maturity of these abilities by this age.  In 
contrast, extensive difficulties in performing mental transformations both of objects and 
the self were identified in individuals with WS.  As a group, participants with WS 
performed in line with what could be expected based on non-verbal ability, often 
demonstrating performance at a level similar to TD 5 and 6 year-olds.  However, a 
different pattern of errors was observed in the WS group compared to TD children, 
indicative of divergent rather than simply arrested or delayed development.  When 
asked to imagine the rotation of a single image, performance in WS was positively 
correlated with chronological age, suggesting that some older individuals with WS may 
have developed successful techniques by which to mentally rotate objects.   
Findings in part suggest that poor performance on VPT in WS is related to 
difficulties in inhibiting a prepotent egocentric response.  However, it is likely that 
deficits in imagined rotations of the self are related to atypical processing in cortical 
regions associated with the translation of egocentric and allocentric spatial frames of 
reference required for successful updating of the position of the self, following both 
imagined and actual movement.  Severe impairments in mental transformation abilities 
in WS are likely to be implicated in performance in large-scale spatial tasks, particularly 
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given the known associations in typical adults between VPT and navigation 
performance (e.g., Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  This is examined further in chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3 
Study 2: Egocentric and allocentric navigation strategies in typical 
development and Williams syndrome 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The study of small-scale visuospatial cognition in individuals with Williams 
syndrome (WS) presented in study 1, offered preliminary insight into the specific 
deficits in the use of different spatial frames of reference associated with this disorder.  
Study 2 presented in the current chapter aimed to examine the manner in which such 
deficits are evident in large-scale space, particularly in navigational learning in WS, 
compared to performance in typically developing (TD) children aged between 5 and 10 
years.   
In large-scale space, the use of an egocentric spatial frame of reference (the 
encoding of environmental locations in relation to one’s own body), allows an 
individual to accurately retrace a route from one location to another, using simple 
stimulus-response navigation (Burgess, Jeffery, & O'Keefe, 1999).  However, being 
able to use an allocentric spatial reference frame, that is, encoding the spatial 
relationships between landmarks (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978), facilitates more complex 
navigation, such as the ability to make short-cuts or to understand how to relocate 
oneself when starting from a novel location in a familiar environment.   
In typical development, when spontaneously navigating through an environment, 
both children and adults predominantly rely on the use of a sequential egocentric 
strategy, by recalling the temporal order of body turns at specific (and spatially distinct) 
environmental locations (Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; Iglói et al., 2009).  Using a virtual 
navigation task, Bullens and colleagues found that the ability to successfully employ an 
allocentric strategy to navigate develops progressively between 5 and 10 years of age, 
but is systematically utilised only when the task demands a more complex 
understanding of the spatial relationships in the environment.  This is in line with 
research that suggests a developmental change between 6 and 8 years of age from a 
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reliance on viewpoint-dependent spatial processing (e.g., the use of stored views of 
spatial locations in relation to the self), to more flexible viewpoint-independent 
processing, or environment-centred spatial representations that allow accurate recall 
irrespective of the viewer’s movements (Nardini et al., 2009).  
Using a spatial coding paradigm to examine the development of body-, 
environment- and object-based spatial frames of reference in WS, Nardini et al. (2008)  
found that individuals with WS exhibit specific difficulties on tasks requiring the 
encoding of spatial relationships between landmarks in a small-scale array.  This is 
indicative of particular difficulties in WS in the use of an intrinsic (array-based) frame 
of reference.  Further to this, in a series of small-scale visual spatial judgement tasks, 
individuals with WS were found to have impairments in the use of both egocentric and 
allocentric frames of reference (Bernardino, Mouga, Castelo-Branco, & van Asselen, 
2013), suggesting that impairments in coding spatial information in WS are not just a 
result of deficits in memory capabilities, but that impairments also occur at the 
perceptual level.   
Difficulties in WS with encoding spatial locations of objects in relation to the 
self and other objects were similarly presented in study 1 using tasks requiring imagined 
rotations of the self and objects.  These findings are in line with previous reports of 
mental transformation difficulties in this disorder (Farran et al., 2001; Stinton et al., 
2008).  Imagined rotations of the self (visual perspective-taking, VPT), in particular, 
require the ability to update egocentric spatial locations within an allocentric frame of 
reference, and this ability is thought to be supported by hippocampal and medial 
temporal lobe structures (Burgess, 2008; Lambrey et al., 2012; Vann et al., 2009).  
Known structural and functional abnormalities of the hippocampus in WS (Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2005) are therefore likely to be associated with difficulties observed 
in WS on tasks that require this kind of imagined rotation.  In addition, given the known 
deficits in dorsal stream functioning in WS (J. Atkinson et al., 2003; J. Atkinson et al., 
1997), difficulties in egocentric spatial coding supported by the dorsal stream in typical 
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adults (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Packard & Knowlton, 2002), may also contribute to 
such deficits on imagined rotation tasks in these individuals.  
In typical adults, increased activition in the hippocampal region is associated 
both with allocentric spatial coding (understanding the relationships between objects in 
an array), and with large-scale allocentric navigation (Burgess et al., 1999; Burgess et 
al., 2002).  It can be inferred therefore that individuals with WS are also likely to 
present with difficulties on large-scale tasks that require the use of allocentric spatial 
coding.  Moreover, in typical adults, the ability to imagine the self rotating predicts 
performance on navigation tasks that require the individual to constantly update self-to-
object and object-object locations when moving through an environment, namely the 
ability to utilise allocentric coding (Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  Thus, difficulties on 
small-scale tasks in WS suggest that large-scale spatial tasks, particularly those 
requiring allocentric encoding, are likely to be problematic for this group.  
Previous studies examining large-scale environmental learning have shown that 
not all large-scale spatial abilities are equally impaired in WS.  For instance, individuals 
with WS can successfully learn to navigate and accurately retrace their route both in 
real-world (Farran et al., 2010) and virtual environments (Farran, Courbois, Van 
Herwegen, & Blades, 2012).  However, in line with small-scale relational coding 
difficulties, in the 2010 study, Farran and colleagues found that in a real-world task, 
individuals with WS showed deficits on tasks requiring an understanding of spatial 
relationships in the environment.  That is, when asked to point to the location of 
imperceptible landmarks from positions along a route, individuals with WS displayed a 
high number of errors compared to TD children, consistent with the predicted 
difficulties in allocentric encoding in WS.   
Of note, real-world navigation tasks may pose a particular difficulty for 
individuals with WS in relation to the physical demands of the task and therefore the 
extent to which participants are able to gain extensive experience in an environment.  In 
typical adults and children, extended experience within an environment leads to 
enhanced understanding of the spatial relationships between landmarks (Anooshian & 
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Young, 1981; Golledge & Spector, 1978; Lehnung et al., 2003; Siegel & White, 1975).  
Reduced opportunities for independent navigation and active exploration in real-world 
environments has been implicated in poor spatial-relational knowledge in individuals 
with physical disabilities (Foreman, 2007; Foreman et al., 2003; Stanton, Foreman, & 
Wilson, 1998).  This may also be the case for individuals with learning difficulties 
(Mengue-Topio, Courbois, Farran, & Sockeel, 2010).  Given the time restraints and 
physical demands involved in navigating a route multiple times, real-world tasks in WS 
may be limited by the scope of experience that each participant can gain from an 
environment.  This suggests that difficulties in spatial relational knowledge identified in 
WS on previous real-world tasks (e.g. Farran et al., 2010) is, in part, a consequence of 
this lack of environmental experience, and that further experience in these environments 
may have led to the development of more complex spatial representations.  As such, it is 
not clear whether increased exposure to an environment in individuals with WS would 
improve the ability to encode spatial relationships in that setting and apply an 
allocentric spatial frame of reference when the task demands.       
Using a radial-arm maze, Mandolesi et al. (2009) examined the mnesic 
components related to large-scale visuospatial difficulties in WS.  The results showed 
that individuals with WS were impaired in acquiring procedural competencies and 
spatial working memory.  This is in line with other findings implicating the role of a 
deficit in dorsal stream functioning on poor spatial working memory in WS (O'Hearn, 
Courtney, Street, & Landau, 2009).  Mandolesi and colleagues found that perseverative 
errors in exploration were also evident in some participants with WS, a further 
reflection of spatial memory and planning difficulties in this group.  Others have also 
identified similar perseverative errors in WS during navigation (Farran et al., 2012).  
Such difficulties in spatial working memory and use of inefficient exploration strategies 
in WS may underlie some of the difficulties demonstrated on tasks requiring the recall 
of landmark locations (e.g., Farran et al., 2010).  Importantly, Mandolesi and colleagues 
found that some individuals with WS demonstrated an understanding of the spatial 
representation of the test layout when asked to draw the environment; the only 
indication in the literature of possible spatial relational knowledge in WS.  In another 
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real-world study however, search strategies in WS were found to be disorganised and 
ineffective compared to TD children, and individuals with WS failed to develop an 
understanding of the environmental layout (Foti et al., 2011). 
Our understanding of whether individuals with WS are able to develop spatial 
relational knowledge and utilise an allocentric spatial frame of reference in large-scale 
space, therefore, remains ambiguous.  Although individuals with WS have demonstrated 
successful route-learning abilities, to date no study has specifically examined the 
navigational strategies employed in this group, and in particular the use of egocentric 
and allocentric spatial frames of reference.  The aim of the present study was to examine 
navigational strategies in WS in a large-scale virtual environment (VE), compared to 
TD children between 5 and 10 years of age.  Using a virtual cross-maze design, 
spontaneously employed navigational strategies were examined across groups, together 
with the ability to make use of allocentric spatial coding when required.   
  Given the potential of exploring a VE multiple times within a relatively short 
time period and without the physical demands of real-world environments, the use of 
VEs to examine large-scale spatial difficulties may be a useful resource in WS.  For a 
further discussion regarding the use of VEs to examine spatial navigation, see 1.6.   
Allocentric spatial strategies are thought to be supported in part by the 
hippocampal region (Iaria et al., 2007; King, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha-Khadem, & 
O'Keefe, 2002; McNamara & Shelton, 2003; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978), particularly the 
right hippocampus (Iglói et al., 2010).  Given the known hippocampal impairments in 
WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005), difficulties in the use of an allocentric strategy in 
WS were anticipated in the current study.  Sequential egocentric spatial representations, 
in contrast, are related to left hippocampal (Iglói et al., 2010) and dorsal stream 
activation (Milner & Goodale, 1995), a finding supported by neuroimaging during the 
use of egocentric navigation strategies (Committeri et al., 2004; Galati et al., 2000; 
Neggers, Van der Lubbe, Ramsey, & Postma, 2006).  Deficits in dorsal stream 
functioning have been identified in individuals with WS (e.g., J. Atkinson et al., 2003; J. 
Atkinson et al., 1997; Nakamura, Kaneoke, Watanabe, & Kakigi, 2002).  As such, 
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despite previous findings of successful performance on route learning tasks in WS (e.g. 
Farran et al., 2010), it was hypothesised that, where TD children may predominantly 
employ a sequential egocentric strategy, individuals with WS may demonstrate 
alternative navigation strategies on such tasks, suggestive of an atypical pattern of 
coding spatial frames of reference in large-scale environments.  
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
The same sixty-seven typically developing (TD) children who were recruited 
and completed tasks in study 1 were also included in the present study.  As before, TD 
participants were separated into four age groups; 5, 6, 8, and 10 year-olds.  The same 
twenty individuals with Williams Syndrome (WS) who successfully completed the 
mental transformation tasks in study 1 were also included.  All WS participants had 
received a positive diagnosis of WS, based on a “fluorescence in-situ hybridisation” 
(FISH) test for deleted Elastin gene on the long arm of chromosome 7, as well as 
phenotypic diagnosis from a clinician. 
Nine participants from the original TD group (N=6, 5 year-olds; N=2, 6 year-
olds; and N=1, 8 year-old) and three from the original WS group did not manage to 
complete the VE tasks in the present study successfully, due to lack of motivation or 
concentration.  Data for these participants were excluded from subsequent analyses.  Six 
more TD 5 year-olds were therefore recruited to maintain comparable group sizes, all of 
whom completed the tasks successfully.  Therefore, data were analysed from 64 TD 
children; 5 year-olds (N=16, 10 males, Mean age (years; months) = 5;07, SD = 0;04, 
CA range = 5;01 – 6;01); 6 year-olds (N=15, 10 males, Mage = 6;08 years, SD = 0;03, 
CA range = 6;04 – 7;05); 8 year-olds (N=17, 10 males, Mage= 8;03, SD = 0;04, CA 
range = 7;07 – 8;08); and 10 year-olds (N=16, 9 males, Mage =10;01, SD = 0;03, CA 
range = 9;06 – 10;09), and 17 participants with WS (9 males, Mage= 21;10, SD = 8;05, 
CA range = 13;01 – 43;03).  Verbal and Non-verbal abilities were assessed using the 
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British Picture Vocabulary Scale-III (BPVS-III; Dunn et al., 2009) and the Ravens 
Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM; Raven et al., 2003), respectively. 
 
3.2.2 Virtual environment (VE) 
The interactive VE cross-maze was developed using The Vizard Development 
Edition software (www.worldviz.com), and presented on a 17” laptop screen on a table-
top in front of the participant.  Adapted from a five-arm maze used in other studies (e.g. 
Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; Iglói et al., 2009), the VE cross-maze task presented 
participants with a more simple environmental layout within which individuals were 
able to use either a ‘sequential egocentric’ or ‘allocentric’ spatial strategy to navigate, or 
a combination of the two (a ‘mixed’ strategy).  For a birds-eye schematic image of the 
cross-maze layout, see 3.2.2.1 Figure 9. 
The VE consisted of four paths (A, D, G, and J) extending from a central square.  
The central square was made up of eight paths, made distinct by a turn or a junction (B, 
C, E, F, H, I, K and L).  The alleys of the central square and the extending pathways all 
had red brick walls and therefore appeared identical from any starting position and all 
paths between decision points were the same length.  Surrounding the environment were 
six distal landmarks, consisting of three different landmarks appearing twice each (two 
trees, two city landscapes and two red towers).  Each distal landmark appeared twice 
around the environment so that participants would have to encode landmarks in terms of 
their relationship to each other and the paths, and not use them as directional cues.  
Participants navigated through the environment using the keyboard arrow-keys.  
Selected views from within the VE, as seen by the participant, are displayed in 3.2.2.2 
Figure 10. 
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3.2.2.1 Figure 9. Schematic layout of cross-maze with routes taken by participants using different strategies: a) route taken during learning and eight 
normal test trials, b) route taken using a Sequential Egocentric strategy, c) Allocentric, d) Mixed, e) Mirrored Egocentric. 
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3.2.2.2 Figure 10. Screen shots from the virtual environment (VE); a) view from beginning of path ‘A’, showing the grass path for the learning trial; b) 
view from path ‘F’ towards path ‘H’ and junction of path ‘G’ (right). 
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3.2.3 Design and procedure   
3.2.3.1 Learning phase. 
Participants were asked to navigate from the starting position at the beginning of 
path A to find a “hidden exit” at the end of path G.  Participants were unable to see the 
end of any other pathway from any starting position within the environment.  During the 
learning phase, participants were first shown the optimal route to the hidden exit by 
following a grass path (see 3.2.2.2 Figure 10a).  Once the target location was found, a 
“Yippee!” reward sound was played and the programme window closed.  The 
participant was then returned to the starting position in path A, without a grass path, for 
the first learning trial.  Here, participants were required to walk the route from memory.  
During the learning trials (maximum 10 trials), participants had to navigate down the 
correct path to reach the hidden target without error on two trials to move on to the 
testing phase.  During learning trials, invisible walls were positioned one quarter of the 
way down incorrect paths to guide learning.  Participants were therefore able to look 
down the incorrect turns but not travel down them further than this point.  If participants 
incorrectly navigated to the point of hitting an invisible wall, this was counted as an 
error.   
 
3.2.3.2 Testing spontaneous navigation strategies.  
Following successful learning (reaching criterion of two correct learning trials), 
participants were told that the invisible walls had now been removed and so could travel 
down any path they wanted.  Participants were instructed that for each test trial, they 
must try to reach the same hidden exit (in path G) by the shortest route possible.  
Participants then completed twelve test trials.  
To intermittently test the strategy that the participant was using, the twelve test 
trials were interspersed with four ‘strategy test’ trials (trials 3, 7, 9, and 12); where 
instead of the normal starting point in path A, the participant was unsuspectingly placed 
at the beginning of path J as a starting location.  From both starting positions (J and A), 
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the views contained similar distant landmarks, including a tree, cityscape and red tower.  
Therefore, participants who spontaneously relied on the use of a ‘sequential egocentric’ 
strategy may not have encoded the spatial layout, even if they could identify similar 
landmarks, and would have followed the same sequence of body turns as usual (3.2.2.1 
Figure 9b).  Participants spontaneously using an ‘allocentric strategy’, however, would 
have identified the different spatial relationships between landmarks surrounding the 
environment and navigated directly to the correct exit by the shortest route (3.2.2.1 
Figure 9c).  On the four spontaneous strategy tests, both the ends of paths G and D 
revealed the reward sound as positive feedback for the use of either of these 
spontaneous strategies.  Therefore, participants who used an egocentric strategy would 
not be alerted to the change in starting position, and they would continue to use their 
spontaneous strategy on subsequent test trials.  
 
3.2.3.3 Enforced allocentric strategy trials. 
To examine whether participants were able to navigate using an allocentric 
strategy when required, they were asked to navigate in the same VE to a new hidden 
exit from different starting points.  Participants were first told that the hidden exit had 
moved to a new place.  They were then placed in path J and asked to follow the grass 
path to the hidden exit now in path A.  Participants then completed the learning trials 
without the grass until they had successfully navigated to the new hidden exit on two 
trials, i.e. they had reached the learning criterion.  Following learning, participants were 
informed that they would now have to find this hidden exit from different starting 
positions and were encouraged to take note of the environmental landmarks to remind 
them of the location of the hidden exit.  Participants completed six test trials from 
different starting positions (three from path G and three from path D, presented in a 
random order).  The reward sound was played only at the end of path A, following the 
use of an allocentric strategy. 
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3.2.3.4 Layout knowledge test. 
Following the enforced allocentric strategy trials, to further examine whether 
participants had developed an allocentric understanding of the environmental layout, 
participants were asked to choose the correct layout of the environment from a set of six 
map options (3.2.3.4.1 Figure 11).  Correct selection of an environment layout, or 
ability to draw a ‘map’ of the environment is considered to be a valid measure of large-
scale allocentric knowledge (Billinghurst & Weghorst, 1995; Morganti, Carassa, & 
Geminiani, 2007). 
  
 
3.2.3.4.1 Figure 11. Layout knowledge test: six environment layout choices 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Verbal and non-verbal abilities 
To examine the difference across groups on BPVS and RCPM scores, one-way 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for each, with group (5 levels; 5y, 6y, 
8y, 10y, and WS) as a between-subjects factor (see 3.3.1.1 Table 9).  This demonstrated 
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an uneven cognitive profile in WS, characteristic of the disorder (Bellugi et al., 2000; 
Jarrold et al., 1998), with nonverbal abilities at a level no different from TD 5 year-olds, 
and relatively higher verbal abilities, significantly greater than TD 5 and 6 year-olds, at 
the level of TD 8 and 10 year-olds.   
 
3.3.1.1 Table 9. Mean (SD) participant scores on BPVS-III and RCPM. 
 Group ANOVA Post-hoca 
 WS       
(N=17) 
5 years  
(N=16) 
6 years 
(N=15) 
8 years  
(N=17) 
10 years 
(N=16) 
F (df) p  
B
PV
S 
ra
w
b  123.65 
(22.38) 
78.94 
(13.49) 
91.33 
(14.25) 
112.35 
(15.78) 
130.81 
(15.18) 
27.55 
(4, 80)   
< .001 5 = 6 <  8, 10 
and WS 
8 < 10 
WS = 8 and 10 
B
PV
S 
st
an
dc
  
- 
 
97.31 
(10.43) 
95.13 
(10.97) 
102.47 
(14.96) 
97.44 
(12.92) 
1.01 
(3, 63) 
.396  
- 
R
C
PM
d  
16.82 
(3.15) 
18.63 
(3.85) 
23.67 
(5.07) 
27.94 
(5.25) 
30.56 
(3.37) 
31.96 
(4, 80) 
< .001 5 < 6, 8, and 
10 
6 < 10 
WS < 6, 8 and 
10 
a Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests, ‘=’ refers to no significant difference at .05 level, and 
‘<’ denotes p< .01; bBPVS-III: British Picture Vocabulary Scale-III raw scores; cBPVS-
III standardised scores; dRCPM: Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) raw 
scores  
 
3.3.2 Learning trials 
Following the original learning trial with the grass path, the number of trials 
(including two correct criterion trials) taken to successfully reach criterion (required to 
advance to the testing phase) was examined in each group. 
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Results of a one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of age on mean 
number of trials taken to learn the route to the hidden target, F (4, 80) = 4.59, p= .002.  
Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests showed that TD 10 year-olds (M= 2.75, SD= .68) 
required significantly fewer trials to learn the route than the 5 year-old (M= 4.38, SD= 
1.71, p= .033), 6 year-old (M= 4.67, SD= 1.88, p= .009) and WS (M= 4.76, SD= 2.08, 
p= .003) groups, but not 8 year-olds (M= 3.76, SD= .97).  No significant difference in 
number of trials was found across any other groups (p> .05, for all). 
 
3.3.3 Test trials 
 To examine whether performance on the eight trials in the test phase – not 
including the four spontaneous strategy trials – was successful for each participant, the 
percentage of trials without error (direct route taken to the exit, without traversing more 
than half way down incorrect paths) was calculated for each group.   
 Results of a one-way ANOVA showed steady performance on the eight test-
phase trials following learning in each group, with no significant difference in 
percentage of correct test trials found across groups: 5 years (Mean = 77.34%, SD= 
20.01%); 6 years (Mean = 71.67%, SD= 26.50%); 8 years (Mean = 71.32%, SD= 
21.99%); 10 years (Mean = 80.47%, SD= 21.39%); WS (Mean = 72.22, SD=19.91%), 
F(4, 81) = .56, p = .691. This shows that after reaching criterion on learning trials, all 
groups performed at a similar level on subsequent way-finding.  
 
3.3.4 Spontaneous strategy trials 
3.3.4.1 Strategy types. 
The spontaneous strategies used by participants on each of the four strategy 
trials during the test phase were grouped into four different categories.  As in previous 
findings using VEs, (Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; Iglói et al., 2009), three of the strategies 
observed were (i) ‘Sequential Egocentric’ (3.2.2.1 Figure 9b), where participants 
repeated an identical sequence of body turns in both the normal and strategy tests;  (ii) 
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‘Allocentric’ (3.2.2.1 Figure 9c), where participants used environmental cues and an 
understanding of the environment layout to reach the correct hidden exit by the shortest 
route; and (iii) ‘Mixed’ (3.2.2.1 Figure 9d), where participants demonstrated a change 
from a sequential egocentric strategy at the start of the trial to the use of environmental 
cues within one trial.  Some participants in the current study also demonstrated the use 
of a fourth strategy that has been labelled (iv) ‘Mirrored Egocentric’ (3.2.2.1 Figure 9e), 
where during the strategy tests participants traversed along a route towards the hidden 
target that was the mirror image of the ‘sequential egocentric’ route.  This strategy 
potentially demonstrated an understanding of the symmetrical layout of the environment 
and thus an alternative route to the hidden exit, but without consideration of the 
positioning of landmarks.  Participants who did not reach the hidden exit at the end of 
path D or G using any of these strategies, or who got lost during the spontaneous tests 
were allocated the category (v) ‘non-specific’ for those trials.  Mean percentage of each 
type of strategy used across the four spontaneous strategy trials in each group, are 
displayed in 3.3.4.1.1 Figure 12. 
Data were analysed to examine the differences between groups on the 
percentage of each strategy type used on spontaneous trials.  As data did not meet 
normality assumptions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p< .05) for any groups, Kruskal- Wallis 
tests were conducted, with post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests.  Results showed a significant 
difference across groups on percentage of egocentric strategy use, χ2 (4) = 13.95, 
p= .007, due to the WS group using an egocentric strategy significantly less often than 
all other groups (5 year-olds, p= .006; 6 year-olds, p< .001; 8 year-olds, p= .048; and 
10 year-olds, p= .026).  A significant difference across groups on percentage of mixed 
strategy use was also found, χ2 (4) = 13.29, p= .010, with individuals with WS using a 
mixed strategy significantly more often than all other groups (5 year-olds, p= .025; 6 
year-olds, p= .005; 8 year-olds, p= .006 and 10 year-olds, p= .004).  Results also 
showed a significant difference across groups on percentage of mirrored strategy use, χ2 
(4) = 14.63, p= .006.  Post-hoc tests showed that 10 year-olds used a mirrored strategy 
significantly more often than 5 year-olds (p= .037), 6 year-olds (p= .010), and WS 
(p= .006), and 8 year-olds used a mirrored strategy significantly more often than 6 year-
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olds (p= .048) and WS (p= .036).  No significant group differences were found on 
percentage of allocentric or non-specific strategies used (p> .05 for both). 
Data were also analysed to examine whether one strategy was used significantly 
more often than any other within each group separately.  Results of Friedman’s 
ANOVAs, (5 levels; egocentric, allocentric, mixed, mirrored, and non-specific) showed 
a significant effect of strategy type used on spontaneous trials in all groups: 5 year-olds, 
χ2(4) = 22.93, p< .001; 6 year-olds, χ2(4) = 29.43, p< .001; 8 year-olds, χ2(4) = 10.08, 
p= .039; 10 year-olds, χ2(4) = 15.30, p= .004; and WS, χ2(4) = 21.54, p< .001.  Post-
hoc Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests showed that this was due to a significantly greater 
percentage of egocentric compared to allocentric and non-specific strategies in all TD 
groups; 5 years (p= .002 and p= .014); 6 years (p= .002 and p= .003); 8 years (p= .015 
and p= .022); and 10 years (p= .023 and p= .003).  A significantly greater percentage of 
egocentric than mixed was found in 6 (p= .007) and 8 (p= .043) year-olds, and a 
significantly greater percentage of egocentric than mirrored for 5 and 6 year-olds 
(p= .001 for both).  Only the 6 year-olds showed significantly less use of a mirrored 
strategy than allocentric (p= .034) or mixed (p= .024).  In contrast, the WS group used 
a mixed strategy significantly more often than egocentric (p= .030), allocentric (p= .041) 
and mirrored (p= .001) strategies, and a mirrored strategy significantly less often than 
allocentric (p= .015) and non-specific (p= .006). 
To examine the consistency of performance in each group across the four 
strategy trials, the percentage of participants who used the same strategy on at least 
three out of the four trials was calculated.  The majority of participants in each of the 
TD groups were consistent in their use of strategy type (5 year-olds = 93.3%, 6 year-
olds = 66.7%, 8 year-olds = 64.7%, and 10 year-olds = 75.0%).  However, consistent 
strategy use across the four trials was not observed in participants with WS, with the 
majority of participants in this group (70.6%) using different strategies across trials.   
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3.3.4.1.1 Figure 12. Mean (SE) percentage of each strategy used across the four 
spontaneous strategy test trials in each group 
 
3.3.4.2 ‘Allocentric score’ on spontaneous trials. 
To examine the extent to which participants in each group were navigating 
‘allocentrically’ across the four spontaneous trials, an allocentric score was calculated 
for each participant.  For each of the four spontaneous trials, zero points were awarded 
for the use of a sequential egocentric strategy, or non-specific strategy, and two points 
were given for each allocentric strategy used.  Given that the use of a mixed strategy 
may have demonstrated a change from an egocentric to allocentric strategy within one 
trial, one point was awarded for each mixed strategy used.  One point was also allocated 
for each mirrored egocentric trial as this may have resulted from an understanding of the 
shape of the environment, a component of allocentric knowledge.  Participants could 
therefore receive a maximum score of eight allocentric points across the four 
spontaneous trials.  Total allocentric score was then converted to a percentage for 
analysis, for comparison to the corresponding score for enforced-allocentric trials (see 
3.3.5.2). 
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Data were normally distributed for 8 and 10 year-olds and WS groups only 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05).  However, given that normality was present for more 
than half of the groups, and ANOVA can be robust to violations of normality 
assumptions, parametric tests are reported.  Non-parametric equivalents of the following 
analyses were also conducted, with comparable results.  The analysis showed a 
significant difference across groups on percentage allocentric score on spontaneous 
trials, due to a significantly higher allocentric score in the WS group than TD 5 
(p= .028) and 6 year-olds (p= .032).  Mean percentage allocentric score for each group 
and results of a one-way ANOVA are displayed in 3.3.4.2.1 Table 10. 
 
3.3.4.2.1 Table 10. Mean (SD) percentage allocentric score on ‘spontaneous’ and 
‘enforced allocentric’ trials across each group 
 Group One-way 
ANOVA 
Post-hoca 
 WS 
(N=17) 
5 years 
(N=16) 
6 years  
(N=14) 
8 years 
(N=17) 
10 years  
(N=16) 
F (df) p  
b S
po
nt
an
. 
36.76 
(18.47) 
14.06 
(20.35) 
15.18 
(18.46) 
24.26 
(20.48) 
29.69 
(28.46) 
3.19   
(4, 79) 
.018* WS > 5 and 
6  
c E
nf
or
ce
d 
 
24.51 
(11.96) 
25.00 
(32.06) 
25.00 
(19.06) 
38.73 
(22.81) 
52.60 
(31.58) 
4.04   
(4, 79) 
.005** 5 = 6 = WS 
< 10 
a Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests, ‘=’ refers to no significant difference at .05 level, and ‘<’ 
denotes p< .05; b Spontaneous strategy trials; c Enforced allocentric trials. *significant at .05 
level; **significant at .01 level. 
 
3.3.5 Enforced allocentric trials 
3.3.5.1 Strategy types. 
The strategy used on each of the six enforced allocentric trials was identified for 
each participant.  Strategies were identified in the same way as for the spontaneous 
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trials and consisted of sequential egocentric, allocentric, mixed, and non-specific 
strategies.  For Mean percentage of each strategy-type used across the six enforced 
allocentric strategy trials see 3.3.5.1.1 Figure 13. 
As for spontaneous trials, data were analysed to examine the differences 
between groups on the percentage of each strategy-type used during enforced trials.  As 
data violated normality assumptions for all groups (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p< .05), 
Kruskal- Wallis tests were conducted, with post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests.  Results 
showed a significant difference across groups on percentage of egocentric strategies 
used, χ2 (4) = 9.53, p= .049, with 6 year-olds and WS groups using an egocentric 
strategy significantly more than 10 year-olds (p= .006 and p= .009, respectively).  
Results also showed a significant difference across groups on percentage allocentric 
strategy used, χ2 (4) = 10.05, p= .040, with 5 year-olds and WS groups using an 
allocentric strategy significantly less than 10 year-olds (p= .013 and p= .014, 
respectively).  
To examine whether one strategy was used significantly more often than any 
other within each group separately, Friedman’s ANOVAs (4 levels: egocentric, 
allocentric, mixed, or non-specific) were conducted.  Results showed a significant 
difference between strategy type used during enforced trials in 6 year-olds, χ2 (3) = 
19.87, p< .001, and WS, χ2 (3) = 13.80, p= .003 groups, and a trend in 5 year-olds, χ2 (3) 
= 7.63, p= .054.  Post-hoc Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests showed that for 6 year-olds, an 
egocentric strategy was used significantly more often than a mixed strategy (p=.001).  
Allocentric and non-specific strategies were also used more often than a mixed strategy 
in this group (p=.007 and p= .003, respectively).  Similarly, 5 year-olds used an 
egocentric strategy significantly more often than a mixed strategy (p= .016).  
Individuals with WS however, demonstrated the use of an egocentric strategy 
significantly more often than mixed (p= .006) and allocentric (p= .003) strategies, both 
of which would have resulted in successful navigation to the hidden exit.  The 
predominant use of egocentric searching during the enforced trials in WS was, therefore, 
indicative of an ineffective navigation strategy in this group.  
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3.3.5.1.1 Figure 13. Mean (SE) percentage of each strategy used across the six enforced 
allocentric test trials in each group 
 
3.3.5.2 Allocentric score for enforced allocentric trials. 
An allocentric score from the six enforced trials was calculated for each 
participant using the same criteria as for spontaneous trials.  Participants could therefore 
receive a maximum score of 12 allocentric points across the six trials.  As before, 
allocentric scores were then converted to percentages for analysis.  Data were normally 
distributed for all groups, except TD 5 year-olds.  However, given that normality was 
present for all but one of the groups in the sample, parametric tests are reported.  Non-
parametric equivalents of the following analyses were also conducted, with comparable 
results.  Mean percentage allocentric score on enforced allocentric trials and results of a 
one-way ANOVA are displayed in 3.3.4.2.1 Table 10, showing a significant difference 
across groups, due to a significantly higher allocentric score in TD 10 year-olds than 5 
year-olds (p= .019), 6 year-olds (p= .012) and WS group (p= .014).   
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Differences in allocentric score on spontaneous trials compared to enforced 
allocentric trials were examined.  A two-way mixed ANOVA was performed on 
percentage allocentric score, with a between-participants factor of group (5 levels: 5, 6, 
8, 10 and WS) and within-participants factor of trial type (2 levels: spontaneous or 
enforced).  Results showed a significant main effect of group, F(4, 75) = 3.94, p= .006, 
partial η2 = .17, and a significant main effect of trial type, F(1, 75) = 7.72, p= .007, 
partial η2 = .09.  A significant interaction was also identified, F(4, 75) = 3.27, p= .016, 
partial η2 = .15.  Results of post-hoc paired-samples t-tests for each group showed a 
significant increase in allocentric score from spontaneous to enforced trials for TD 8 
year-olds, t(16) = -2.39, p= .029 and TD 10 year-olds, t(15) = -2.40, p= .030.  In 
contrast, a significant decrease in allocentric score was demonstrated in participants 
with WS, t(16) = 2.24, p= .040.  No significant difference was found for 5 or 6 year-
olds. 
To determine whether there were any effects of gender, spontaneous and 
enforced allocentric scores for males and females were also compared.  Results found 
no significant differences between males and females on spontaneous or enforced 
allocentric scores in any group (p> .05 for all).  
 
3.3.6 Layout knowledge test 
The correct layout from a choice of six was chosen by 31.3% of participants in 
the 5 year-old group, 33.3% of 6 year-olds, 52.9% of 8 year-olds, 62.5% of 10 year-olds, 
and 35.3% of participants with WS.  Even the oldest TD children did not, therefore, 
perform at an exceptionally high level on this task.  However, this is in line with what 
could be expected based on the percentage of older TD participants who were able to 
successfully employ either an allocentric or mixed navigation strategy on enforced trials 
(8 year-olds = 45.1%, and 10 year-olds = 59.4%).  
Performance in each group was compared to the level that would be expected 
due to chance (16.67%).  Results of chi-squared tests showed no significant difference 
from chance among 5 year-olds, 6 year-olds, or participants with WS, (p> .05 for all).  
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In contrast, the correct layout was chosen significantly more often than chance in 8 
year-olds χ2 (1) = 5.11, p= .024, and 10 year-olds, χ2 (1) = 7.54, p= .006.  For 
proportion of each maze layout option, including the correct choice (layout 4) chosen by 
participants in each group, see 3.3.6.1 Figure 14. 
Independent samples t-tests were used to examine whether children in the oldest 
two TD groups who chose the correct layout had higher allocentric scores than those 
who chose the incorrect layout.  The results found that TD 10 year-olds who chose the 
correct layout had significantly higher percentage ‘enforced allocentric’ scores (correct: 
Mean = 66.67, SD= 30.17; incorrect: Mean = 29.17, SD= 17.28), than those who were 
incorrect, t(13.99) = 3.16, p= .007.  No significant differences were found for 
spontaneous allocentric scores, or for either allocentric scores in TD 8 year-olds (p > .05 
for all). 
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3.3.6.1 Figure 14. Proportions of each maze layout option chosen by participants in each group
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3.3.7 Relationships between allocentric score, age and cognitive abilities  
Given the wide age-range in the WS group, it may have been that older 
participants with WS were more likely to use an allocentric strategy than younger 
participants with WS, due to greater life-experience in navigating, and thus increased 
opportunities to develop a more efficient navigation strategy.  Furthermore, 
chronological age in WS was positively related to object-based mental rotation ability in 
study 1 (see 2.3.7), suggesting that some spatial abilities may develop with age in 
individuals with WS.  Therefore, the relationships between age and allocentric scores 
were calculated for each group.  Given the small sample sizes in relation to results of 
power analyses discussed in Chapter 2 (suggested N = 21), data were collapsed across 
TD age groups.  Data were normally distributed for TD and WS groups (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov, p> .05), and so Pearsons correlations were used. 
Results showed that, although age was significantly correlated with both 
spontaneous and enforced allocentric score in the TD group when collapsed across age 
groups (spontaneous, r (63) = .28, p= .024; enforced, r (63) = .39, p= .002), no 
significant relationships were found for any TD group separately (p> .05 for all), nor 
between age and allocentric scores in the WS group (p> .05 for both). 
As allocentric ability was not correlated with chronological age in any group, the 
relationship between performance on verbal and non-verbal cognitive measures and 
ability to employ an allocentric strategy during navigation was also examined.  
Correlations were calculated for each group separately between BPVS-III and RCPM 
raw scores and both spontaneous- and enforced-allocentric scores.  Results showed that 
for 6 year-olds, percentage enforced allocentric score was significantly positively 
related to BPVS-III raw score, r (15) = .67, p= .010.  Conversely, for 10 year-olds, the 
percentage enforced allocentric score was significantly positively related to RCPM raw 
score, r (16) = .65, p= .007.  No other significant correlations were found in 5 year-olds, 
8 year-olds and WS groups (p>.05 for all).  
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3.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine navigation strategies employed in a large-
scale virtual environment, by typically-developing children aged 5–10 years and 
individuals with Williams syndrome.  The study examined the strategies that were 
employed spontaneously during navigation and also the ability to use an allocentric 
strategy on trials that required an understanding of interrelationships between features 
within the environment and a representation of the environmental layout.   
The types of strategies used to navigate through the cross-maze were in line with 
those identified in previous studies of similar design (Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; Iglói et 
al., 2009).  In particular, TD children between 5 and 10 years predominantly relied on 
the use of a sequential egocentric strategy –retracing the same sequence of body turns – 
to navigate through a route.  The results also identified some spontaneous use of 
allocentric strategies, particularly in the older TD children, and an increase with age in 
the spontaneous use of a mirrored strategy, indicative of an increasing sophistication in 
the use of different spatial frames of reference with development.  This, in turn, 
suggests that the use of a mirrored strategy was a reflection of partial allocentric 
knowledge, rather than a backwards re-tracing of the route from the end to the start.  
Backwards retracing would have reflected a misunderstanding of the task instructions 
and thus would be more likely seen in the youngest TD group.   
These findings also reflect performance seen in typical adults (Iglói et al., 2009), 
suggesting that from at least 5 years of age, a predominant reliance on the use of an 
egocentric strategy during basic way-finding in a familiar environment does not go 
through a significant developmental change.  The results did, however, highlight a 
developmental increase in the ability to employ an allocentric spatial strategy when 
navigation required an understanding of the spatial relationships between environmental 
locations.  This is indicative of an age-related increase in the ability to encode more 
complex spatial information for successful and efficient navigation.  During enforced 
allocentric trials where participants were required to encode the spatial relationships 
within the environment, independent of previously experienced viewpoints, only 8 and 
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10 year-old TD children showed a reliable use of this spatial ability.  In contrast to this, 
Bullens, Iglói, et al. (2010) showed above chance performance on allocentric spatial 
tasks in TD children as young as 5 and 6 years.  Although the current cross-maze was 
designed as a less complex environment than that used in previous studies, including 
fewer decision points, our results may be a reflection of more stringent scoring criteria, 
with trials counted as incorrect when a participant made incorrect initial turns or 
returning later to a correct path following indirect exploration.  This is reflected in the 
high number of incorrect (‘non-specific’) trials performed across groups.  However, the 
more stringent scoring criteria used in the current study is likely to more accurately 
bring to light the ability of each participant to use an allocentric strategy from the 
starting point of a trial, without error; thus, producing a clearer summary of 
performance.  
The findings from the layout choice test also show that only the oldest TD 
participants were able to accurately select the correct layout more often than chance, 
indicative of having developed an allocentric spatial representation of the environment.  
Indeed, this was reflected in significantly higher enforced-allocentric scores in TD 10 
year-olds who correctly chose the layout compared to those who made an incorrect 
selection.  The second highest choice across all groups was the alternative square layout 
with four paths, suggesting that participants in each group had developed some 
understanding of the basic shape of the environment.  However, given that this was the 
most commonly selected layout by individuals in the youngest TD and WS groups, the 
conceptualisation of traversing and making turns around a square-shaped route may 
have been the most prominent and important feature for these participants, rather than 
the correct global spatial representation that would have taken into account all aspects 
of the environmental layout.     
In addition to replicating previous findings in TD children, these results provide 
insight into the nature of large-scale spatial navigation in WS.  Individuals with WS 
were able to successfully learn a route through the environment after a similar number 
of trials as TD children between 5 and 8 years of age.  This is in line with previous 
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route-learning studies, in which individuals with WS were able to learn a route 
sequence and recall this successfully after a few attempts, albeit at a slower rate than TD 
children (e.g., Farran et al., 2010; Farran, Courbois, Van Herwegen, & Blades, 2012).  
Therefore, although route-learning may be impaired relative to chronological age in WS, 
the performance of individuals with this disorder is in line with TD children of similar 
non-verbal ability. 
In contrast to route-learning ability in WS, trials examining the type of 
spontaneous strategies used during wayfinding highlighted an atypical pattern of 
performance in this group.  Unlike TD children, for whom a sequential egocentric 
strategy was predominantly employed, individuals with WS primarily demonstrated the 
use of a mixed strategy.  On such trials, it could be surmised that participants began by 
using a body-based sequential egocentric strategy to navigate, but then switched to 
using environmental landmarks as a guide to the correct path.  Use of this strategy could 
therefore be a reflection of a change from an egocentric to allocentric strategy within 
one trial, following the late realisation of a change in starting position.  As a 
consequence, in the calculation of an ‘allocentric score’, participants were rewarded for 
partial use of an allocentric strategy when this occurred.  This therefore elucidates the 
high allocentric score on spontaneous trials in the WS group relative to TD groups.  
Two possible explanations could be put forward for this finding in WS.  Firstly, it may 
have been that participants with WS were more able than TD children to spontaneously 
switch to using an allocentric strategy to find the correct path.  Secondly, an alternative 
explanation is that individuals with WS would start by relying on the use of a sequential 
egocentric strategy, but then following a difficulty in determining subsequent turns, 
would switch to using a view-matching strategy, relying on perceptual matching of 
visual scenes of distant landmarks to guide navigation.  If the first turn made by 
participants in the WS group was due to random choice, there would likely be an equal 
number of ‘mixed’ and ‘allocentric’ strategies reported during spontaneous strategy 
trials.  However, the higher proportion of ‘mixed’ strategies in this group is indicative 
of the ability to remember only the initial egocentric turn.  It should be noted however, 
that a ‘mixed’ strategy was not used consistently across the four strategy trials in this 
 127 
group.  Therefore, although this may have been the predominant strategy used in the 
WS group, inconsistency by participants with WS on this task suggests a more 
unsystematic and extemporary approach to navigation.    
Poor performance in WS on ‘enforced allocentric’ trials that required the use of 
an allocentric navigation strategy for success, also suggest that the use of a mixed 
strategy on spontaneous trials was unlikely to be a reflection of allocentric spatial 
knowledge in this group.  Indeed, participants with WS presented with a significantly 
lower allocentric score on enforced trials compared to spontaneous trials.  This indicates 
that although landmarks are significantly utilised in guiding the retracing of a route in 
WS (conceivably through the use of a view-matching strategy), developing a 
representation of the interrelationships between landmarks and the location of the exit 
following movement of the self, may be particularly problematic.  
This use of a mixed strategy and possible switch to a reliance on view-matching 
was less evident, however, on enforced trials.  This may have been due to difficulties in 
switching from an egocentric to view-matching strategy when beginning from multiple 
starting places on these trials.  Alternatively, the second route may not have been 
consolidated as well as the first, and therefore been under competition from the 
previously learnt route.  However, this is unlikely as participants in all groups 
successfully learnt the second route before continuing onto the enforced allocentric 
trials.  These findings raise a question as to whether individuals with WS would perform 
successfully during an enforced egocentric task, or have difficulties in the use of a 
sequential egocentric strategy; a concept that will be examined further in study 4.    
Allocentric coding difficulties in WS are in line with previous results from both 
small (e.g., Bernardino et al., 2013; Nardini et al., 2008) and large-scale (Farran et al., 
2010) tasks, and findings of atypical search strategies and difficulties developing a 
cognitive spatial map in real-world tasks (Foti et al., 2011).  Even adults with WS have 
difficulties in understanding the intrinsic spatial relationships between landmarks within 
an array (Nardini et al., 2008), despite it being seen to develop in TD children as young 
as 5 years of age.  Similarly, impairments in the use of both egocentric and allocentric 
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frames of reference in WS were identified using 3D spatial judgment tasks (Bernardino 
et al., 2013).   
Given the multiple opportunities to navigate the VE in this study, allocentric 
spatial coding difficulties in WS are unlikely to be due to reduced navigation experience, 
as seen in typical development (e.g. Anooshian & Young, 1981; Lehnung et al., 2003; 
Siegel & White, 1975).  As such, it is unlikely that poor performance on large-scale 
tasks requiring relational knowledge in previous studies (Farran et al., 2010) would 
have been alleviated with continued environmental experience.  Indeed, even potential 
navigation experience gained throughout development in individuals with WS was not 
conducive to superior allocentric coding abilities, as seen in the lack of reliable 
association between chronological age and allocentric scores in this group.    
Findings from spontaneous trials in particular suggest a greater unprompted 
reliance on landmarks in WS than in TD children, who showed a predominant use of a 
strategy that did not take into account the presence of landmarks.  This reliance on such 
a rudimentary view-matching approach to wayfinding in WS may be related to 
underlying difficulties in spatial working memory, previously noted in WS (Mandolesi 
et al., 2009; Vicari, Bellucci, & Carlesimo, 2003; Vicari et al., 2006).  The use of a 
sequential egocentric strategy relies on the ability to continuously update the location of 
the self in reference to the starting position both temporally and spatially, and is hence 
supported by spatial working memory.  Research examining the use of landmarks 
during navigation in WS, alongside performance on perceptual view-matching tasks 
would, therefore, further explicate the spontaneous strategies relied on in WS.  Poor 
performance on perceptual-matching tasks would demonstrate difficulties in recalling 
and visually matching patterns, and would thus rule out view-matching as a possible 
way-finding strategy; however, findings suggest that perceptual matching may be 
relatively unimpaired in WS (Hoffman et al., 2003).  Indeed, Vicari et al. (2006) found 
that performance in WS was in-line with mental-age matched controls on a perceptual 
object matching task, but not on a perceptual spatial orientation task, suggesting that 
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different perceptual abilities may be differentially affected in WS, particularly when a 
spatial element is included in a task. 
Results from spontaneous and enforced trials in this study imply that processing 
of both allocentric and egocentric spatial codes may be atypical in WS.  Even though 
route-learning ability was in line with TD children of similar non-verbal ability, the 
differential use of strategies during navigation compared to the same group of TD 
children suggests that this is not simply a reflection of developmental delay in WS, but 
of a differential developmental trajectory.  It is likely, therefore, that individuals with 
WS use alternative compensatory strategies to navigate, often resulting in inefficient 
search techniques.    
Difficulties in the use of egocentric spatial coding are in line with a particular 
vulnerability of the parietal portion of the dorsal stream known to be associated with 
WS (e.g. J. Atkinson & Braddick, 2011; J. Atkinson et al., 1997; Meyer-Lindenberg et 
al., 2004).  In typical development, the dorsal visual stream is specialised for the 
guidance of action (Milner & Goodale, 1995), and the atypical development of the 
dorsal stream in WS is thought to be an enduring feature across development, persisting 
into adulthood (J. Atkinson et al., 2006).  Activation of the left hippocampus also plays 
a role in the use of a sequential egocentric representation during navigation (Iglói et al., 
2010).  Vulnerability of the hippocampus in WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005) is 
therefore likely to contribute to impairments in episodic memory, namely, difficulties in 
retracing the complete sequence of turns through an environment identified in this 
group. 
One study examining large-scale spatial search in two individuals with WS and 
two patients with a partial genetic deletion on the WS critical region of chromosome 
7q11.23, also alludes to difficulties in the coding of egocentric spatial information in 
WS (Smith, Gilchrist, Hood, Tassabehji, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2009).  The authors found 
that, in comparison to the inefficient search strategies seen in WS, the partial deletion 
patients did not demonstrate such difficulties, despite the deletion of the LIM domain 
kinase 1 (LIMK1) gene, which has been previously implicated in spatial deficits in WS 
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(e.g. Frangiskakis et al., 1996).  As such, difficulties observed with egocentric spatial 
coding in WS may arise from a combination of deleted genes within the WS critical 
region, which in-turn impinges upon the development of brain regions that typically 
subserve such cognitive functions.  This will be explored further in study 5, through the 
presentation of two individuals with contrasting partial deletions on 7q11.23. 
Turning to allocentric coding and the associated role of the hippocampus (e.g. 
Iaria et al., 2007; Iglói et al., 2010; King et al., 2002), impairments in global spatial 
representations are also in line with known atypical function and metabolism of this 
region in WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005).  This said, the ability to update the 
location of the self following movement within an allocentric frame of reference is 
thought to rely on successful translation between egocentric and allocentric spatial 
codes supported by the parietal and retrosplenial regions (including the hippocampus), 
respectively (Burgess, 2008; Lambrey et al., 2012; Vann et al., 2009).  Therefore, 
attributing the difficulties in egocentric and allocentric spatial coding in WS to deficits 
in individual brain regions may be somewhat simplistic, and a more detailed 
understanding of the relationships between behaviour and atypical functioning in these 
brain areas in WS is required.  Further studies involving functional brain imaging 
during large-scale navigation tasks in WS may help to elucidate the specific cortical 
mechanisms associated with the performance and types of navigation strategies 
employed in this group.  
Impairments in the ability to encode large-scale space in relation to both 
egocentric and allocentric spatial reference frames indicate that it may not only be the 
more complex spatial tasks that pose a challenge for individuals with WS.  It is unclear, 
however, whether the use of view-matching and reliance on landmarks during 
navigation in WS is the result of an atypical spontaneous strategy, or whether this has 
been taught as a compensatory strategy to some individuals.  Further examination of 
this and the development of navigation abilities with age and experience in WS may 
provide insight into possible interventions to enhance the use of more efficient 
navigation strategies.  This said, no relationship was found between age, or cognitive 
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ability, and allocentric score in WS in this study, and so it may be unlikely that 
experience and age are influencing factors in increased navigational ability in this group.  
However, an examination of the reliance on landmarks in WS compared to TD children 
during route learning may provide insight into whether this is an important strategy for 
individuals with this disorder.  
 
3.5 Conclusions   
In summary, the results of this study indicate that during spontaneous navigation 
through a familiar environment, TD children between 5 and 10 years of age 
predominantly rely on the use of a sequential egocentric strategy.  Individuals with WS, 
however, primarily employ an atypical navigation strategy, which likely involves an 
early switch from the use of an egocentric strategy to a reliance on the perceptual 
properties of visual landmark scenes in an environment as indicators to the correct 
pathway.  On trials that required an understanding of the spatial relationships between 
landmarks in the environment, however, only TD children aged 8-10 years 
demonstrated the ability to use an allocentric strategy and develop a global mental 
representation of the environmental layout.  These results are indicative of deficits both 
in allocentric and sequential egocentric spatial coding in WS, even following extensive 
experience in an environment, resulting in the use of more time-consuming and less 
efficient strategies for way-finding in large-scale environments.  Specific inferences that 
can be made from the findings of this study bring into question whether individuals with 
WS are able to develop a sequential egocentric representation of a route.  Indeed, if not, 
do individuals with WS rely heavily on the presence of landmarks and visual cues to 
orientate and locate their goal; and to a greater extent even than TD children?  A further 
investigation of this in study 4 may provide important insight not only into the specific 
impairments that individuals with WS have when navigating through large-scale 
environments, but also the strategies and methods that are preferably relied upon in this 
group.    
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Chapter 4 
Study 3: The relationship between small and large-scale spatial abilities in 
typical development and Williams syndrome 
 
4.1 Introduction 
For the most part, research into spatial cognition, and particularly the field of 
Williams syndrome research, has examined small-scale visuospatial abilities separately 
from performance on large-scale tasks.  Despite spatial cognition at different scales 
being considered somewhat dissociable, performance on small-scale spatial tasks is 
often used to make inferences about cognition and processing in large-scale space (D.R. 
Montello, 1993).  However, the relationships between these aspects of spatial cognition, 
and thus the underlying determinants of large-scale spatial knowledge, are not clearly 
understood.  Different reports have been offered regarding the extent to which 
performance on tests in small-scale space account for the variance in spatial ability on 
large-scale environmental tasks.  Predominantly, these studies have correlated small-
scale, table-top measures of spatial cognition with large-scale measures such as route-
knowledge or way-finding ability (e.g., Pearson & Ialongo, 1986; Thorndyke & Goldin, 
1983).  Some authors have noted substantial correlations, as high as r =.57 (Walsh, 
Krauss, & Regnier, 1981) and even .88 (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978).  However, in a 
review of the literature examining the link between table-top psychometric test 
performance and large-scale spatial abilities, Hegarty and Waller (2005) found 
predominantly very weak correlations (around r = .2) reported by the majority of 
authors.   
Support for a robust relationship between spatial abilities at different scales 
therefore is ambiguous.  However, differences in study outcomes and generally poor 
levels of predictability may be due to the use of different spatial measures at both scales, 
and with disparate cognitive factors likely to underlie different large-scale spatial 
abilities (Allen et al., 1996; Hegarty et al., 2006).  For example, navigational abilities 
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may be differentially related to aspects of visuospatial cognition, depending on the type 
of spatial information and mental imagery required for each task.   
As discussed in study 1, a distinction can be made between cognitive processes 
required for the mental manipulation of objects and those for imagined self-rotations 
(see also, Huttenlocher & Presson, 1979).  Research has therefore sought to examine the 
relationships between these different mental imagery skills and different aspects of 
environmental spatial cognition.  As discussed more thoroughly in 1.3, in typical adults, 
the ability to mentally rotate a geometric shape and imagine the self moving through an 
environment are related to an ability to form a mental representation of the spatial 
relationships between landmarks and update the location of the self within this cognitive 
map (Palermo et al., 2008).  Similarly, visual perspective-taking ability in adults 
reliably predicts navigational abilities, particularly on tasks that required the individual 
to keep track of their changing position in relation to environmental objects 
(Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  Conversely, the authors of this study did not find a reliable 
relationship between mental rotation and navigational performance.  
Other research has also identified relationships between different cognitive 
processing strategies on small-scale tasks and the ability to successfully develop route 
(also called way-finding) knowledge compared to allocentric (also called 
survey/cognitive-map/global) knowledge (e.g., Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982).  For 
instance, individuals who are able to successfully develop survey representations of 
large-scale space outperform ‘landmark-centred’ navigators on tests of mental rotation 
(Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001), with others showing that route and survey encoding are 
preferentially related to perspective-taking and object-based rotations, respectively 
(Fields & Shelton, 2006).  Brain imaging studies provide further insight into the 
possible relationships between cognitive processes involved in tasks at different spatial 
scales, although these are scarce (however see, Shelton and Gabrieli (2004).  
In developmental research, although some studies have failed to identify 
significant correlations between small and large-scale spatial tasks (Quaiser-Pohl et al., 
2004), a link between performance on tests of visuospatial ability (including mental 
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rotation, Corsi block and mental paper folding tests) and way-finding in a real-world 
environment was found in children aged 5-6 years, but not for older children aged 7-9 
years of age (Fenner et al., 2000).  Fenner et al. found that young children with a low 
score on tests of visuospatial ability made significantly more errors than those of higher 
visuospatial ability, a pattern not shown in the older children.  This suggests that 
younger children rely on different cognitive strategies to support navigation, which are 
more related to the small-scale visuospatial abilities examined in that study.  Fenner and 
colleagues concluded that older children may have developed more efficient cognitive 
strategies for way-finding that do not rely on visuospatial cognition, as measured on 
these small-scale tasks.  On examining this further, Purser et al. (2012) found that 
although a significant association was found between standardised measures of 
visuospatial working memory and large-scale route-learning ability in children aged 5-
11 years, these relationships were largely moderated by executive control, suggesting 
that caution should be taken when interpreting correlations between tasks when they 
may both be mediated by other cognitive demands.  
Despite these few developmental studies, the extent to which object-based (OB) 
mental rotation and visual perspective-taking (VPT) are differentially related to large-
scale navigation abilities across development, as seen in typical adults (e.g., 
Kozhevnikov et al., 2006), remains unclear.  Developmental changes in the way in 
which OB rotation and VPT tasks are performed (e.g., Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973; 
Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 1992), and also the maturation of the ability to integrate 
different spatial frames of reference to support navigation (Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; 
Nardini et al., 2006), suggests that there may be different underlying mechanisms 
involved in spatial cognition across development.   In typical adults, a linear increase in 
reaction time is observed with increased angular disparity on object-based mental 
rotation tasks, but not on visual perspective-taking tasks (e.g., Zacks et al., 2000).  In 
typically developing (TD) children however, this angular disparity effect is observed 
during perspective-taking tasks (Roberts & Aman, 1993), demonstrating that children 
use a different technique to perform self-rotations compared to adults, who are able to 
employ a more ‘automatic’ transformation to complete these tasks (Wraga et al., 2000; 
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Zacks & Michelon, 2005).  Indeed, in typical adults an advantage for spatial memory in 
terms of performance and reaction time is found following imagined rotation of the self 
compared to equivalent array-rotations (Lambrey et al., 2012).  As such, developmental 
changes in the cognitive processes involved in these small-scale tasks may result in the 
emergence of different techniques to mentally update the position of the self in large-
scale space during navigation with age.  
With regards to individuals with WS, little can be concluded thus far as to the 
possible relationships between spatial abilities at different scales.  In one study, Farran 
et al. (2010) examined the relationships between route-learning performance in 
individuals with WS compared to TD controls, and performance on small-scale tasks 
that included visuospatial working memory, VPT, and map use.  Results showed that 
performance on small-scale tasks was not related to real-world navigation abilities in 
TD children.  In the WS group and a group of individuals with moderate learning 
difficulty, a measure of visuospatial working memory where participants were asked to 
draw a route through a maze previously seen on an image in front of them, correlated 
with large-scale route knowledge (number of correct turns made retracing a route) and 
relational knowledge (pointing to imperceptible landmarks).  However, associations 
between other small and large-scale spatial abilities were not seen, and as a group, poor 
performance on the maze task contrasted with relatively good route-learning, suggesting 
that impairments on tasks at different spatial scales are not necessarily indicative of a 
single deficit in WS. 
In the present chapter, the relationships between performance on a more 
comprehensive set of measures of small-scale mental rotation and visual perspective-
taking (study 1) and large-scale route-learning and ability to use an allocentric strategy 
for navigation (study 2) were examined.  The present analyses were conducted to further 
identify the extent to which similar cognitive mechanisms may support the capacity to 
perform imagined mental rotations of objects and the self on small-scale tasks and 
different aspects of large-scale navigation in TD children aged 5-10 years and 
individuals with WS.  As discussed above, in typical adults, some inferences can be 
 136 
made as to large-scale spatial abilities or individual preferences for specific navigational 
strategies from performance on different small-scale measures of mental imagery 
(Fields & Shelton, 2006; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001; Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001).  
Therefore, an investigation into the relationships between such tasks in WS and across 
typical development may provide important insight into whether impairments across 
different spatial scales should be considered independent, or are likely supported by 
common underlying mechanisms, such as the ability to employ different spatial frames 
of reference, in these groups.  This would have important implications, particularly for 
research in WS, regarding the extent to which findings of impairments on table-top 
visuospatial tasks could be used to make inferences about deficits in large-scale space. 
The development of an ability to successfully employ the use of an allocentric 
spatial frame of reference between 8 and 10 years of age in a large-scale virtual 
environment (study 2), alongside near-ceiling performance on measures of object-based 
mental rotation and visual perspective-taking (study 1), suggest that older children 
perform more in line with typical adults on these different measures of spatial cognition 
than younger children.  That said, caution should be taken in interpreting the ceiling 
performance on measures of OB mental rotation and VPT, reported in study 1, as 
having reached adult level, given the lack of an adult control group and possible lack of 
sensitivity of the tasks to measure a full range of ability.  However, the navigation 
strategies employed in the oldest TD group in study 2 are similar to those seen in typical 
adults on comparable tasks (Iglói et al., 2009), and suggest a developmental change in 
the ability to apply an appropriate spatial frame of reference between 5 and 10 years of 
age.  Given that positive correlations are identified between performance on different 
measures of mental transformation (imagined rotation of objects or the self) with route-
learning and ability to use an allocentric strategy in adults (e.g., Kozhevnikov & 
Hegarty, 2001), it can be inferred that performance on these types of small- and large-
scale spatial measures will similarly correlate in older children between 8 and 10 years 
of age.  However, the pattern of performance on tasks at different spatial scales in 
younger TD children and individuals with WS and whether similar cognitive 
mechanisms are involved across tasks remains unclear.  
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1. Participants 
For the present analysis, only participants who completed all four mental 
transformation tasks from study 1 (visual perspective-taking (VPT) path, object-based 
(OB) monkey task, VPT circle, and OB circle) and navigation strategies tasks from 
study 2 were included.  Sixty-one TD children were therefore included and separated 
into the same four age-groups as noted in studies 1 and 2: 5 year-olds (N=15, 9 males, 
Mean age (years; months) = 5;06 years, SD = 0;03, CA range = 5;01 – 6;01); 6 year-
olds (N=14, 10 males, Mage = 6;08 years, SD = 0;03, CA range = 6;04 – 7;05); 8 year-
olds (N= 16, 9 males, Mage = 8;03 years, SD = 0;04, CA range = 7;07 – 8;08); and 10 
year-olds (N=16, 9 males, Mage = 10;01 years, SD = 0;03, CA range = 9;06 – 10;07).  
Participants with WS who completed all tasks in study 1 and 2 (N=16, 8 males, Mage = 
22;05 years, SD = 8;04, CA range = 13;01 – 43;03) were also included.   
 
4.2.2. Design and procedure 
All participants completed the four mental rotation tasks in the order stipulated 
in study 1 (see 2.2.6) before completing the spatial navigation tasks.  All participants 
with WS who were included in the present analysis completed testing in one day, with 
breaks given when necessary.  Given that the majority of testing in the TD groups was 
conducted during school time and at the participant’s school, tasks were separated into 
two shorter sessions to be completed within one month (mean = 19.02 days (16.83)). 
For full task designs for the four mental rotation measures and spatial navigation 
tasks, see corresponding Method 2.2 and 3.2.  In brief, participants were asked to 
complete two visual perspective-taking (VPT) tasks to examine the ability to imagine 
the rotation of the self on a single axis (VPT path task) and the rotation of the self to 
various displacements around an array (VPT circle task), and two object-based (OB) 
mental rotation tasks to examine ability to imagine the rotation of a single object on one 
axis (OB monkey task) and the rotation of objects in an array (OB circle task).  This 
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allowed for a full range of OB mental rotation and VPT abilities to be examined.  On 
the spatial navigation task, participants were asked to learn a route in a VE cross-maze.  
They were then tested on their spontaneous navigation strategy and their ability to use 
an allocentric strategy when required to take the shortest route from new starting places 
in the environment. 
    
4.2.3. Variables 
Comparisons were conducted between variables in each main group (TD and 
WS) and each TD age group separately (TD 5, 6, 8 and 10 year-olds).  For the four 
small-scale measures, percentage rotation trials correct on VPT path and OB monkey 
tasks and percentage left-right trials correct on VPT circle and OB circle tasks were 
used.  From the large-scale VE navigation paradigm, variables included ‘route-learning’ 
(the cumulative number of errors across learning trials) and ‘way-finding’ (after having 
reached learning criterion, the number of correct trials from the test phase, excluding the 
4 ‘spontaneous test trials’).  ‘Enforced allocentric score’ was used as a measure of large-
scale relational knowledge. Given the small group sizes and non-normally distributed 
data (kolmogorov-smirnov, p< .05), non-parametric Spearman’s correlations were 
conducted. 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1. Small-scale spatial abilities and large-scale route-learning and way-
finding  
To determine the relationship between small-scale visuospatial ability and large-
scale route-learning and way-finding, comparisons were carried out for each group 
between performance on the four mental rotation trials and number of errors across 
learning trials (route-learning), and number of correct test trials following learning 
(way-finding). 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, given the small sample sizes in relation to 
results of power analyses (suggested N = 21), data were first collapsed across TD age 
groups. When collapsing across TD groups and controlling for age, significant 
correlations were only found between performance on the VPT path and ‘wayfinding’ (r 
(57)= .28, p= .035), and between OB circle performance and route-learning (r (57)= .32, 
p = .013).  
On examination of relationships between tasks across each group separately, a 
significant relationship was found between large-scale route-learning and performance 
on the OB circle task in TD 6 year-olds, rs (14)= -.66, p= .010, and TD 10 year-olds, rs 
(16)= -.54, p= .033, and between route-learning and VPT path task in TD 8 year-olds, rs 
(14) = -.52, p= .041, and TD 10 year-olds, rs (16) = -.54, p= .032.  No other 
comparisons between performance on small-scale tasks and route-learning were 
significant in any other group (p > .05 for all).  
Comparisons between large-scale way-finding performance and small-scale 
tasks yielded significant relationships only in TD 10 year-olds between number of 
correct test trials and OB circle, rs (16) = .54, p= .031.  No other comparisons were 
significant in any other group (p > .05 for all).  For full results of correlational analyses, 
see 4.3.2.1 Table 11. 
 
4.3.2. Small-scale spatial abilities and large-scale allocentric knowledge 
To examine whether performance on small-scale tasks were related to large-
scale spatial relational knowledge, comparisons were carried out between the four 
small-scale mental rotation measures and percentage enforced allocentric score.  This 
variable was used as this provided the most accurate indicator of participants’ ability to 
use an allocentric strategy to navigate in a large-scale environment when required.  
Non-parametric comparisons yielded a significant relationship between performance on 
the two VPT tasks and allocentric score in the TD 10 year-olds, in the predicted 
direction; VPT path: r s (16) = .72, p= .002 and VPT circle: r s (16) = .63, p= .009. 
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4.3.2.1 Table 11. Non-parametric correlations between small and large-scale 
spatial abilities for each group 
Group  VPT patha OB monkeyb VPT circlec  OB circled 
rs .23 -.09 -.18 -.11 Route 
learninge  p .41 .75 .53 .71 
rs .47 -.04 .16 -.22 Wayfinding 
correctf  p .08 .89 .58 .43 
rs -.15 -.12 .04 -.25 
5 yrs 
Allo scoreg 
p .59 .70 .88 .36 
rs -.04 -.35 -.41 -.66 Route 
learning  p .89 .22 .15 .01** 
rs .17 .16 -.21 .12 Wayfinding 
correct  p .56 .59 .46 .69 
rs -.06 .29 .24 .10 
6 yrs 
Allo score 
p .83 .32 .42 .73 
rs -.52 .06 .43 -.28 Route 
learning  p .04* .84 .10 .30 
rs -.08 .19 .16 .05 Wayfinding 
correct  p .78 .49 .55 .86 
rs -.38 .02 .09 -.09 
8 yrs 
Allo score 
p .14 .93 .75 .74 
rs -.54 -.29 -.17 -.54 Route 
learning  p .03* .27 .52 .03* 
rs .45 .26 .38 .54 Wayfinding 
correct  p .08 .33 .15 .03* 
rs .72 .18 .63 .37 
10 yrs 
Allo score 
p <.01** .49 .01** .15 
rs .04 .44 -.23 .05 Route 
learning  p .88 .09 .39 .86 
rs .07 .06 -.25 .32 Wayfinding 
correct  p .79 .82 .35 .25 
rs -.21 -.15 -.09 .25 
WS 
Allo score 
p .43 .59 .75 .37 
* = significant at .05 level, ** = significant at .01 level. aPercentage correct on VPT 
path, bpercentage correct rotation trials on PB monkey task, cpercentage correct left-
right trials on VPT circle task, dpercentage correct left-right trials on PB circle task, 
ecumulative number of errors on route-learning trials, ftotal correct wayfinding trials, 
gpercentage enforced allocentric score. 
 
4.3.3. Small-scale spatial abilities and layout knowledge test 
To further examine associations between small-scale spatial abilities and large-
scale spatial relational knowledge, performance on small-scale tasks by participants 
 141 
who correctly identified the spatial layout and those who did not, were compared in 
each group.  Participants in each group were separated into subgroups of those who 
selected the correct layout option on the ‘layout knowledge test’ and those who chose 
an incorrect option.  Given the small and unequal subgroup sizes, non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney tests were conducted to compare mean scores on each mental 
transformation test between correct and incorrect subgroup participants in each group 
separately.  Descriptive statistics are displayed in 4.3.3.1 Figure 15. 
Significant differences in mean scores were found between ‘correct’ and 
‘incorrect’ subgroups on the VPT maze, VPT circle and OB circle, in TD 10 year-olds 
only (VPT maze: U= 5.50, p= .005; VPT circle: U= 15.00, p= .048; and OB circle: U= 
9.50, p= .024).  No significant difference between subgroups in TD 10 year-olds was 
found on the OB monkey task (p> .05).  No significant differences between subgroups 
on mental transformation scores were found for any other group (p> .05 for all). 
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4.3.3.1 Figure 15. Mean (SE) percentage score on the four mental transformation tasks for layout test subgroups (correct [blue]/ incorrect [red]) in 
each group 
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4.4 Discussion 
The extent to which object-based mental rotation and visual perspective-taking 
are differentially related to large-scale navigation abilities in TD children and 
individuals with WS was examined in this chapter.  The results revealed significant 
correlations between route-learning performance in a large-scale environment and the 
ability to mentally rotate objects around a small-scale array (OB circle task) in TD 6 and 
10 year-olds, and the ability to imagine the self rotating on a single axis (VPT path) in 
TD 10 year-olds.  Way-finding ability on a previously-learnt route was associated with 
performance on the OB circle task only in the TD 10 year-old group.  Comparatively, 
large-scale allocentric knowledge positively correlated with both small-scale measures 
of VPT in the oldest TD group, indicative of a large amount of shared variance between 
imagining the self moving on a single axis and around an array, and the ability to 
develop a mental representation of the spatial relationships in a large-scale environment 
at 10 years of age.  This was further supported as TD 10 year-olds who chose the 
correct environmental layout (a test of large-scale allocentric spatial knowledge) 
performed at a significantly higher level on the two VPT tasks than those who chose an 
incorrect layout.  No reliable associations between performances on tasks at different 
spatial scales were found in the WS group, a discussion of which will follow an 
examination of the findings across typical development.  
Previous developmental studies regarding the extent to which small-scale spatial 
abilities are related to performance on spatial tasks at an environmental scale have 
shown mixed results.  In one study, a significantly greater number of environmental 
route-learning errors were made by TD 5-6 year olds with low compared to high 
visuospatial ability, a finding not seen in older TD children aged 7-9 years (Fenner et al., 
2000).  However, although the study by Fenner and colleagues included visuospatial 
measures such as mental rotation, spatial short-term memory span, and a mental paper-
folding task, an aggregate visuospatial score was calculated from these sub-tests and 
individual spatial skills were not examined separately.  A more multifaceted view of 
visuospatial cognition was taken in the current analyses, and the findings suggest that 
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different large-scale spatial abilities in children are associated with disparate aspects of 
small-scale spatial cognition, not just with visuospatial cognition per se.  In particular, 
the ability to mentally rotate the position of shapes around an array was reliably 
associated both with learning a new route in an environment in 6 and 10 year-olds, and 
re-tracing a familiar route having previously reached learning criterion in 10 year-olds.  
Of note however is the lack of reliable correlations in TD 5 and 8 year-olds on these 
tasks alongside significant findings in the TD 6 and 10 year-olds.  In typical adults, 
mental rotation abilities have been found to be associated with a preference for survey-
based (allocentric) encoding, but not with better route learning performance, as seen in 
TD 6 and 10 year-olds in this chapter (Fields & Shelton, 2006; Pazzaglia & De Beni, 
2001; Shelton & Gabrieli, 2004).  The contrasting findings presented here may reflect a 
difference in strategy use for learning a route in children compared to adults that 
suggests similar cognitive demands are involved in imagined array-rotation and route-
learning during development, but not by adulthood.  However, little is known about the 
neural correlates of spatial encoding at small and large scales across development, and 
so our understanding of the possible shared mechanisms underlying mental rotation 
abilities and different aspects of navigational performance in typical children compared 
to adults remains limited.  If mental rotation is indeed a robust predictor of route-
learning performance in TD children, the small group sizes in this study may be a 
contributing factor to the lack of reliable findings across all TD groups (as indicated by 
the a priori power analyses).  Further research with larger sample sizes across groups 
should therefore be conducted before robust conclusions can be met regarding the extent 
to which OB mental rotation is associated with environmental route-learning across this 
period of development.   
Other developmental studies have been unsuccessful in finding a relationship 
between small-scale spatial abilities and environmental knowledge in children (Quaiser-
Pohl et al., 2004).  Here, the authors reported no correlations between measures of 
small-scale spatial cognition (spatial object-perception and mental rotation) and 
configurational (allocentric) knowledge as measured by neighbourhood sketch-maps 
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drawn by children aged 9-12 years.  This finding was, in part, reflected in the current 
analysis, with no significant associations found between measures of OB mental 
rotation and allocentric knowledge in any group.  However, in the oldest TD group, 
individuals who selected the correct environmental layout were significantly better at 
mentally rotating objects around an array.  On one hand, this may indicate that (in older 
TD children) this small-scale ability shares more similar underlying mechanisms with 
large-scale allocentric knowledge than classic mental rotation of a single object as 
measured by the OB monkey task in the current analysis and those used by Quaiser-
Pohl and colleagues.  However, a lack of relationship with the OB monkey task in this 
chapter is more likely a reflection of near-ceiling performance on this task by 8 and 10 
year-olds.  Alternatively therefore, the current findings can be considered as reflecting 
the relationship between OB rotation abilities and ‘map-like’ or survey encoding of an 
environment seen in typical adults (Fields & Shelton, 2006; Pazzaglia & De Beni, 2001; 
Shelton & Gabrieli, 2004), by 10 years of age.   
Until now, studies examining associations between cognitive abilities at 
different spatial scales in TD children have not included measures of VPT (although see 
Farran et al., 2010).  Strong positive correlations between performance on both VPT 
tasks and allocentric score in TD 10 year-olds in the current analyses suggest that small-
scale VPT may be a more reliable predictor of individual and developmental differences 
in large-scale spatial abilities, and particularly allocentric knowledge, than OB mental 
rotation.  This pattern of performance in TD 10 year-olds is in line with adult data, 
which indicates that VPT ability is positively related to performance on navigational 
tasks that require updating self-to-object representations, more than the variance 
predicted by mental rotation measures (Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  Indeed, Palermo and 
colleagues (2008) similarly found that the ability to develop a cognitive map was related 
to the ability to imagine the self moving through an environment, as measured in a task 
similar to the VPT path task used here. 
It is logical to surmise that similar cognitive mechanisms are employed during 
the use of an allocentric navigation strategy, which allows for the recognition of 
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environmental landmarks and their relative location given a change in viewer 
perspective, and imagining what an array of objects would look like following a change 
in position, as measured in small-scale VPT tasks.  Neuroimaging studies support the 
finding of an association between these two cognitive abilities.  For instance, 
preferential activation of the parieto-occipital sulcus (including retrosplenial cortex) and 
left anterior hippocampus are seen in tasks requiring imagined self-rotation compared to 
object/array-based mental rotation (Lambrey et al., 2012); a finding consistent with 
cortical activation that is often associated with spatial navigation (e.g., Maguire, 2001) 
and the ‘spatial updating’ of egocentric locations (supported by the posterior parietal 
lobe) within an allocentric environmental frame of reference (supported by hippocampal 
and medial temporal lobe structures) (Vann et al., 2009).  In essence, comparable brain 
regions are seen to subserve imagined self-rotations and the ability to update the 
location of the self following movement in small and large-scale space, respectively. 
Why then is the association between VPT and allocentric ability not also 
observed in TD children younger than 10 years of age?  The ability to infer spatial 
relationships between elements in an environment that are independent of the viewer’s 
initial perspective develops between 6 and 8 years (Nardini et al., 2009), suggesting that 
children of this age possess the mental operations by which they are able to imagine 
themselves at a different viewpoint.  However, no relationship between imagined self-
rotations (on the VPT tasks) and allocentric knowledge was found in the current chapter 
in these age groups.  As such, the representation of spatial relationships between objects 
in an array may not be akin to developing a representation of a whole space 
allocentrically.  Development of the ability to switch successfully between egocentric 
and allocentric navigation strategies is protracted, with adult-like performance not 
occurring until 10 years (Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; see also study 2).  This, alongside a 
similar developmental course for performing imagined transformations of the self (see 
study 2) more feasibly underlies the lack of association between VPT and navigation 
abilities in TD children before this age.  As such, the use of a successful strategy on the 
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allocentric navigation tasks in children below 10 years may be accounted for by 
different processing to that used by older children and adults. 
Immature executive functioning, particularly inhibition, may also contribute to 
difficulties in strategy-switching during navigation in younger children, as seen in other 
spatial cognitive tasks (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006), and in 
inhibiting an egocentric response in VPT tasks.  Proficiency on tasks of inhibition is 
dependent on the frontal lobes, which are considered to have an extended 
developmental course (Diamond, 1990).  Purser et al. (2012) found that correlations 
between performance on measures of visuospatial short-term memory and route-
learning in school-age children were mediated by aspects of executive function indexed 
by a ‘Go/No-Go’ task , even when controlling for chronological age.  This may 
therefore support the findings of shared variance between small and large-scale 
measures in older TD children, but not in younger children who have poorer inhibitory 
control.   
In the analyses conducted in this chapter, no significant correlations were found 
between performance on any spatial tasks at different scales in the WS group.  Given 
that differences in performance across VPT and OB tasks are reported between TD and 
WS groups (see section 2.3), and that some reliable associations between small and 
large-scale measures (particularly in TD 10 year-olds) were found, the tasks used in this 
study can be considered valid and reliable measures of different components of 
visuospatial cognition.  As such, the lack of significant relationships between task 
performances in the WS group across any measures warrants an alternative explanation.  
Performance at the level of chance on imagined rotations of objects and the self at 
rotations greater than 45º from vantage point in WS may partly elucidate the lack of 
associations in this group.  However, despite poor group performances on the majority 
of imagined rotations on VPT and OB tasks in the WS group, all WS participants were 
able to learn a route, and to a similar extent to TD children of comparable non-verbal 
ability.  Furthermore, performance on the OB monkey task in WS was found to 
correlate significantly with chronological age, even when controlling for verbal and 
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non-verbal ability (see 2.3.7) indicative of variability in spatial ability in WS.  On 
measures of large-scale spatial cognition however, variation in performances within the 
WS group reflected a more inconsistent and unsystematic approach to navigation rather 
than strategic behaviour seen in (particularly older) TD children.  
These findings suggest that, although no reliable correlations are seen between 
performance on small and large-scale spatial tasks, not all spatial skills are 
compromised to the same extent in WS; particularly in regards to large-scale spatial 
cognition, where route-learning abilities may not be as compromised as spatial 
relational coding.  Furthermore, just because impairments in WS are seen on small-scale 
spatial tasks, it is not parsimonious to assume that these difficulties will translate to 
large-scale space. This was echoed by Farran and colleagues (2010), who found 
minimal correlations between small and large-scale abilities in individuals with WS, 
concluding that impairments in WS on small and large-scale tasks are indicative of 
independent deficits at each level.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The findings presented in this chapter, alongside those from previous research, 
have important implications for understanding spatial cognition both in typical 
development and WS.  In TD children, aspects of large-scale spatial cognition that 
consist of route-learning and way-finding abilities are reliably associated with the 
ability to imagine the rotation of an array of objects.  However, this was not a finding 
that was consistently found across each age group, and is in contrast with results from 
typical adults.  More reliable relationships however were found between performance 
on small-scale VPT tasks and allocentric ability at a large scale in TD 10 year-olds, a 
finding that is in line with performance and shared variance between such tasks in 
adults.  In the WS group, no significant relationships were found between abilities at 
different spatial scales, indicative of high levels of inconsistency in performance on 
spatial tasks in this group.  Therefore, although there may be common mechanisms 
underlying some small- and large-scale abilities in TD children by 10 years of age 
 
 
 149 
(particularly when both tasks require the ability to update the location of the self 
following imagined or actual movement and thus translating between egocentric and 
allocentric reference frames), this is not the case for younger TD children or individuals 
with WS.  As such, in the same way that aspects of small-scale spatial cognition such as 
OB mental rotation and VPT should be considered as distinct abilities, supported by 
independent mechanisms, so too should aspects of spatial cognition measured at 
different scales.  To some extent there are likely to be commonalities in the underlying 
mechanisms and indeed overlapping neural correlates of small and large-scale 
visuospatial cognition; however, it is not true to say that performance at one spatial 
scale would reliably predict performance at another. 
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Chapter 5 
Study 4: Sequential egocentric navigation and reliance on landmarks in 
typical development and Williams syndrome  
 
5.1. Introduction 
The findings reported in study 2 of this thesis suggest that the development of 
global representations of space, and the use of allocentric spatial strategies to guide 
navigation are particularly problematic for individuals with WS.  This extends previous 
findings of impairments in the use of an allocentric spatial frame of reference in WS 
both on small-scale (Bernardino et al., 2013; Nardini et al., 2008) and large-scale tasks 
(Farran et al., 2010).  Similar difficulties in developing an understanding of the global 
layout of an environment -for use in devising short-cuts- have also been found in some 
individuals with intellectual difficulties (Mengue-Topio et al., 2010) and Down 
syndrome (Courbois et al., 2013), and suggests that atypical brain development can 
often result in a reliance on more simple spatial learning strategies such as associating 
landmark cues with a specific egocentric response.  
Atypical navigational performance during spontaneous way-finding tasks in 
individuals with WS also indicates that the use of more simple sequential egocentric 
strategies (as predominately used in TD children and adults) may be problematic for this 
group (see study 2).  These findings suggest instead that individuals with WS may rely 
on less efficient navigation strategies.  One possibility, explored in this chapter, is that 
this group use a strategy that involves searching for familiar visual scenes in order to 
find a target location.   
In previous studies, including the findings from study 2, individuals with WS 
have been found to successfully learn a route both in virtual and real environments, 
albeit often at a slower rate than TD children of comparable non-verbal ability (Farran 
et al., 2010; Farran, Courbois, Van Herwegen, & Blades, 2012; Farran, Courbois, Van 
Herwegen, Cruickshank, & Blades, 2012).  However, to date, this has only been 
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examined in environments in which landmarks have been present.  As such, research 
into the extent to which individuals with WS rely upon the presence of landmarks to 
guide learning and the retracing of a route would provide further insight into the 
specific navigation strategies that are commonly employed in this group.  More 
specifically, an examination into the ability to use a sequential egocentric strategy when 
explicitly required to do so (for example, when landmarks are removed and an 
individual must rely on their memory of the sequence of left-right body turns) would be 
a useful tool to further identify specific deficits in large-scale spatial cognition in WS. 
In the real world, navigation usually requires the ability to retrace a route from 
one location to another, along familiar or previously learnt paths, only occasionally 
necessitating knowledge of short-cuts or an understanding of the spatial relationships 
between locations in a given environment.  Indeed, some research has argued that even 
when taking novel short-cuts, a more simple landmark navigation strategy is 
predominantly employed, rather than complex allocentric spatial referencing (Foo, 
Duchon, Warren, & Tarr, 2007; Foo et al., 2005).  Given the importance of egocentric 
spatial coding and the use of landmarks as navigational guides, therefore, it is essential 
to address the way in which individuals with WS are able to navigate from one location 
to another along familiar routes, and which aspects of the environment are the most 
useful in aiding successful way-finding. 
 
5.1.1. The role of landmarks in navigation 
Landmarks are typically defined as features that serve as spatial ‘points-of-
reference’ (Lynch, 1960), with others purporting that these points of reference must be 
easily recognisable and memorable in order to serve a useful function with regards to 
spatial cognition (Presson & Montello, 1988).  However, the extent to which landmarks 
are used to facilitate route-learning and the specific function that they serve, has been a 
matter of some debate.  Research in typical adults regarding the specific role of 
landmarks has found contrasting results.  Some authors have reported the importance of 
environmental landmarks as navigational aids (e.g., Jansen-Osmann, 2002), while 
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others have found little benefit of the presence of landmarks, particularly when other 
strategies, such as recalling a sequence of left-right turns, are readily available to the 
navigator (e.g., Tlauka & Wilson, 1994).   
Through a series of experiments, Waller and Lippa (2007) found that the impact 
of landmarks on way-finding abilities depends largely on the purpose that landmarks 
serve during learning, with landmarks that are used as ‘beacons’ (e.g., when a landmark 
is located near to a particular goal, prompting the individual to simply navigate towards 
it) resulting in more accurate learning and subsequent way-finding than those 
functioning as ‘associative cues’ (when a landmark is paired with a particular 
directional action such as ‘turn left at the tree’).  The authors relate this distinction 
between the use of ‘beacons’ and ‘associative cues’ to that made between recognition 
memory and cued-recall memory tasks, respectively; with recognition tasks being less 
complex and cognitively demanding than cued-recall.  Others have also found that the 
nature of landmark knowledge depends on the type of navigational experience.  For 
instance, L. Wang, Mou, and Sun (2013) found that after only one trial to learn a route, 
participants could develop landmark knowledge for guidance (akin to Waller and 
Lippa’s (2007) ‘landmarks as beacons’), but that the use of landmarks for place 
recognition (likened to ‘landmarks as associative-cues’) or knowledge of landmark 
sequence developed after retracing the route five times.  As such, these findings imply 
that the visual cues that are utilised from a given environment for navigation, and 
indeed the function that they serve, is likely to be context-specific and dependent on the 
demands of the task.   
Another distinction in the type of environmental landmark that could be utilised 
to support navigation lies in whether it is a global (distal) landmark, which can be seen 
from multiple locations around and within the environment, or a local (proximal) 
landmark, which can only be seen from one locality.  In typical adults, slight detriments 
to the accuracy of way-finding can be seen when either of these types of landmarks are 
removed (Steck & Mallot, 2000) (although see, Purser et al., in press).  However, 
compared to a no-landmark condition, errors in way-finding were only reduced 
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following the inclusion of local, but not global landmarks (Ruddle, Volkova, Mohler, & 
Bülthoff, 2011), indicating that there was no additive effect of having both forms of 
landmark available, and that the orientation information that global landmarks provided 
did not have a beneficial effect.  
Given that the use of proximal landmarks in way-finding studies may only 
support the use of paired-associative learning (Waller & Lippa, 2007; L. Wang et al., 
2013), the use of distal landmarks instead could encourage the development of more 
complex spatial knowledge for navigation.  In study 2, distal landmarks were used to 
encourage the development of allocentric mental representations of space, but also 
allowed for the use of a sequential egocentric representation as a spontaneous 
navigation strategy in TD children.  For consistency, distal landmarks were also used in 
the present study, to encourage the use of similar cognitive mechanisms and 
spontaneous navigation strategies.  Indeed, the presence of distal landmarks as 
presented here would allow for the use of paired-associative learning, but not limit way-
finding to this strategy.  The additive benefits to way-finding of including both proximal 
and distal landmarks is unclear.  Some research has reported no additional benefit for 
including proximal alongside distal landmarks (Ruddle et al., 2011), whilst others find 
improved performance with the inclusion of both (Purser et al., in press).  In light of this, 
and for consistency with study 2, proximal landmarks were not included in this study.  
 
5.1.2. The use of landmarks across development 
The ability to use landmarks to guide performance on spatial tasks develops 
throughout early childhood (e.g., Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000; Sutton, 2006), 
although a range of ages have been suggested as to when the ability to use different 
landmarks emerges, which is likely reflected in the variability of task demands and size 
of environmental space.  In relation to the development of spatial knowledge for 
navigating in large-scale environments, spatial representations become progressively 
more complex throughout childhood, with landmark knowledge conjectured to precede 
sequential route knowledge and global or configurational mental representations, 
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respectively (Cousins et al., 1983; Siegel & White, 1975).  This developmental 
acquisition of spatial knowledge is considered to be mediated by the emergence of low-
level cognitive abilities, with landmark knowledge associated with the development of 
recognition-in-context memory, and route knowledge with the emergence of paired-
associative learning (Allen & Ondracek, 1995).  Others have concluded that these age-
related changes are associated with a development of spatial coding, rather than a 
qualitative shift from one stage to the next (e.g., Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000).  
This is also in line with different developmental trajectories for egocentric and 
allocentric spatial frames of reference as seen in both small- (Nardini et al., 2006) and 
large-scale tasks (Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010), with older children and adults more able 
to successfully switch to using an allocentric frame of reference when the task requires a 
more global mental representation of space.   
It can be inferred, therefore, that younger children will rely on more basic 
landmark-based spatial strategies by which to navigate, that do not comprise of 
allocentric (spatial-relational) information.  Indeed, Cohen and Schuepfer (1980) 
showed children aged 7 and 11 years and adults a series of slides along a route that 
contained landmarks.  Although all groups required the same amount of time to learn 
the route, when shown the slides of the maze without landmarks, 7 year-olds made more 
incorrect turn choices than 11 year-olds, who in turn made more errors than adults.  The 
youngest children also recalled fewer landmarks that were integral to route orientation 
(i.e. positioned at a correct or incorrect turn), suggesting that younger children are more 
influenced by the place-connectivity induced by the presence of landmarks. These 
findings were replicated in the same age groups using continuous navigation through 
virtual environments (Jansen-Osmann & Wiedenbauer, 2004).  Specifically, Jansen-
Osmann and Fuchs found that although 11 year-olds and adults were able to learn a 
route in fewer trials than 7 year-old children (both with and without landmarks), route-
finding performance in all groups benefited equally from the presence of landmarks.  
This suggests that young children did not rely more heavily on the existence of 
landmarks for way-finding.  However, Jansen-Osmann and Fuchs (2006) argued that the 
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findings of the two aforementioned studies actually indicate that children and adults use 
landmark information in a qualitatively similar way to enhance way-finding, and that 
developmental differences in the use of landmarks are only seen in relation to other 
aspects of spatial cognition.  For instance, when landmarks were part of a single 
semantic category, children aged 7-8 years were better able to recall landmarks that 
were adjoining correct turns than older children aged 11, and adults.  However, the 
younger children were poorer at locating categorically similar landmarks.  Thus, despite 
the importance of landmarks being shared by children and adults, younger children may 
be less able to integrate landmark location information into the development of a spatial 
representation of the environment.  
The type of landmarks used may also vary across development.  In line with this, 
when asked to retrace a route, children aged 6 and 12 years of age were found to benefit 
equally from being advised to take notice of landmarks near the route; although only the 
older children were able to benefit from being told to pay attention to distant landmarks 
(Cornell et al., 1989).  As such, children and adults are seen to use the information 
provided by (proximal) landmarks to a similar extent to adults for way-finding 
behaviour, but that a developmental difference is seen in the way in which landmarks 
are used for other aspects of large-scale spatial cognition, with age-related differences in 
the use of landmarks dependent on the task demands and type of landmark available.  
 
5.1.3. The role of landmarks in WS 
To date, there has been a paucity of research examining the role of landmarks in 
navigation in WS.  As mentioned previously, even adults with WS show deficits in 
understanding the intrinsic relationships between landmarks within a small-scale array 
(Nardini et al., 2008), a finding consistent with difficulties coding interrelationships 
between environmental features in large-scale space (as seen in study 2).  However, on 
way-finding tasks in a 6-turn virtual environment, individuals with WS were able to 
successfully learn a route, using landmarks as cues to aid way-finding, in line with TD 
children aged 6-8 years (Farran, Courbois, Van Herwegen, & Blades, 2012).  In 
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addition, Farran and colleagues found that individuals with WS with higher non-verbal 
ability were able to differentiate between junction and path landmarks, shown by 
superior memory for junction over path landmarks; indicative of an ability to 
understand the usefulness of landmarks at junctions.  As a result, the authors concluded 
that although individuals with WS are able to form cognitive representations of 
landmarks, important landmark knowledge that can be used to enhance way-finding 
may only occur with increased maturity of non-verbal ability.   
These findings suggest that environmental landmarks may play an important 
role in the development of spatial knowledge in WS, as seen in typical development.  
Furthermore, the findings reported from study 2 in this thesis indicate that individuals 
with WS may well use visual scenes within an environment to navigate, including in 
situations where TD children are able to apply alternative spatial coding strategies.  The 
extent to which individuals with WS would rely on the presence of landmarks both for 
learning and retracing a route compared to TD children, however, remains equivocal.   
One explanation for the findings in study 2 regarding the atypical strategies in 
WS on spontaneous navigation trials is that of a difficulty in using a sequential 
egocentric strategy to reiterate the same temporal sequence of body turns to retrace a 
route.  Difficulties in recalling the specific sequence of turns in an environment may be 
in line with findings of a specific deficit in procedural learning in WS (Vicari, Bellucci, 
& Carlesimo, 2001).  Vicari and colleagues identified procedural memory difficulties in 
WS shown by poor implicit learning of the temporal sequence of events on a serial 
reaction time block task.  This deficit was not found in individuals with Down 
syndrome in a previous study (Vicari, Bellucci, & Carlesimo, 2000), suggesting that the 
procedural difficulties in WS are unlikely due to global cognitive delay, but are specific 
to the nature of brain and cognitive development in this disorder.  This is in line with 
findings by Mandolesi et al (2009) using a radial arm maze, that demonstrated specific 
deficits both in procedural competencies and spatial memory in WS.  Procedural 
memory will be assessed in the current study by examining the pattern of performance 
across junctions (1-6) in a 6-turn maze.  
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5.1.4. Neural basis of sequential egocentric navigation  
The use of functional neuroimaging studies in typical adults has provided 
considerable insight into the neural correlates of different cognitive processes involved 
in the use of spatial navigation strategies, such as the encoding of interrelationships 
between environmental features, or the representation of body-based spatial coding.  A 
greater understanding of the neural underpinnings of different navigation strategies has 
further identified not only the dissociation between body-based and environment-based 
representations of space, but also the way in which these systems overlap, and their 
association with different neural mechanisms for memory processes and motion-based 
mental representations.  An overview of studies examining the neural basis of 
‘egocentric’ and ‘allocentric’ processing can be found in chapter 3.  
In brief, studies regarding ‘allocentric’ processing often highlight the role of the 
right hippocampal region (e.g., Burgess et al., 2002; Hartley et al., 2003), with 
‘egocentric’ processing associated with activation in the fronto-parietal networks along 
the dorsal stream (e.g., Seubert, Humphreys, Muller, & Gramann, 2008; Weniger et al., 
2009) and striatum (e.g., Packard and McGaugh, 1996).  However, memory for the 
sequence of body turns associated with specific choice points through a route (a 
sequential egocentric strategy) may involve other neural networks than those associated 
with independent egocentric responses.  Indeed, processing involved in the use of a 
sequential egocentric strategy may be akin to episodic memory processes (Iglói et al., 
2009), with similar activation observed in the left hippocampus during such tasks (Iglói 
et al., 2010).  Similarly, mentally navigating between landmarks on a previously learnt 
route is associated with activation in the insula and medial part of the hippocampal 
region (Ghaem et al., 1997), and sequential memory is associated with activation in the 
hippocampus, particularly during the acquisition of spatial sequences (Rolls & Kesner, 
2006).  These findings are in line with cortical activation during sequential route-based 
navigation in mice (Rondi-Reig et al., 2006).  Furthermore, continued rehearsal of the 
same sequence of bodily turns during route-learning leads to the formation of a 
predominantly action-based mental representation that is associated with activation in 
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parietal/somatosensory, premotor cortex, and supplementary motor areas (Hartley et al., 
2003). 
In light of the findings regarding the neural basis of the use of different spatial 
frames of reference and navigational strategies, alongside findings of atypical brain 
development in WS, particularly in the hippocampus (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005), it 
stands to reason that individuals with WS would exhibit specific difficulties on tasks 
requiring accurate processing of both allocentric and sequential egocentric spatial 
information.  However, it remains unclear as to the strategies that individuals with WS 
typically use to complete way-finding tasks, and indeed, the underlying neural 
mechanisms and cortical structures that are involved.  
 
5.1.5 Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this study was to examine the extent to which individuals with WS 
rely on the presence of landmarks both when learning a route, and when retracing a 
route once landmarks are removed following learning, compared to typically developing 
children of comparable verbal and non-verbal ability.  In essence, are individuals with 
WS able to apply the use of a sequential egocentric strategy (recalling the sequence of 
left-right body turns), which is independent of the use of landmarks, to retrace a route 
when visual properties of the environment (i.e. landmarks) are no longer, or have never 
been, available?   
Given the use of atypical strategies during spontaneous navigation tasks in WS 
(study 2), and the points discussed above, it can be inferred that individuals with WS 
will have difficulties in developing a sequential egocentric representation of a route, that 
could be used when landmarks are removed.  Typically-developing children and adults 
are able to reiterate the sequence of body turns through a route to reach a target location 
(Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; Iglói et al., 2009).  However, deficits in procedural memory 
and atypical brain development in cortical regions that subserve spatial coding strategies 
such as allocentric and sequential egocentric representations in WS imply that 
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individuals with this disorder will rely on landmarks, and to a greater extent even than 
TD children when learning a route.  Impairments in the use of a sequential egocentric 
strategy would also be reflected in a difficulty learning a route that does not contain any 
visual landmark cues, and would therefore be indicative of a complete reliance on 
landmarks to guide way-finding. 
With regards to the nature of difficulties in the use of a sequential egocentric 
strategy in WS, a further aim of this study was to examine the pattern and type of errors 
made by individuals with WS compared to TD children when learning routes in 
environments with and without landmarks, as a measure of procedural memory.  That is, 
do individuals with WS present with a similar pattern of errors across junctions 
throughout environments with and without landmarks as seen in TD children?        
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1. Participants 
Fifty-three typically developing (TD) children were recruited from two London, 
UK primary schools, and separated into three age groups; 5, 7, and 9 year-olds.  
Twenty-one individuals with WS were recruited from the records of the Williams 
Syndrome Foundation, UK.  All participants with WS had received a positive diagnosis 
of WS, based on a “fluorescence in-situ hybridisation” (FISH) test for deleted Elastin 
gene on the long arm of chromosome 7, as well as phenotypic diagnosis from a clinician. 
All TD participants were tested in a quiet room within their schools, whilst WS 
participants were tested either at their home or in a testing room at the Institute of 
Education, London.  Seven participants from the TD groups; 5 years (N=5), 7 years 
(N=1), and 9 years (N=1), and three participants from the WS group had difficulties 
with the tasks or did not complete all measures.  Data for these participants were 
subsequently excluded from the analyses.  Therefore, data were analysed from 48 TD 
children; 5 years (N=16, 8 males, Mean age (years; months) = 5;09, SD= 0;02, CA 
range = 5;03–6;01); 7 years (N=16, 6 males, Mage = 7;08, SD= 0;02, CA range = 7;05–
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8;00); 9 years (N=16, 8 males, Mage = 9;07, SD= 0;03, CA range = 9;03–10;00); and 18 
participants with WS (9 males, Mage =  21;09, SD = 4;07; CA range = 16;01–32;01).  
Verbal and Non-verbal abilities were assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale-III (BPVS-III; Dunn et al., 2009) and the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices 
(RCPM; Raven et al., 2003), respectively. 
5.2.2. Virtual environment (VE) 
The interactive virtual environment (VE) was developed using The Vizard 
Development Edition (version 3.0) software programme, and presented on a 17” laptop 
screen.  The VE task presented participants with a 6-turn maze layout within which 
individuals were able to navigate using the arrow keys on the keyboard.  Each path was 
of equal length, and each decision point consisted of a single left-right T-junction.  
Incorrect turns were also concealed by using T-junctions at the end of each dead-end 
path, so that they did not appear visually different from correct turns when viewed from 
the decision point.  Each participant completed a ‘landmark (LM)’ and ‘no-landmarks 
(NLM)’ condition, the order of which was counterbalanced across participants in all 
groups.  Two maze designs (layouts A and B) were employed; these contained identical 
path lengths, structure, and wall height, but with different sequences of left-right turns 
(see 5.2.2.1 Figure 16).  To control for any differences across maze designs, half of the 
participants in each group received layout A as the LM condition and layout B as the 
NLM condition, whilst the other half received layout B as the LM condition and layout 
A as the NLM condition.  For consistency, the same set of landmarks was used for each 
LM condition, regardless of maze design (A or B), with comparable configurations. 
To distinguish between conditions and encourage participants to learn a different 
route, the LM condition always consisted of red-brick walls, whereas the NLM 
condition maze always contained grey-brick walls, regardless of whether layout A or B 
was used.  This was kept consistent for all participants so that LM scenes presented in a 
‘visual matching’ task (detailed in section 5.2.3.4.), that was presented following the 
LM trials, all contained red brick walls. 
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5.2.2.1 Figure 16. Birds-eye-view of virtual environment routes A and B used for 
counterbalancing. Dashed line denotes correct route through maze. Red markers denote 
location of distal landmarks when route used for ‘landmark’ condition. 
5.2.3. Design and procedure 
 All participants completed the BPVS-III and RCPM tasks before any other 
measures.  Participants were then presented with either the LM or NLM condition VE 
maze (counterbalanced across participants in each group).  A ‘visual-matching’ and 
‘landmark naming’ task always immediately followed the LM condition for all 
participants. 
5.2.3.1. ‘Landmark’ condition. 
In the landmark maze (LM) condition, participants were asked to navigate from 
the starting position to find a “hidden exit” at the end of the maze (either layout A or B).  
Surrounding the maze were 12 distal landmarks (two distinct trees, two distinct 
lampposts, a playground, a cityscape, a high-rise building, a house, a traffic light, a red 
tower, a shop, and a block of flats), at least two of which were visible from each path.  
During the learning phase, participants were first shown the correct route by following a 
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grass path.  On reaching the exit, a celebratory trumpet sound was played and the 
programme window automatically closed.  The participant was then returned to the 
starting position, without the grass path, for the first learning trial.  Here, participants 
were required to walk the route from memory.  An error was counted if the participant 
travelled more than half way down an incorrect path.  During the learning trials, the 
participant had to navigate through the correct route to the exit without error on two 
consecutive trials to reach learning criterion and move onto the test trial.  Each 
participant was given a maximum of seven learning trials to reach criterion, unless zero 
errors were made on trial 7, then eight trials were given.  As this was to check whether 
learning had occurred within 7 trials, if errors were made on trial eight, data from this 
trial were not included in the analysis. 
Once the participant had learnt the route successfully (reached criterion) in the 
landmark condition, they were returned to the starting position of the maze, but this 
time with all landmarks removed.  Participants were then asked to retrace the correct 
route to the exit.  This single test trial was used to examine the extent to which 
participants continued to rely on the use of landmarks for successful navigation 
following learning, or whether they were able to use sequential egocentric coding to 
retrace the route.   
5.2.3.2. ‘No landmarks’ condition. 
As a control condition, to examine whether participants were able navigate 
through a maze that did not have any landmarks to begin with, participants were also 
asked to learn a route through the no-landmark maze (NLM).   
Similar to the LM condition, participants were first shown the correct route by 
following a grass path to the hidden exit.  Participants then entered the learning phase, 
without the grass path and were asked to navigate the correct route, without error.  In 
line with LM condition learning trials, participants had to navigate the correct route 
with no errors on two consecutive trials (maximum seven trials, unless zero errors on 
trial 7, then 8 trials) to meet criterion.   
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5.2.3.3. ‘Visual matching’ task. 
Immediately following the LM condition, participants were presented with a 
visual matching task, to examine the ability to remember the correct visual scenes from 
the maze.  Participants were shown a series of images from the viewpoint of each of the 
six junctions of the maze that they had learned.  For each trial, two images (one correct 
and one incorrect) were presented adjacent to each other on the computer screen.  
Participants were asked to select which of the two scenes they had actually viewed 
when walking through the maze.  Incorrect scenes consisted of either an incorrect 
configuration (an incorrect spatial layout, but containing the correct landmarks), or 
included incorrect landmarks from different parts of the maze (but in the same 
configuration as the correctly presented scene).  Each correct and incorrect scene pair 
was presented twice throughout the task (12 trials), with each image appearing once on 
the left- and once on the right-hand-side of the screen. 
5.2.3.4. ‘Landmark naming’ task. 
  To examine whether participants were able to easily recognise and name each 
landmark, and therefore, to assess the saliency of each environmental marker as a 
potential navigational guide, a landmark naming task was used.  Here, each of the 
twelve landmarks from the landmark-maze was presented individually on the screen and 
the participant was asked to name the object.  Items were scored as correct if the correct 
name, a commonly used alternative, or synonym was given.   
 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Verbal and non-verbal abilities 
To examine differences across groups on BPVS-III and RCPM scores, one-way 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for both measures, with group (4 levels: 
5 years, 7 years, 9 years, and WS) as a between-subjects factor.  Similar to the findings 
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in studies 1 and 2, results demonstrated an uneven cognitive profile in WS, 
characteristic of the disorder (Jarrold et al., 1998; Martens et al., 2008), with nonverbal 
abilities significantly below TD 9 year-olds, and at a level no different from TD 5 and 7 
year-olds, compared to relatively higher verbal abilities, significantly greater than TD 5 
and 7 year-olds, but not significantly different from TD 9 year-olds (5.3.1.1 Table 12). 
   
5.3.1.1 Table 12. Mean (SD) scores on BPVS-III and RCPM for each group 
  Group ANOVA Post-hoca 
 WS       
(N=18) 
5 years  
(N=16) 
7 years  
(N=16) 
9 years 
(N=16) 
F (df) p  
B
PV
S 
ra
w
b   128.39 
(15.38) 
76.19 
(6.78) 
91.56 
(12.85) 
120.06 
(11.26) 
67.39 (3, 65) < .001 5 < 7 < 9 = WS 
B
PV
S 
st
an
dc
 
 92.94 
(6.53) 
88.25 
(11.12) 
90.00 
(9.61) 
1.04 .361 - 
R
C
PM
d  20.83 
(6.21) 
17.75 
(2.54) 
21.56 
(3.97) 
28.06 
(4.11) 
15.05 (3, 65) < .001 WS = 5 = 7 < 9 
a Tukey-corrected post-hoc tests, ‘=’ refers to no significant difference at .05 level, and ‘<’ 
denotes ‘significantly less than’ ( p< .01); b BPVS-III: British Picture Vocabulary Scale-III raw 
scores; cBPVS-III standardised scores; dRCPM: Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM) 
raw scores  
 
5.3.2. Learning phase 
To examine route-learning abilities in both the ‘with landmarks’ (LM) maze 
condition and ‘no-landmarks’ (NLM) maze condition across groups, Mean number of 
learning trials taken to reach criterion (two consecutive trials without error) was 
calculated for each maze condition in each group.  As a more sensitive measure of 
route-learning ability, the cumulative number of errors made across all learning trials 
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for each maze condition was also analysed.  Descriptive statistics for these two 
dependent variables are displayed in 5.3.2.1 Table 12. 
 
5.3.2.1 Table 13. Group Means (SD) for measures of performance on learning phase in 
Landmark (LM) and No-Landmark (NLM) mazes 
  Group 
  WS 
(N = 18) 
5 years 
(N = 16) 
7 years 
(N = 16) 
9 years 
(N = 16)  
Number of Learning 
Trials (including two 
criterion trials) 
5.17 (1.89) 4.25 (1.84) 3.50 (1.16) 3.25 (1.44) 
LM
 
Number of Errors 5.06 (4.35) 3.19 (3.47) 1.44 (1.26) 2.00 (2.19) 
Number of Learning 
Trials (including two 
criterion trials) 
7.00 (0.00) 5.75 (1.77) 5.94 (1.48) 5.50 (2.16) 
N
LM
 
Number of Errors 15.94 (3.72) 9.06 (6.65) 7.94 (5.98) 7.81 (6.48) 
 
5.3.2.2. Number of learning trials to reach criterion. 
Data from the LM condition were normally distributed for TD 5 and 7 year-olds 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05), but not for the TD 9 year-olds or WS group.  Given 
that half of the groups presented with normally distributed data, and that ANOVA is 
robust to violations of normality (Field, 2009), parametric analyses were conducted.  
Data were not normally distributed for any group for ‘number of learning trials’ in the 
NLM condition (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p< .01 for all).  Also, as none of the WS 
participants (and the majority of TD participants) failed to meet learning criterion for 
the NLM, and thus reached the maximum trial limit, non-parametric analyses were 
conducted on this data and analysed separately from LM data. 
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Results of a one-way ANOVA (with Tukey-corrected pairwise comparisons) for 
number of learning trials on the LM maze (including the two correct criterion trials), 
showed a significant effect of group, F(3, 65) = 4.85, p= .004, η2 = .19.  This was due to 
the WS group requiring a significantly greater number of trials to learn the route than 
TD 7 year-olds and 9 year-olds; p= .020 and p= .006, respectively.  No significant 
differences were found between WS and TD 5 year-olds (p= .360), or between any TD 
groups (p> .05 for all).  A non-parametric equivalent of this analysis was conducted, 
with comparable results.  
For the NLM, results of a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test yielded a 
significant effect of group on number of learning trials, H(3) = 8.43, p= .038.  Post-hoc 
Mann-Whitney tests showed that this was due to the WS group requiring a significantly 
greater number of trials than TD 5 year-olds (U= 90.00, z = -2.81, p= .005, r= -.48 ), 
TD 7 year-olds (U= 81.00, z = -3.08, p= .002, r= -.53), and TD 9 year-olds (U= 90.00, z 
= -2.32, p= .021, r= -.39).  No significant differences were found between any TD 
groups (p> .05 for all).   
 
5.3.2.3. Number of errors across learning trials. 
5.3.2.3.1. Errors made at each junction. 
To examine the pattern of performance during learning of the 6-turn routes, 
Mean number of errors made at each junction across all learning trials was calculated 
for each group.  Mean number of errors at each junction for all groups on LM and NLM 
are displayed in 5.3.2.3.2 Figure 17. 
Data from the LM were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05) for 
WS and 5-year-old groups, but not for 7 and 9 year-olds.  Data from the NLM were 
normally distributed for all groups.  Given that the data were normally distributed for 
the majority of groups across the two maze conditions and ANOVA is robust to 
violations of normality (Field, 2009), results of parametric analyses are reported.  Non-
parametric analyses were conducted on LM maze, with comparable results.   
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Firstly, to examine the effects of counterbalancing on mean number of errors, 
separate mixed ANOVAs with between-participant factor of groups (4 levels: 5, 7, 9 
and WS) and within-participant factors of ‘maze’ (2 levels: LM and NLM) included 
either a between-participant factor of ‘maze-order’ (2 levels; order 1: LM before NLM; 
order 2: NLM before LM)’ or ‘route-order’ (2 levels: A first; B first)’.  Given that no 
significant main effects were found for either ‘maze-order’ (F(1, 58) = .29, p= .592) or 
‘route-order’ (F(1, 58) = .15, p= .699), nor were there any significant interactions with 
either variable (p> .05 for all) it was concluded that there were no order effects, and so 
these variables were not included in subsequent analyses that examined error patterns 
across junctions or error types.    
A mixed ANOVA with between-participants factor of ‘group’ (4 levels: 5, 7, 9 
and WS) and two within-participant factors of ‘maze’ (2 levels: LM and NLM) and 
‘junction’ (6 levels: 1–6) was conducted.  There was a significant main effect of Group, 
F(3, 62)= 10.77, p< .001, partial η2 = .34, with Tukey-corrected pairwise comparisons 
showing that this was due to significantly greater number of errors in the WS group than 
any TD group (p< .01 for all).  No significant differences were found between any TD 
groups.  There was also a significant main effect of Maze, F(1, 62)= 89.93, p< .001, 
partial η2 = .59, due to more errors made during learning of the NLM than the LM maze.  
A main effect of Junction was also found, F(5, 310)= 4.80, p< .001, partial η2 = .07.  
This is explored for each maze separately in light of the maze by junction interaction 
discussed below. 
Results also showed a significant maze by junction interaction, F(5, 310) = 2.55, 
p= .028, partial η2 = .04, and a near-significant maze by group interaction, F(3, 62) = 
2.67, p= .055, partial η2 = .11, showing that there were different patterns of performance 
for each of the two maze conditions.  However, no junction by group interaction, F(15, 
310) = .89, p= .566, nor maze-by-junction-by-group interaction was found, F(15, 310)= 
1.53, p= .094, indicating that this different pattern of performance across junctions 
between the two maze conditions did not differ across groups.  To further examine the 
interactions with maze, each maze was analysed separately.   
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For errors across junctions in the LM condition, a mixed ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of Group, F(3, 62) = 4.56, p= .006, partial η2 = .18, with Tukey-
corrected pairwise comparisons showing this was due to the WS group making 
significantly greater number of errors than TD 7 and 9 year-olds (p= .006 and p= .028, 
respectively).  No significant difference was found between WS and TD 5 year-olds 
(p= .306), or between any TD groups (p> .05 for all).  A significant within-participant 
effect of Junction was also found, F(4.52, 280.23) = 2.36, p= .046, partial η2 = .05.  
Post-hoc comparisons found that this was due to significantly fewer number of errors at 
junction 1 compared with junctions 2 (p= .031), 3 (p= .026) and 5 (p= .004).  
Results for the NLM condition also showed a significant main effect of Group, 
F(3, 62) = 7.87, p< .001, partial η2 = .28.  Here however, Tukey-corrected pairwise 
comparisons showed that the WS group made significantly greater number of errors 
than all TD groups on this maze (p< .01 for all).  This was different to performance in 
the LM condition, in which the WS group performed in line with TD 5 year-olds, and 
thus explains the marginal maze by group interaction.  No significant differences were 
found across TD groups (p> .05 for all).  A significant within-participant effect of 
Junction was also found, F(5, 310)= 4.01, p= .002, partial η2 = .06.  Post-hoc 
comparisons showed that this was due to significantly fewer number of errors at 
junction 1 than junctions 3, 4 and 5 (p= .014, p< .001, and p= .012, respectively), and 
significantly greater number of errors at junction 4 than at junctions 2 and 6 (p= .018 
and p= .004, respectively).  This pattern of errors therefore differed to that seen in the 
LM, and thus explains the maze by junction interaction, as learning in the NLM led to 
more errors in the middle of the maze than at any other point. 
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5.3.2.3.2 Figure 17. Mean (SE) number of errors made at each junction across learning 
trials on a) Landmark Maze and b) No-Landmark Maze conditions for each group 
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5.3.2.3.3. Types of errors made during learning.  
As a further investigation into errors made during the learning trials for each 
maze condition, errors were separated into three categories, in line with the method used 
by Farran, Courbois, Van Herwegen, and Blades (2012), and included as a within-
participants factor in the analyses.  Errors were coded as a) ‘single errors’ (an error that 
occurred only once at a specific junction across all learning trials), b) ‘consolidation 
errors’ (errors that occurred at the same junction on more than one learning trial, but not 
on consecutive trials), or c) ‘perseveration errors’ (errors that occurred at the same 
junction on two or more consecutive learning trials).  Mean number of each type of 
error made during the LM and NLM conditions are displayed in 5.3.2.3.4 Figure 18. 
For all error types in each group (except single errors in 5 year-olds, p= .101), 
data were not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p= < .05).  However, given 
that ANOVA is robust to violations of normality (Field, 2009), parametric analyses 
were conducted on the data.  Equivalent non-parametric analyses were also conducted, 
with comparable results for all main effects, and are therefore not reported.  A mixed 
ANOVA with between-participants factor of ‘Group’ (4 levels: 5, 7, 9 and WS) and two 
within-participant factors of ‘Maze’ (2 levels: landmark and no-landmark) and ‘Error 
Type’ (3 levels: single, consolidation, and perseverative) was conducted.  Significant 
main effects of Group and Maze, and Group by Maze interaction are not reported as 
these were as detailed above (see section 5.3.2.3.1).  Results also found a significant 
main effect of Error Type, F (1.43, 88.59) = 44.72, p< .001, partial η2 = .42, with 
pairwise comparisons indicating a significant difference across all error types (p< .001 
for all).   
Results also showed a significant Maze by Error-Type interaction, F (1.87, 
115.94) = 46.22, p< .001, partial η2 = .43, and significant Error-Type by Group 
interaction, F (4.29, 88.59) = 6.99, p< .001, partial η2 = .25.  A significant 3-way Maze 
by Error Type by Group interaction was also found, F (5.21, 107.74) = 3.98, p= .002, 
partial η2 = .16, showing that there was a different pattern of errors seen between the 
two mazes, that differed across groups.  Given the significant main effects, significant 
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interactions, and difference in number of trials to reach criterion, each maze was 
analysed separately (main effects of ‘Group’ are not reported as these are as reported in 
section 5.3.2.3.1.). 
Results from the analysis of types of errors made in the LM condition learning 
trials, found a significant main effect of ‘Error Type’, F(1.45, 89.82)= 4.25, p= .028, 
partial η2 = .06.  Pairwise comparisons found that this was due to significantly fewer 
consolidation errors than single or perseverative errors (p= .003 for both).  However, no 
significant Error-Type by Group interaction was found, F (4.35, 89.82) = .967, p= .967, 
showing that the pattern of errors observed in the LM did not differ across groups. 
Results from the analysis of error type in the NLM condition learning trials, also 
found a significant main effect of ‘Error-Type’, F(1.75, 106.41) = 55.18, p< .001, 
partial η2 = .47.  Pairwise comparisons found that this was due to a significant difference 
across all error types (p< .001 for all).  In addition, a significant Error-Type by Group 
interaction was found, F (5.15, 106.41) = 6.64, p< .001, partial η2 = .24.   
To examine this interaction further, error type was examined separately across 
groups.  Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference only in Mean 
number of perseverative errors across groups, F (3, 65) = 9.49, p< .001.  Tukey-
corrected pairwise comparisons showed that this was due to a significantly greater 
number of perseverative errors made by the WS group than any TD groups (p≤ .001 for 
all).  No significant differences across TD groups were found (p> .05 for all).   
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5.3.2.3.4 Figure 18. Mean (SE) number of each error type made across learning trials 
on a) Landmark Maze and b) No-Landmark Maze conditions for each group 
 
5.3.3. ‘Landmarks-removed’ test trial 
As a measure of the ability to use a sequential egocentric strategy following 
learning in the landmark-condition, participants were asked to immediately complete 
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the route one final time, with all landmarks removed.  Mean number of errors made 
during the test trial was calculated for each group (see 5.3.3.1 Figure 19).  Data were 
normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05) for 7 and 9 year-olds, but not for 
WS and 5-year-olds.  However, given that half of the data were normally distributed, 
parametric one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the mean number of errors 
made across groups.  Results yielded a significant difference across groups, F (3, 65) = 
8.89, p< .001, with Tukey-corrected pairwise comparisons showing that the WS group 
made a significantly greater number of errors than all TD groups (5 years, p= .038, 7 
years, p< .001, 9 years, p<.001).  No significant differences were found across TD 
groups (p> .05 for all).  
 
 
5.3.3.1 Figure 19. Mean (SE) number of errors made during ‘landmarks removed’ test 
trial for each group 
 
5.3.4. ‘Visual-matching’ task 
 Incorrect scenes on the visual matching task were separated into those with an 
incorrect configuration (but with correct landmarks for that junction) and those that 
included incorrect landmarks (but in the correct configuration for that junction).  Mean 
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number of errors (incorrect scene choices made, out of 12 trials) were calculated for 
each group.  Data were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p> .05) for all 
groups, except 9 year-olds (p= .014), and therefore compared using a 2-way ANOVA 
with a between-participant factor of group (4 levels: WS, 5, 7 and 9 years) and within-
participant factor of ‘scene type’ (2 levels: incorrect configuration and incorrect 
landmark).  Although significantly below ceiling (using one-sample t-tests), all groups 
performed well on this task, with few errors made (5 years: M= 9.44 (1.67), t(15) = -
6.13, p< .001; 7 years: M= 9.63 (1.67), t(15) = -5.69, p< .001; 10 years: M= 9.75 (2.69), 
t(15) = -3.34, p= .004; WS: M= 9.22 (1.89), t(17) = -6.22, p< .001).  No significant 
differences were identified across groups, F(3, 62) = .22, p= .882, indicating proficient 
ability to visually match correct scenes from a recently-learned maze in all groups (see 
5.3.4.1 Figure 20 for Mean errors in each group).  However, a significant effect of scene 
type was found, F(1, 62) = 8.17, p= .006, partial η2 = .12, with pairwise comparisons 
indicating that participants made significantly more errors when the incorrect visual 
scene contained an incorrect landmark compared to an incorrect configuration (p= .006).   
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5.3.4.1 Figure 20. Mean (SE) number of errors (incorrect scenes chosen) on ‘visual-
matching’ task in each group.  Incorrect scenes are separated into those that included an 
‘incorrect configuration’ and those with an ‘incorrect landmark’ 
 
5.3.5. Landmark naming task 
 As a test of the saliency of each environmental feature used in the landmark 
condition maze, the number of correct or appropriate labels given for each of the 12 
landmarks was calculated for each group.  Data significantly deviated from normal for 
each group (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p< .05), and so non-parametric analyses are 
reported.  Results indicate that the landmarks were easily named, with a high number of 
correct labels given by each group [Mean (SD)]; WS: 11.83 (.38), 5 years: 11.50 (.82), 7 
years: 11.69 (.60), 9 years: 11.94 (.25), with no significant differences found across 
groups, H (3) = 4.07, p= .254. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
The present study examined the extent to which individuals with WS rely on the 
presence of landmarks both for learning and for recalling a route, compared to TD 
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children aged 5-9 years.  On learning a six-turn route in a VE maze with 12 distal 
landmarks, individuals with WS performed in line with TD 5 year-olds, although 
required a significantly greater number of trials and made more errors than TD children 
aged 7 and 9 years.  This finding is in line with that of previous route-learning studies in 
WS, showing route-learning performance at a level expected based on non-verbal 
reasoning ability (Farran et al., 2010; Farran, Courbois, Van Herwegen, & Blades, 
2012).  On learning trials in a maze without landmarks (NLM) however, individuals 
with WS presented with a significantly higher level of impairment than all TD groups, 
with none of the participants in the WS group successfully able to learn the route.  As 
such, although all groups demonstrated substantially poorer performance on learning a 
maze without landmarks compared to one with landmarks, the negative impact on 
learning without visual cues for navigation was seen to a greater extent in individuals 
with WS.  This difficulty in way-finding without the presence of visual cues was further 
substantiated when landmarks were removed following learning in the LM.  Here, even 
having successfully learnt the route with landmarks to a level comparable with TD 5 
year-olds, individuals with WS made reliably more errors than all TD groups once these 
were removed, demonstrating a greater reliance on the presence of visual markers to 
guide learning and subsequent repetition of a series of decision points along a route. 
No significant differences were found in performance across the three TD 
groups on measures of route-learning in either maze condition, or on number of errors 
made following the removal of landmarks.  This absence of a developmental difference 
on these tasks is indicative of, not only a high level of route-learning ability by 5 years 
of age, but also the capacity to fall back on the use of a sequential egocentric navigation 
strategy when required from at least 5 years.  This is, in part, counter to earlier findings 
of age-related changes in a reliance on landmarks to make correct turns at decision 
points along a newly-learnt route (e.g., Cohen & Schuepfer, 1980; Jansen-Osmann & 
Wiedenbauer, 2004).  The use of proximal landmarks in the above-mentioned studies, 
compared to the use of distal landmarks in the present study may underlie these 
different findings, particularly given that distal (global) landmarks may have allowed 
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participants to develop a single, integrated representation of the route (Ruddle et al., 
2011), resulting in less reliance on landmarks, even in the youngest group.  
Alternatively, given that the age range in the present study did not extend as high as in 
previous studies, this may have resulted in these contradictory findings, where the 
addition of an older TD group here may have yielded improvements with age. That said, 
the present results are in line with findings that young children use landmark 
information to enhance way-finding to the same extent as older children and adults 
(Jansen-Osmann & Fuchs, 2006).  In addition, the present findings alongside those from 
study 2 and findings by Bullens, Iglói, et al. (2010) suggest that the use of sequential 
egocentric coding is a viable navigation strategy that can be utilised by children as 
young as 5 years of age.  This is akin to the spontaneous navigation strategy 
predominantly employed by typical adults on comparable route-learning tasks (Iglói et 
al., 2009). 
The high level of ability to successfully retrace a route observed in TD children 
following the removal of landmarks begs the question of whether participants in these 
groups were simply remembering a verbal sequence of left-right turns to complete the 
route, and were thus unfazed by the change in environmental appearance.  There are 
three arguments to counter this.  First, children aged 5 years have difficulty in the use 
and representation of ‘left/right’ spatial terms (Landau & Hoffman, 2005) and so 
successful execution of this strategy would have been particularly problematic in this 
group.  Second, errors (albeit very few) were observed following landmark removal in 
all TD groups, indicating the role of landmarks at some level in supporting the 
development of spatial knowledge in these groups.  Third, all TD groups performed 
highly on the visual-matching task, demonstrating that they had attended to and encoded 
this information for use in way-finding, a process that would not be necessary had they 
solely relied upon verbally labelling the left-right sequence.  It can be inferred therefore 
that during learning in TD children, but not in individuals with WS, a sequential 
egocentric representation of the temporal order of bodily turns was developed 
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simultaneously to the paired-associative learning of directional responses to specific 
landmarks.   
The use of a sequential egocentric strategy in which the temporal sequence of 
body turns is encoded, requires cognitive demands corresponding to those required for 
episodic or procedural memory (Iglói et al., 2009; Packard & McGaugh, 1996), and is 
associated with activation in the left hippocampus (Iglói et al., 2010).  Given the known 
cortical atrophy associated with WS that includes the hippocampus (Meyer-Lindenberg 
et al., 2005), it stands to reason that spatial encoding that is typically supported by these 
neural networks would be impaired in this disorder.  Indeed, structural and functional 
abnormalities in the hippocampal region in WS are likely associated with not only 
impairments in the use of an allocentric spatial frame of reference in WS (study 2), but 
also with difficulties in the use of a sequential egocentric representation, as identified in 
this study. 
Further insight into the nature of impairments in the use of a sequential 
egocentric strategy in WS was attained by examining the categorisation and pattern of 
errors throughout learning.  In both maze conditions, although particularly in the NLM, 
the pattern of errors across junctions was that of a ‘primacy-recency effect’ serial 
position curve, with turns at junctions in the centre of the maze more difficult to learn 
than those at the beginning or end.  A pervasive phenomenon of human memory (R. C. 
Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Murdock, 1962), this primacy-recency effect is also seen for 
spatial episodic memory events in rodents using large-scale maze paradigms (Bolhuis & 
van Kampen, 1988; Kesner, Measom, Forsman, & Holbrook, 1984).  However, a 
recency effect (for instance with significantly fewer errors made at junction 6 than at 4) 
on the maze that did not contain visual cues to support recognition memory (NLM), 
indicates that participants must have encoded some metric information about this 
environment to track how far through the maze they had travelled, in order to know that 
they were nearing the final junction.  This pattern was also seen in WS, and was 
particularly unexpected given our understanding of deficits in spatial knowledge in this 
group.  An alternative explanation is that these results may have arisen from the use of 
 
 
 179 
non-spatial strategies such as a counting technique to keep track of when the final 
junction was approaching.  However, given that none of the participants in the WS 
group were able to reach learning criterion on the NLM, this is indicative of 
considerable impairments in spatial knowledge.  This was particularly evident in 
difficulties learning from previous junction errors when no landmarks were present to 
aid decision making on subsequent trials.   
This particular difficulty in WS in learning a 6-turn sequence of turns was 
further reflected in the high number of perseverative errors in this group, compared to 
other error types and to performance by all TD groups.  At a behavioural level, 
perseverative errors have been previously noted in WS during navigation tasks (Farran, 
Courbois, Van Herwegen, & Blades, 2012; Mandolesi et al., 2009).  This is indicative 
of difficulties inhibiting previous incorrect responses and is supported by findings that 
individuals with WS fail to engage cortical and subcortical structures in the 
frontostriatal regions that mediate response inhibition (Mobbs et al., 2007).  In the 
current study, however, a significantly greater number of perseverative errors in WS 
compared to TD groups was not identified during learning in a maze with landmarks.  
This difference may simply reflect the natural outcome of the scoring criteria when a 
high total number of errors are made (e.g., during the NLM).  Alternatively, the 
presence of visual cues in the LM condition may have supported the formation of 
cognitive representations of landmarks to guide way-finding in the WS group, leading 
to fewer perseverative errors.  However, a high number of perseverative errors in WS 
were found by Farran and colleagues (2012) on a maze that contained landmarks.  As 
such, the use of proximal landmarks in the Farran et al. study and the use of distal 
landmarks in the present study may provide the crucial comparison for future research. 
The substantial impairments in WS on tasks that required sequential egocentric 
coding suggest that individuals with this disorder instead rely on the presence of 
landmarks to navigate, and to a greater extent even than TD children of comparable 
non-verbal ability.  Successful utilisation of landmarks for way-finding on a previously 
traversed route requires storage of visual information at decision points, even if the 
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sequential order of these choice points are not encoded.  As such, if individuals with 
WS rely on the use of a visual-matching strategy to navigate, it is reasonable to surmise 
that they would score highly on tests of scene recognition.  This hypothesis was 
supported in the current study, showing that participants in this group were successful at 
identifying correct visual scenes from the maze with landmarks.  This is in line with 
findings from an individual with bilateral hippocampal damage who presented with 
spatial impairments in allocentric and context-dependent episodic memory, but was able 
to recognise scenes from a VE environment, suggesting that visual pattern-matching is 
not associated with the hippocampus (Spiers, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha‐Khadem, & 
O'Keefe, 2001).   Previous research in WS has also shown that some perceptual abilities 
may be relatively unimpaired.  For instance, although individuals with WS are typically 
impaired on block construction tasks (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1988), performance on 
perceptual components of similar tasks are found to be at the level of mental-age 
matched controls (Deruelle et al., 2006; Rondan, Mancini, Livet, & Deruelle, 2003). 
On the visual matching task, the finding that incorrect-landmark scenes were 
more difficult to determine than incorrect-configuration scenes was not anticipated; an 
outcome that was particularly unexpected in WS, given the known difficulties with 
coding configurational information in this group (e.g., Bernardino et al., 2013; Nardini 
et al., 2008).  However, this distinction may have been related to differences in the 
ability to detect changes in fine and coarse visual information.  For instance, in the 
incorrect-landmark scenes, the general outline of the scene would have been similar to 
the correct layout, making it more difficult to disambiguate between correct and 
incorrect choices than with changes to coarse information, as seen in incorrect-
configuration scenes.  However, it is difficult to make robust conclusions from this task, 
particularly given that in some scenes more landmarks were visible than in others, 
meaning that scenes were not matched for level of difficulty.  Indeed, the pattern of 
performance was the same across TD and WS groups, suggesting that this outcome was 
more related to the specific nature of the task than a reflection of a syndrome-specific 
pattern of performance.  An alternative method for future studies using such visual-
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matching tasks should therefore include an incorrect-landmark and incorrect-
configuration version of each scene for comparison.  That said, it is important to note 
the high level of accuracy in all TD groups and the WS group on both scene-types, 
indicating that all groups were able to use the visual information from the environment 
to guide way-finding by some means. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
These findings indicate that individuals with WS rely on visual landmarks for 
route-learning and way-finding, to a greater extent than TD children of comparable non-
verbal ability.  All participants with WS failed to learn a route that did not contain 
landmarks, which required the development of a representation of the temporal 
sequence of body turns. When learning a route with landmarks, TD children, but not 
individuals with WS, were able to simultaneously develop a sequential egocentric 
representation of the route to aid way-finding in situations such as when landmarks 
were removed.  Individuals with WS instead relied on a visual matching strategy by 
which to navigate, which is susceptible to errors following changes to the physical 
presentation of the environment (i.e. the removal of landmarks).  Impairments in 
memory processes involved in episodic spatial events such as remembering the 
sequence of bodily rotations through a route is in line with atypical development in 
associated cortical regions in WS.  These findings provide insight, not only into the 
impairments in WS in large-scale spatial cognition, but into the strategies that may be 
commonly employed by individuals with this disorder to support wayfinding, when 
typical strategies and egocentric and allocentric spatial frames of reference are not 
available to them. 
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Chapter 6 
Study 5: The contribution of gene expression to the Williams syndrome 
visuospatial phenotype: Insights from individuals with partial deletions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The studies presented in the previous chapters have examined small- and large-
scale visuospatial impairments in WS at the behavioural level.  These studies have 
demonstrated a diverse range of deficits within this domain in WS.  However, to fully 
understand the complex phenotypic presentation of WS, it may be important to 
elucidate the role of the deleted genes within the WS critical region (WSCR) of 
chromosome 7.  The study in the present chapter provides an examination of the genetic 
contribution to the WS cognitive profile.  Here, an in-depth profiling of the visuospatial 
domain in two individuals with different genetic deletions on the WSCR highlights the 
importance of taking a multi-level approach to understanding visuospatial cognition and 
the phenotypic variability in this disorder.  
The deleted region on chromosome 7q11.23 in Williams Syndrome (WS) 
typically spans some 1.55 to 1.84 megabase pairs (Mb) of contiguous genomic DNA 
(Antonell et al., 2010; Bayés et al., 2003; Pober, 2010; Tassabehji et al., 1999).  The 
common deletion size of ~1.55 Mb (in approximately 95% of WS cases) stems from a 
recombination between the centromeric and medial low-copy-repeat (LCR) sequence 
blocks B, which flank the (~1.2 Mb) single copy gene region, and the less frequent 
deletion of ~1.84 Mb (in about 5% of WS cases) arises from a recombination between 
the centromeric and medial LCR block A copies (Koehler et al., 2014; X. Meng et al., 
1998; Peoples et al., 2000; Schubert, 2009); see 6.2.1.1 Figure 21.   
Twenty-seven to twenty-eight coding genes have been mapped within the 
typical WSCR, and consist of the 22 single copy region genes and up to six genes 
within the flanking medial LCR blocks C and B, depending on the breakpoint location 
(Koehler et al., 2014; Merla, Ucla, Guipponi, & Reymond, 2002; Schubert, 2009).  The 
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contribution of individual genes to the WS phenotype, however, remains elusive.  Thus 
far, unequivocal genotype-phenotype correlation has only been established for one gene; 
with haploinsufficiency for the elastin gene (ELN) being associated with arterial 
stenoses (Ewart et al., 1994; Li et al., 1997; Osborne, 2012; Pober, 2010).  
Animal knock-out models have provided some advancement of the delineation 
of which genes contribute to the WS phenotype.  The deleted band on human 
chromosome 7q11.23 has an orthologous region in mouse chromosome 5G1-G2 (Valero, 
de Luis, Cruces, & Perez Jurado, 2000), in the same sequential order, although inverted.  
However, whilst being a good model for this reason, there are shortcomings in 
generalising animal models to human cognition, including possible differences in 
regulatory effects and patterns of expression of these genes, particularly over 
development (Osborne, 2010, 2012).  In addition, measurable mouse behaviours are not 
likely to always be directly comparable to cognitive expression in humans.  As such, 
examination of cognitive functioning in individuals with atypical rearrangements of 
genes on 7q11.23 offers a favourable and appropriate alternative.   
A number of individuals with atypical deletions within the WSCR on 
chromosome 7 have been reported (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, et al., 2003; C.A. 
Morris et al., 2003), and provide insight into the contribution of specific genes to the 
phenotypic outcome of WS.  Previous research into individuals with partial deletions 
has sought to identify candidate genes responsible for deficits in domains such as global 
intelligence (C.A. Morris et al., 2003), social cognition (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2012), 
and spatial cognition (Frangiskakis et al., 1996; Gray, Karmiloff-Smith, Funnell, & 
Tassabehji, 2006; Smith et al., 2009).  It is often reported that the more severe 
phenotypic outcomes occur with deletions encompassing the region telomeric to the 
ELN gene compared to more centromeric deletions (e.g., Frangiskakis et al., 1996; 
Heller, Rauch, Lüttgen, Schröder, & Winterpacht, 2003); thus denoting a specific role 
of the distal genes in the development of WS cognitive features.  
In relation to spatial cognition, one study that examined two families with a 
partial WS phenotype, including supravalvular aortic stenosis (SVAS) and deficits in 
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visuospatial construction, found that affected family members were hemizygous for 
ELN and LIM domain kinase 1 (LIMK1) WSCR genes (Frangiskakis et al., 1996).  
Given that ELN is not expressed in the brain and mutations of which are not associated 
with spatial deficits but with cardiovascular abnormalities, it was concluded that it must 
be the other deleted gene, LIMK1, that plays an important role in the phenotypic 
expression of impaired spatial cognition in WS.  Indeed, in vivo, Limk1 knockout mice 
have impaired spatial learning performance when tested on reversal learning in the 
Morris water maze (Y. Meng et al., 2002).  They also present with abnormal synaptic 
structure and neuronal spine morphology, as well as altered hippocampal long-term 
potentiation.  
The role of LIMK1, however, has remained inconclusive, with other studies of 
patients with partial deletions that include LIMK1 suggesting that hemizygosity for this 
gene does not in itself result in deficits in visuospatial cognition (e.g., Gray et al., 2006; 
Tassabehji et al., 1999).  Using a large battery of perceptual and visuospatial tasks, Gray 
and colleagues (2006) report a detailed assessment of two patients with deletions of 
only ELN and LIMK1, compared with two adults with full WS matched on verbal ability.  
A profile of normal spatial performance emerged from the two partial deletion patients 
compared to those with the full deletion, suggesting that LIMK1 alone does not account 
for the WS spatial phenotype.  In addition, the successful performance of these same 
two partial deletion patients on a large-scale spatial task indicated that the hemizygotic 
deletion of LIMK1 was also insufficient to result in the poor large-scale search strategies 
identified in individuals with full WS on the same task (Smith et al., 2009). 
These findings concur to indicate that the sole deletion of LIMK1 is not 
sufficient to result in deficits in any form of spatial cognition.  Instead, the authors 
suggest that LIMK1 may play a role in the spatial cognitive profile in WS only when 
hemizygously deleted alongside other genes, particularly those at the telomeric end of 
the WSCR.  It is these latter genes that have been the focus of recent studies.   
Hirota et al. (2003) present a detailed analysis of the relationships between 
partial deletions in three patients and their performance on standardised psychometric 
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tests.  The authors suggest that the general transcription factor (GTF) genes GTF2I and 
GTF2IRD1, at the telomeric end of the WSCR, are likely to play a disproportionate and 
crucial role in the development of neural pathways involved in visuospatial cognition.  
Similarly, clinical-molecular correlations in partial 7q11.23 patients by Antonell et al. 
(2010), suggest that functional hemizygosity for GTF2I and GTF2IRD1 likely 
contribute to the craniofacial phenotype, intellectual deficit and visuospatial 
constructive difficulties associated with WS.  However, GTF2IRD1 alone was also not 
found to be sufficient to result in a visuospatial deficit.   
Dai et al. (2009) also sought to delineate the role of these transcription factors in 
the WS phenotype, finding that an individual with an atypical deletion that included 
GTF2IRD1, but not GTF2I, presented with poor performance on a number of spatial 
subtests from the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence- Revised 
(WPPSI-R) (Wechsler, 1989), including ‘Block Design’, ‘Object Assembly’, and 
‘Mazes’.  Preservation of the normal copy number of GTF2I in this individual was 
argued to contribute to the relative strengths found in those non-verbal cognitive 
measures that did not require visual-motor integration (‘Picture Completion’ and 
‘Geometric Design Recognition’), and in verbal cognition.  This provides further 
support that the GTF-family genes at the telomeric end of the WSCR are likely to make 
a significant contribution to the WS visuospatial phenotype.  
The GTF genes are also thought to have widespread effects on the expression of 
other genes (Young et al., 2008), and are differentially expressed in the developing 
brain compared to the adult brain (Osborne, 2012).  The impact of mutations of these 
telomeric genes, particularly on the expression of other genes, may therefore be diverse 
and have varying cascading effects throughout development.  As such, to gain a more 
thorough understanding of the role, combinatorial effects, and penetrance of all coding 
genes within the WSCR (particularly the GTF genes) on the phenotypic profile of WS, 
research must examine the different effects of specific genetic mutations across partial 
deletion patients with differing genomic makeup.  
 
 
 186 
 It is not only at the level of the genotype that more in-depth research has been 
necessary; the phenotypic outcome also requires more subtle analyses rather than solely 
relying on psychometric spatial tasks.  Studies 1 and 2 in this thesis sought to elucidate 
whether there are dissociable deficits within the visuospatial domain in individuals with 
the full WS deletion, using a variety of tasks at different spatial scales.  In line with 
previous reports of impaired visuospatial abilities in individuals with full WS (e.g., 
Farran et al., 2010; Farran & Jarrold, 2003; Fayasse & Thibaut, 2003; Jarrold et al., 
1998; Nardini et al., 2008; Pani et al., 1999), the findings thus far highlight the 
multifaceted nature of spatial cognitive difficulties associated with this disorder.  Indeed, 
both small- and large-scale spatial abilities are compromised, although not necessarily 
to equal extent.  However, the specific genes or gene combinations that contribute to 
these small-scale and large-scale spatial impairments remains a matter to be addressed.  
Attempts to examine the genotypic correlations with these specific spatial deficits must 
therefore also address the use of these different cognitive processes in individuals with 
partial deletions within the WSCR.   
Previous measures of spatial cognition in individuals with partial genetic 
deletions have, for the most part, relied on the use of psychometric tasks, or small-scale 
(albeit hypothesis-driven) neuropsychological tasks.  For this reason, it is imperative to 
also examine performance on the same novel, hypothesis-driven small-scale tasks and 
navigational large-scale tasks used in individuals with the full WS deletion, which tap 
into egocentric and allocentric spatial cognitive demands. 
The current chapter presents case studies of the spatial cognitive profiles of two 
individuals (HR and JB) with contrasting partial genetic deletions within the WSCR.  
Neither participant meets both genotypic and phenotypic criteria for full WS, although 
both are seen to present with an atypical cognitive profile.  Previous comparisons of 
social cognition in these two patients (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2012), highlight the 
different levels of social impairment that result from such contrasting deletions.   
The impact of these differing genetic deletions in the WSCR on visuospatial 
cognition was examined in this chapter by investigating performance of HR and JB on 
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the same range of small- and large-scale spatial tasks presented in studies 1 and 2, and 
compared to performance on the same tasks in typically developing (TD) children and 
in individuals with the full WS genotype. 
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
Data are presented from two individual cases with different genetic deletions 
occurring within or overlapping the WSCR.  The two participants were recruited 
through collaboration with Annette Karmiloff-Smith at Birkbeck Centre for Brain and 
Cognitive Development, London.  The extent of genetic deletion in each individual was 
determined using array comparative genome hybridisation (aCGH), by independent 
geneticists.  HR is a female, aged 11;09 (years; months), and has a deletion of ~1 Mb 
which spans from the centromeric end of the WSCR at NSUN5 to GTF2IRD1 
(72716513 to 73900000).  The distal breakpoint lies within GTF2IRD1 such that HR is 
partially deleted for GTF2IRD1, leading to reduced expression and thus 
haploinsufficiency for this general transcription factor (Tassabehji et al., 2005).  The 
remaining three telomeric genes of the WSCR (GTF2I, NCF1, GTF2IRD2) are present 
in HR.  JB is a male aged 14;02 and, in contrast with HR, has a deletion of ~2 Mb with 
a breakpoint in the distal WS region within (and so partially deleted for) GTF2I that 
extends beyond the WSCR in the telomeric direction (including a deletion of NCF1 and 
GTF2IRD2 within the WSCR) to HIP1 (74133268 to 75333536).  JB’s deletion 
therefore contains 21 reviewed RefSeq genes based on the most recent build of the 
human genome (hg19).  For the genetic deletions of HR and JB together with the 1.55-
1.84 Mb regions typically deleted in patients with WS, see 6.2.1.1 Figure 21.  
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6.2.1.1 Figure 21. Schematic representation of genes located within the Williams syndrome critical region (WSCR) on chromosome 7q11.23, 
depicting common deletion sizes of ~1.55 - 1.84 megabases (Mb), and the individual deletions of HR and JB. Centromeric (cen), medial (mid) and 
telomeric (tel) low-copy-repeats (LCRs) A, B and C blocks (C cen not shown) are displayed in arrows flanking the single-copy gene region. The base 
pair positions (bp) of typical WSCR (~1.55 MB), HR and JB deletion points are based on build hg19 of the human genome. Gene codes in bold depict 
the 27-28 genes typically deleted in WS. Figure adapted and gene codes obtained from Schubert (2009). Figure not to scale.  
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Both participants completed a broad range of cognitive-functioning and 
visuospatial tasks.  Testing took place in a quiet room at Birkbeck Centre for Brain and 
Cognitive Development, London.  Visuospatial tasks included the object-based (OB) 
(monkey) mental rotation task, and visual perspective-taking (VPT) circle task 
presented in study 1, and the large-scale navigation strategies task presented in study 2.  
Performance by the two participants was compared to that of the typically developing 
(TD) individuals aged 5-10 years, and individuals with full WS earlier reported in 
studies 1 and 2.   
6.2.2 Psychometric cognitive functioning measures 
‘Verbal’, ‘Non-verbal Reasoning’, and ‘Spatial’ cognitive functioning were 
assessed using the British Ability Scales-II School Age (BAS-II) (Elliott, Smith, & 
McCulloch, 1996).  ‘Verbal’ scores from the BAS-II are calculated from the Verbal 
Similarities and Word Definitions core scales, and Non-verbal reasoning is calculated 
from the Matrices and Qualitative Reasoning core scales.  ‘Spatial’ scores are derived 
from the Recall of Designs and Pattern Construction core scales.  The Raven’s Coloured 
Progressive Matrices (RCPM) (Raven et al., 2003) was included as an additional 
measure of non-verbal ability as it has been established as a sensitive and reliable 
measure of non-verbal functioning in WS (Van Herwegen, Farran, & Annaz, 2011), and 
for consistency across studies.  
6.2.3 Spatial measures 
 Two of the small-scale measures previously presented in study 1, and the large-
scale virtual environment (VE) spatial task presented in study 2 were used in the present 
study in order to measure a diverse range of visuospatial abilities in HR and JB.  As 
discussed previously, a behavioural distinction can be made between the mental 
transformation of objects and imagined self-rotations (perspective-taking) (Hegarty & 
Waller, 2004; Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973), with performance on these two types of 
task associated with activity in dissociable, although overlapping, neural systems (e.g., 
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Zacks et al., 2000).  Therefore, tasks requiring the use of different types of mental 
transformation (namely, object-based mental rotation and visual perspective-taking), as 
well as measures route-learning and egocentric and allocentric spatial-coding in large-
scale space were conducted with these two participants. 
6.2.3.1 Mental rotation (MR) task. 
The ability to imagine the rotation of a 2D object at varying degrees of 
displacement from upright was measured using the monkey MR task.  For full details of 
task design, see 2.2.3.  In brief, participants were asked to view images of two monkeys 
above a horizontal line and one monkey below the line at varying degrees of rotation 
from upright, presented on a 14” laptop computer screen.  Participants had to select 
which of the two monkeys on the top matched the rotated one underneath, indicating 
their response by pressing a left or right button on a keyboard in front of them.  The MR 
task consisted of 28 rotation trials, and four control trials where the monkey underneath 
was not rotated (0° position).  The test positions of the target monkey included 45°, 90°, 
135° and 180° clockwise rotations and -45°, -90°, -135° anticlockwise rotations.  
6.2.3.2 Visual perspective-taking (VPT) task. 
The VPT task was used to examine participants’ ability to imagine themself 
rotating around a circular array of four objects.  For full details of task design, see 2.2.4.  
In brief, throughout the task, the participant was asked to imagine looking at the array 
from different viewpoints as well as a series of questions about the position of the 
different objects from the imagined perspectives (which object would be to your left, 
right, furthest, nearest).  For consistency with the procedure used with TD and WS 
participants, both HR and JB were given a sticker on one hand (randomised left and 
right across participants) so that instead of declaring a left or right turn, they stated 
whether they would turn to their ‘sticker’ or ‘no-sticker’ side.  Using two separate 
arrays, each participant was tested on a variety of imagined displacements of the self 
(45°, 90°, 135° and 180°, collapsed across clockwise and anti-clockwise rotations).  The 
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test consisted of 28 rotation trials and four control trials where no imagined rotation was 
required. 
6.2.3.3 Large-scale navigation strategies task.   
The interactive VE maze presented in study 2 was used to examine the 
spontaneous strategy employed by each participant during large-scale navigation, and 
also whether the participant could develop an understanding of the spatial relationships 
between landmarks in the environment (an allocentric understanding of space), when 
required.  For full task design, see 3.2.2.  In brief, the VE presented participants with an 
environmental layout within which individuals could use either a sequential egocentric 
strategy (using the same sequence of left-right body turns) or an allocentric strategy to 
navigate, or a combination of the two (mixed strategy) to spontaneously navigate.  As 
previously, spontaneous strategy trials and enforced allocentric trials were conducted 
with HR and JB.  An ‘allocentric score’ was calculated from the enforced allocentric 
trials for both participants.  As a further measure of their mental representation of the 
spatial relations of the environmental layout, at the end of the task participants were 
shown a selection of six birds-eye-view maps and asked to choose the correct layout of 
the environment through which they had been navigating.  
6.2.4 Statistical analyses 
Comparisons of performance on OB mental rotation, VPT and large-scale 
navigation by HR and JB with WS and TD data were conducted using Crawford-Howell 
modified t-tests for case-control comparisons (Crawford & Howell, 1998), developed to 
compare an individual's score to that of a small control group or normative sample 
(where N< 50).  The program ‘Singlims_ES.exe’, was used to analyse the data 
(Crawford, Garthwaite, & Porter, 2010), available at: 
http://homepages.abdn.ac.uk/j.crawford/pages/dept/psychom.htm [last accessed 
27/05/2014].  The modification of the independent samples t-test takes into account the 
mean and standard deviation for the comparison group on the task (and group N), and 
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the raw score of the single case.  A point estimate of the effect size for the difference 
between the case and control (z-cc) with an accompanying 95% CI are also reported for 
statistically significant findings. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Cognitive functioning 
 HR had a Verbal score of 80 (9th percentile) and Spatial score of 73 (4th 
percentile) on the BAS-II, demonstrating relatively impaired performance in both of 
these domains.  In contrast, she presented with a relative strength in Non-Verbal 
Reasoning, with a score of 98 (45th percentile).  HR’s age-appropriate score of 32 on the 
RCPM also indicated a cognitive strength in non-verbal reasoning. 
 In contrast to HR, JB showed impaired performance on all measures of the 
BAS-II, with a Verbal score of 59 (0.3 percentile), a Spatial score of 47 (0.1 percentile), 
and a Non-Verbal Reasoning score of 65 (1st percentile).  Similarly, JB presented with 
impaired performance on the RCPM, with a score of 18, an age-equivalent level of 7 
years pointing to a score of only half his chronological age.  
6.3.2 Spatial measures 
Descriptive statistics for HR, JB, TD and WS groups from the Mental Rotation 
and Visual Perspective-Taking tasks are shown in 6.3.2.2.1 Table 14.  Descriptive 
statistics for HR, JB, TD and WS groups for Navigational Strategies measures are 
shown in 6.3.2.3.1 Table 15. 
6.3.2.1 Mental rotation (MR) task.   
On the monkey mental rotation task, HR scored 18 out of 28 on rotation trials 
(64.29% correct).  This was in line with the level of performance observed in TD 5 and 
6 year-olds (t = -.19, p = .42; and t = -.28, p = .39, respectively), but reliably poorer 
than performance seen in TD 8 and 10 year-olds (t = -2.61, p= .01, z-cc = -2.68 [CI= -
3.71 to -1.64], and t = -2.26, p = .02, z-cc = -2.33 [CI= -3.29 to -1.36], respectively).  
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HR’s performance was at a similar level to that of individuals with full WS (t = .64, p 
= .27), who were at chance level.  Conversely, JB scored 25 out of 28 on rotation 
condition trials (89.29% correct), demonstrating a high, near-ceiling level of 
performance on this task.  Unlike HR, JB scored significantly above the WS group on 
this task, t = 2.03, p= .03, z-cc = 2.08 [CI= 1.29 to 2.87].  Although JB’s performance 
was at a similar level to TD 8 and 10 year-olds, who perform at near-ceiling on this task, 
using the statistical methods noted above, scores were not reliably different from any 
TD groups (5 years: t = .81, p= .22; 6 years: t = .84, p= .21; 8 years: t = .19, p= .42; 10 
years: t = -.04, p= .48).   
 
6.3.2.2 Visual perspective-taking (VPT) task.   
HR showed no deficits on this task, performing at ceiling with all 28 self-
rotation responses correct, HR’s score for left-right responses on the task being 100 
percent (14/14).  This reliably exceeds performance by individuals with WS (t = 4.44, 
p< .001, z-cc = 4.55, [CI = 3.04 to 6.04]), who show substantial deficits on self-
rotations greater than 45˚ from their own vantage point.  Similarly, JB showed no 
deficits on this task, apart from on trials when asked to state the ‘nearest’ object.  This 
may have reflected a difficulty in understanding the meaning of the word, although he 
did get this correct on the control trial.  On the trials requiring a left-right response, JB 
performed at ceiling with all 14 self-rotation responses correct.  Again, this performance 
was greater than that observed in individuals with WS (t = 4.44, p< .001, z-cc = 4.55, 
[CI = 3.04 to 6.04]), and at a similar level to TD 8 and 10 year-olds (t = .69, p= .25; and 
t = .57, p = .29, respectively), many of whom also performed at ceiling.  Of note 
however, is that neither HR nor JB performed reliably above TD 5 and 6 year-olds (p 
> .05 for all), given that some individuals in these groups also performed well on this 
task.  This may be a reflection of the stringent nature of the modified t-test, given that 
age-related differences were found between TD groups on this task (see 2.3.4.1).   
In sum, HR and JB had similar performance on this task, demonstrating no 
deficit in VPT.  Given ceiling performance, this task may not have been sensitive 
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enough to reveal differences between HR, JB and TD children.  However, performances 
by both PD patients were indicative of a visuospatial profile different to that typically 
seen in individuals with WS.  This high level of performance by JB was particularly 
surprising, given his poor scores on psychometric measures of cognition-functioning, 
although it is in line with his good mental rotation performance.  
 
6.3.2.2.1 Table 14. Scores on mental rotation and visual perspective-taking tasks in HR 
and JB compared to Mean (SD) scores for TD and WS groups 
 HR JB WS 
(N=20) 
TD 5 
years 
(N=16) 
TD 6 
years 
(N= 16) 
TD 8 
years 
(N=17) 
TD 10 
years 
(N=16) 
Mental rotation 
(% correct 
rotation trials) 
64.29 89.29 52.86 
(17.48) 
69.19 
(24.11) 
70.54 
(21.61) 
87.61 
(8.29) 
89.73 
(10.90) 
Perspective-
taking (% correct 
L/R rotation 
trials) 
100 100 32.13 
(14.93) 
46.88 
(32.57) 
60.92 
(30.52) 
91.27 
(12.14) 
91.96 
(13.77) 
 
6.3.2.3 Large-scale navigation strategies task.   
HR learnt the route quickly, in only 4 trials.  Although this was marginally 
slower than the ceiling performance seen in TD 10 year-olds (t = 1.78, p = .05, z-cc = 
1.84 [CI = 1.01 to 2.64]), this was in line with TD children aged 8 years and younger 
and individuals with WS, who all reached criterion after a short number of trials (p 
> .05 for all).  On trials examining the spontaneous navigation strategy, HR did not use 
a consistent strategy, but was incorrect on the first trial, then used an egocentric strategy 
for one trial and a mixed strategy on the final two trials.  Comparable with spontaneous 
performance in typical adults (Iglói et al., 2009), TD children predominantly rely on the 
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use of a sequential egocentric strategy to navigate on this type of task (Broadbent, 
Farran, & Tolmie, 2014; Bullens, Nardini, et al., 2010), a strategy associated with 
preferential activation in the dorsal striatum and left hippocampus (Iglói et al., 2010).  
Individuals with WS, however, tend to rely on a mixed strategy on this task, likely due 
to the use of visual-matching and a reliance on landmarks for guidance.  In contrast to 
individuals with WS, on trials examining the ability to use an allocentric strategy when 
prompted, HR was able to use this effectively, showing an allocentric strategy and 
ability to take the shortest route on 5/6 trials.  The calculated allocentric score for HR on 
this task was at an age-appropriate level, in line with TD 10 year-olds (t = .95, p = .18), 
and at a level significantly higher than TD 5 year-olds (t = 1.76, p= .04, z-cc = 1.82 [CI 
= .99 to 2.62] ); 6 year-olds (t = 2.96, p= .01 z-cc = 3.06 [CI = 1.82 to 4.28]); and 8 
year-olds (t = 1.89, p = .04, z-cc = 1.95 [CI = 1.12 to 2.76]).  Similarly, HR scored 
significantly higher than individuals with WS (t = 4.79, p < .001, z-cc = 4.94 [CI = 3.17 
to 6.69]), who demonstrate particular deficits in the use of spatial relational or 
allocentric frames of reference for navigation (see study 2).  HR also chose the correct 
map layout, further suggesting an appropriate spatial relational representation of the 
environmental layout. 
JB required a significantly greater number of trials than TD 8 and 10 year-olds 
to learn the route (t = 2.24, p = .02 z-cc = 2.31 [CI = 1.38 to 3.22], and t = 4.64, p 
< .001, z-cc = 4.78 [CI = 3.01 to 6.53], respectively), reaching criterion only after 6 
trials.  JB’s performance was not reliably different to that observed in TD 5 year-olds (t 
= .92, p = .19), 6 year-olds (t = .66, p = .26), or WS (t = .58, p = .29).  On trials 
examining the spontaneous navigation strategy, JB made errors on two trials, but used 
an egocentric strategy on the other two trials, in line with the strategy predominantly 
observed in TD children.  On trials examining the ability to use an allocentric strategy 
when required, JB made errors on half (3/6) of the trials.  However, on the other trials, 
JB demonstrated an ability to use view-matching to search for the correct path, albeit in 
an inefficient and laborious manner that did not include taking the shortest route (2 
trials as mixed strategy, 1 as allocentric).  Although this resulted in an allocentric score 
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that could be considered delayed when contrasted with TD 10 year-olds, analyses did 
not yield any significant differences between JB and any TD group or the WS group, 
(p> .05 for all).   
JB also correctly chose the environmental layout from the map selection. This 
suggests that JB may have developed a partial mental representation of the 
environmental layout.  It should be noted, however, that a few WS participants also 
chose the correct layout despite showing no other use of an allocentric strategy for 
navigation.  Although it cannot be concluded that JB developed an allocentric spatial 
representation of the environment to aid navigation, JB’s large-scale spatial 
performance appeared stronger than typically observed in WS, and particularly 
unexpected given JB’s very low scores on measures of non-verbal reasoning and 
psychometric measures of spatial intellect (BAS-II). 
 
6.3.2.3.1 Table 15. Scores on navigation strategies VE task in HR and JB compared to 
Mean (SD) scores for TD and WS groups 
 HR JB WS 
(N=17) 
TD 5 
years 
(N=16) 
TD 6 
years 
(N= 14) 
TD 8 
years 
(N=17) 
TD 10 
years 
(N=16) 
Navigation strategies 
(trials to learn) 
4 6 4.76 
(2.08) 
4.38 
(1.71) 
4.64 
(1.99) 
3.76 
(.97) 
2.75 
(.68) 
Navigation strategies 
(allocentric score) 
10 4 2.94 
(1.43) 
3.00 
(3.85) 
3.00 
(2.29) 
4.65 
(2.74) 
6.31 
(3.79) 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The uneven cognitive profile and identifiable genetic deletion in WS provides a 
unique model for examining the link between genes and cognitive-level outcomes.  
Elucidation of which of the 28 WSCR genes play a role in the visuospatial phenotype of 
WS, however, is challenging.  The presentation of two genetically contrasting cases in 
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the current chapter provides insight both into the complex nature of mapping genetic 
contributions to human cognition, and the multifaceted nature of visuospatial cognition.  
Moreover, this study further highlights the possible combinatorial effects of genes 
within the WSCR, including the role of the general transcription factors and other 
telomeric genes on some aspects of visuospatial cognition. 
Initial studies had implicated LIMK1 as a major contributor to the visuospatial 
deficits in WS, on the basis of human partial deletion patients (Frangiskakis et al., 1996) 
and limk1-knockout mouse models (Y. Meng et al., 2002).  LIMK1 is expressed in 
various central nervous system tissues including cerebellum, spinal cord, and 
mesencephalon, as well as in the peripheral nervous system (Frangiskakis et al., 1996).  
Given the role of LIMK1 in neurogenesis promoting axon outgrowth in the mammalian 
brain (Osborne, 2012), and possible involvement in synapse formation and regulation 
(Scott & Olson, 2007), it is a good candidate for a role in the WS cognitive phenotype.  
However, subsequent work on other partial deletion patients showed that if LIMK1 does 
contribute, it is likely to be in combination with other genes at the telomeric end of the 
WSCR (Gray et al., 2006; Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2009; 
Tassabehji, 2003; Tassabehji et al., 1999).   
Drawing conclusions regarding human visuospatial cognition from studies (such 
as those aforementioned) that compare small-scale, table-top spatial deficits in WS with 
large-scale navigational deficits in the mouse is problematic given the very different 
cognitive demands placed on each species.  Indeed, it remains unclear from such studies 
whether LIMK1, as well as other genes within the WSCR, contribute differently to 
cognitive or neural processes involved in egocentric compared to allocentric spatial 
coding.  The current study examined both small- and large-scale visuospatial abilities in 
the same participants.  This more in-depth analysis of visuospatial cognition is critical if 
we are to understand genotype/phenotype relations in WS. 
An interesting pattern of strengths and weaknesses within the spatial-cognitive 
domain emerged in both participants.  In particular, HR showed poor performance on 
psychometric measures of spatial cognition (as measured using BAS-II) and object-
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based mental-rotation, alongside a relative strength in non-verbal reasoning (BAS-II and 
RCPM), and visual perspective-taking.  Despite her deletion of over 24 genes in the 
WSCR, HR’s performance was therefore not reflective of the cognitive profile of 
individuals with the full WS deletion.  Indeed, HR performed at a level significantly 
above that observed in individuals with full WS on the VPT task, but below an age-
appropriate level, and in line with individuals with WS on the MR task.   
Neither was the pattern of performance across small- and large-scale tasks in HR 
necessarily typical.  Relatively poor performance by HR both on the psychometric 
measures of spatial cognition and the mental rotation task, alongside proficient 
performance on VPT and large-scale navigation, reflects the multi-faceted nature of 
spatial cognition.  In typical individuals, moderate correlations are found between 
performance on small-scale psychometric spatial measures and large-scale spatial 
abilities (Fenner et al., 2000; Hegarty & Waller, 2005) (for a further discussion, see 
chapter 4).  However, in typical development, although performance on standardised 
tests of visuospatial memory correlate highly with route-learning ability, this is largely 
moderated by executive control (Purser et al., 2012).  As such, although somewhat 
overlapping, small- and large-scale spatial abilities are partly dissociable and it can be 
inferred from the current findings that visuospatial abilities may be differentially 
affected by divergent genetic deletions.   
What about the relationship between VPT and navigation strategies?  Moderate 
correlations are also found in typical adults between VPT and the ability to use an 
allocentric navigation strategy in large-scale space (Kozhevnikov et al., 2006).  
Accordingly, HR’s high level of performance on the VPT and navigation tasks 
(compared to individuals with the full WS deletion, who show substantial deficits on 
both of these tasks) suggests that she may be able to use this ability to spatially update 
the location of the self and to navigate successfully following a change in position in a 
large-scale familiar environment.  That said, little is known about the extent to which 
performance on VPT tasks account for the variance in navigational abilities across 
development (see chapter 4).  Indeed, the ceiling level of performance in JB on the VPT 
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task contrasted with poor navigational ability and low overall cognitive functioning 
(discussed below) suggests that they are not wholly associated, and may be 
differentially affected by genotypic variation.   
In summary, in spite of HR’s deletion of over 24 genes on the WSCR, including 
haploinsufficiency for GTF2IRD1, only some atypical visuospatial functioning was 
observed that resembles that of individuals with full WS.  These findings suggest that 
the retention of the more telomeric 7q11.23 genes contribute to the relatively good 
large-scale visuospatial performance observed in HR, particularly in the face of her 
relatively low level of cognitive functioning as measured on ‘Verbal’ and ‘Spatial’ 
psychometric scales.  This is in line with other research implicating a significant role for 
the GTF genes in the WS visuospatial profile (e.g., Antonell et al., 2010; Hirota et al., 
2003).  However, it remains inconclusive from this the extent to which each of the 
telomeric genes - GTF2I, NCF1 and GTF2IRD2- play an equal role in large-scale 
spatial cognition.   
The GFT genes GTF2IRD1 and GTF2I share similar structure and function, 
coding for TFII-I proteins, which contain helix-loop-helix domains known as I-repeats 
(Roy, 2012).  These TFII-I proteins are thought to act as transcriptional-activators and 
have a role in gene-regulation (Hinsley, Cunliffe, Tipney, Brass, & Tassabehji, 2004).  
Less is known regarding the function of GTF2IRD2, although it similarly codes for 
TFII-I-related proteins, and is thus thought to be another likely candidate for modulating 
the effects of others genes on the WSCR (Antonell et al., 2010; Tipney et al., 2004).  
NCF1 however, is an NADPH-oxidase component involved in immune defence, and 
linked to the development of hypertension (Schubert, 2009).  As such, it can be inferred 
that NCF1 is less likely to be implicated in the WS visuospatial phenotype than those in 
the gene-modulating GTF family, although this cannot be established through the 
present findings.   
If LIMK1 (deleted in HR) plays a role in spatial cognition, then it may be that 
the preservation of the most telomeric genes within the WSCR allowed for the 
development of compensatory spatial strategies in HR.  This is reflected in part by her 
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high level of performance, albeit with some atypical features, on the large-scale 
navigation task.  That said, it is difficult to disentangle between whether such 
compensation is due to a genetic mechanism, or to the application of an alternative 
strategy that transpired through specific training.  Further consideration of the 
modulatory role of both LIMK1 and GTF genes on various visual processes within the 
WS phenotype, particularly in regards to their expression in different neural tissues (e.g., 
Castelo-Branco et al., 2007), is therefore imperative.  As such, more comprehensive 
phenotypic studies at different levels of the nervous system would highlight more 
specifically the profile of visuospatial strengths and weaknesses in relation to the 
genetic underpinnings.    
The profile of HR was presented alongside that of JB, an individual with a 
contrasting hemizygous deletion, which extends telomerically from within GTF2I to 
beyond the WSCR.  Two quite differing cognitive profiles emerged from HR and JB.  
At the cognitive level, JB presented with profound impairments across the Verbal, Non-
verbal and Spatial cognitive domains as measured using the BAS-II, and poor non-
verbal reasoning measured by RCPM.  Despite his preservation of the majority of the 
genes on the WSCR, this profile of deficits is expected, given the probable role of the 
telomeric genes on the expression of other genes (Osborne, 2012) as well as the role of 
GTF2I on general intellectual ability (C.A. Morris et al., 2003).  It should be noted 
however, that JB’s deletion comprises haploinsufficiency for up to 21 genes, many of 
which have unknown function.  As such, it remains unclear what contribution they 
make to his profile.  For example, haploinsufficiency for HIP1 (deleted in JB) has been 
reported to be associated with neurological and neuropsychological deficits including 
epilepsy and autistic traits in other individuals with atypical deletions flanking the 
WSCR (Fusco et al., 2013).  Indeed, a previous report of social cognition in JB revealed 
an autistic-like profile (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2012).  It is therefore important to take 
into account that JB has a large number of genes deleted outside of the WSCR, 
including haploinsufficiency for HIP1 and is likely to have altered expression of GTF2I.  
Conclusions regarding comparisons of the two cases are therefore tentative.  That said, 
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the inclusion of these two cases together provides insight into the differential effects of 
deleted genes within 7q11.23 on visuospatial abilities at different spatial scales, in the 
face of differing overall levels of intellectual ability.   
Surprisingly, JB performed at a very high level on the small-scale monkey MR 
and VPT tasks, with scores significantly above those observed in individuals with full 
WS.  By contrast, on the large-scale navigation task, and like individuals with WS, JB 
took a long time to learn the route, with performance below TD 8 and 10 year-olds. 
Allocentric spatial coding was also somewhat compromised, although not significantly 
different from any TD or WS groups (possibly due to the stringent nature of the 
modified t-test, given that differences were found across TD and WS groups on 
allocentric score, see 3.3.5.2).  Despite these impairments in large-scale spatial coding, 
his performance reflected an overall profile unlike that typically observed in WS.  
Likewise, the uneven profile of JB’s relative strengths and weaknesses across different 
spatial scales in the visuospatial domain was not comparable to that observed in TD 
individuals aged 5-10 years.   Furthermore, given that JB performed at a high level on 
MR and VPT tasks, his relatively poorer performance on large-scale navigation cannot 
purely be considered a reflection of low general cognitive ability.  Instead, these 
findings strongly indicate the role of other genes at 7q11.23 in mental rotation ability 
other than GTF2I or GTF2IRD2 (for which JB is haploinsufficient).  One possible 
candidate is the perseveration of GTF2IRD1 in JB.  Although others have reported that 
this gene alone is not sufficient to result in visuospatial deficits (e.g., Antonell et al., 
2010), the current findings leave open the possible role for GTF2IRD1 in mental 
rotation, albeit possibly only alongside haploinsufficiency of other genes on the WSCR.  
Similar robust conclusions cannot be made regarding the role of WSCR genes on VPT 
ability, given that both JB and HR performed at a high level on this task, and the vastly 
differing intellectual profiles of the two cases.  However, there may be combinatorial 
effects of the GTFs and other more centromeric WSCR genes on VPT, although this can 
only be tentatively inferred given the difficulties in drawing direct comparisons from 
the two cases presented here.  
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Across the tasks in the current study, neither HR nor JB presented with a clear 
WS visuospatial cognitive profile, and both performed outside of the typically-observed 
variations in performance by individuals with full WS.  A spatial advantage, particularly 
for mental rotation (Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995), is usually attributed to males, 
which could ostensibly be considered an explanation for the higher level of performance 
on this task by JB than HR.  However, no gender differences were apparent in the TD or 
WS participants across the battery of spatial tasks employed here, including in mental 
rotation (see 2.3.9 and 3.3.5.2), suggesting that differences in the two cases presented 
here are not likely related to gender.  Furthermore, on other tasks HR typically 
performed at a higher level than JB, which is more likely a reflection of their differences 
in overall intellectual functioning, than of gender. 
These contrasting profiles pose an interesting question as to the combinatorial 
effects of genes at locus 7q11.23 on the WS visuospatial phenotype, particularly those 
at the telomeric end.  As mentioned, HR’s deletion includes that of LIMK1, a gene that 
had gained much attention in the search for mapping from genotype to spatial 
phenotype.  Although limk1 plays a critical role in long-term potentiation in the mouse 
hippocampus (Y. Meng et al., 2002), research in humans with atypical deletions in the 
WSCR has challenged the independent contribution of LIMK1 to the visuospatial 
deficits seen in WS (e.g., Gray et al., 2006; Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, et al., 2003; Smith 
et al., 2009).  More recently, the chromosomal region telomeric from RFC2, including 
CYLN2, GTF2IRD1, and GTF2I, has become a focus of interest as a possible 
contributor to the spatial cognitive profile in WS (Hoogenraad et al., 2002; Tassabehji et 
al., 1999).  CYLN2 (also known as CLIP2), for example, encodes CLIP-115, which is 
expressed in dendrites and cell bodies in a number of brain regions, including the 
hippocampus (Schubert, 2009), and Clip2 knock-out mice present with brain and 
behaviour abnormalities associated with impaired cerebellar and hippocampal processes 
(Hoogenraad et al., 2002).  HR is not deleted for GTF2I or other more telomeric genes, 
but her deletion does include a reduced expression of (and thus haploinsufficiency for) 
GTF2IRD1.  Given HR’s difficulties in mentally rotating objects, these results support 
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previous findings that haploinsufficiency for GTF2IRD1 in combination with other 
7q11.23 genes such as CYLN2 or LIMK1 may play a role in some of the (small-scale) 
visuospatial cognitive deficits observed in individuals with WS (Smith et al., 2009; 
Vandeweyer et al., 2012).  This is supported by JB who is not deleted for either of these 
genes and performed well on the mental rotation task.  Nonetheless, we cannot rule out 
that the deletion of the other more telomeric general transcription factors has impacted 
the expression of CYLN2 and other 7q11.23 genes in JB (e.g., see Vandeweyer et al., 
2012).  It also remains unclear whether the deletion of other genes beyond the WSCR 
plays a role in the expression of intact genes within the WSCR. 
Initially, the examination of visuospatial performance by HR and JB seems 
indicative of the additive effect of deleting each of the GTF2I family genes on the 
severity of cognitive impairment, and is in line with other findings in individuals with 
extended deletions, particularly those that encompass GTF2IRD2, who present with 
significantly greater neurological impairments than individuals with shorter deletions 
typical of WS (Porter et al., 2012).  However, although we cannot dismiss the effects of 
other deleted genes in JB that extend beyond the WSCR on cognitive functioning, JB’s 
high level of performance on small-scale mental rotation and VPT rules out the 
conclusion of a general deficit, and excludes the role of WSCR genes telomeric from 
GTF2I in these specific small-scale spatial abilities.  Indeed, the preservation of most 
other genes within the WSCR in JB suggest that spatial skills may be differentially 
affected when GTF genes are deleted in combination with other more centromeric genes 
on the WSCR.  
While the current study has highlighted candidate genotype/phenotype relations 
in the presentation of two contrasting case studies, it is clear that future studies need to 
adopt longitudinal and more in-depth analyses of genetics and cognitive phenotypes, 
measured across developmental time (Karmiloff-Smith, 2006).  This is particularly 
important given that genes have changing patterns of expression throughout 
development, and environmental factors play a significant role in the modulation of 
gene expression across ontogeny (Osborne, 2012).  This is reflected in the different 
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profiles of strengths and weaknesses expressed in WS in infancy compared to adulthood 
(e.g., Paterson, Brown, Gsodl, Johnson, & Karmiloff-Smith, 1999; Steele, Scerif, 
Cornish, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2013).  The fact that genome function is modified over 
developmental time as a function of the epigenome requires assessments from infancy 
onwards of the details of the changing phenotype.  Indeed, single gene dysfunction 
likely results in cascading effects at different cortical, subcortical and molecular levels 
of functioning that vary throughout development, highlighting the importance of 
applying a developmental and multisystem perspective to studying genotype/phenotype 
relationships in future (Scerif & Karmiloff-Smith, 2005).    
With reference to genetics, it would be preferable to perform DNA and RNA 
sequencing to delineate the precise genomic boundaries of the deleted regions, and to 
examine gene expression patterns in the WSCR region and throughout the genome 
(Antonell et al., 2010).  However, it is also critical that such detailed genetic studies be 
accompanied by in-depth phenotypic investigation, particularly at the cognitive level.  
The phenotypic analysis requires a broad spectrum of tasks, both standardised and 
hypothesis-driven, like in the current study, (see also, Gray et al., 2006) as examining 
performance only on standardised tasks (e.g., Antonell et al., 2010) does not yield a 
detailed account of phenotypic expression, particularly regarding the multi-faceted 
nature of spatial cognition. 
A limitation of using case studies such as JB and HR is the difficulty in 
ascertaining whether gender influences gene expression in the WSCR, or whether the 
individuals have other genetic mutations elsewhere on their genome, outside the WSCR, 
that may affect general intellectual outcome.  Furthermore, caution should be taken in 
making robust conclusions from such case studies, as direct mappings from individual 
genes to cognitive phenotype cannot be clearly defined, given the sometimes diverse 
contribution of genes to different aspects of cortical development (Karmiloff-Smith, 
2006).  In relation to the current study, numerous factors that include changes in gene 
expression across development, environmental influences, education and other 
individual differences may have contributed to the complex phenotypic outcomes in 
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both HR and JB.   As such, genetic and phenotypic examination of other family 
members would be critical to complete the picture of such case studies, as well as being 
supplemented by appropriate animal models.  In addition, such genotype-phenotype 
correlations should take into account the possible role of candidate genes in the 
development of other neural tissues.  For example, Castelo-Branco and colleagues 
(2007) examined the contribution of the general transcription factors to the neural 
retinal phenotype in WS, finding patterns of visual impairment that were separate from 
the known cortical dorsal-stream phenotype.  This highlights the important nature of in-
depth phenotypic analyses in order to draw more robust conclusions as to the 
contributions of specific genes to cognitive phenotypes.   
 
6.5 Conclusions 
The examination of two individuals with such contrasting genetic deletions 
within the WSCR presented in this chapter provides further insight into candidate 
genotype relations to the WS visuospatial cognitive phenotype.  The pattern of strengths 
and weaknesses within the visuospatial domain that emerged in both participants speaks, 
in particular, of the multifaceted nature of visuospatial cognition and the divergent 
effects of genetic deletions within the WSCR on different components of small- and 
large-scale spatial ability. 
A deletion of over 24 genes on the WSCR in HR (including haploinsufficiency 
for GTF2IRD1) did not result in a phenotypic expression typically observed in WS, 
despite encompassing the majority of the genes typically compromised in individuals 
with the full WS deletion.  Nor was HR’s visuospatial cognition in line with what is 
observed in typical development.  As such, the retention of the more telomeric genes in 
HR (including GTF2I, NCF1, GTF2IRD2) likely contributes to her relatively good 
large-scale spatial cognition, albeit with atypical features.  In JB, an individual with a 
contrasting deletion in the distal WS region from within GTF2I presented with good 
performance on object-based mental rotation and VPT, alongside poor performance on 
large-scale spatial and general cognitive functioning measures.  As such, these findings 
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indicate that even in the face of a stark intellectual deficit as seen in JB, mental rotation 
abilities in particular are not affected by genes extending telomerically from GTF2I.  
Indeed, although conclusions cannot be met from such case studies regarding precise 
genotype-phenotype mapping, the current study provides further insight into the 
complex, dynamic, and combinatorial role of different genes within the WSCR on 
disparate phenotypic expression within the visuospatial domain.  Moreover these 
findings contribute to the ongoing debate regarding gene-brain-behaviour relations in 
WS, and highlight the importance of taking a multi-level approach to understanding the 
visuospatial cognitive phenotype associated with this disorder. 
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion 
7.1 Thesis overview 
Examples of impaired visuospatial cognition in Williams syndrome (WS) have 
been frequently reported in the literature, and are often noted in comparison to relative 
strengths in other cognitive domains such as language and face processing (Bellugi et 
al., 2000).  Evident in numerous small-scale tasks including visuospatial construction 
(Mervis et al., 1999), spatial orientation (Lakusta, Dessalegn, & Landau, 2010), and 
mental rotation (Stinton et al., 2008), poor visuospatial abilities are a hallmark and 
seemingly pervasive characteristic of the WS phenotype. 
A reasonable conjecture therefore is that individuals with WS would also 
experience difficulties on tasks at different spatial scales, with the deficit pervading to 
large-scale navigational abilities such as learning a route or re-orientating oneself after 
getting lost.  Indeed, this inference is made alongside parental reports of poor 
navigational performance in individuals with WS (J. Atkinson et al., 2001). 
The studies presented throughout this thesis aimed to investigate the nature of 
large-scale spatial abilities in individuals with WS compared to typically developing 
(TD) children.  An examination into the development of small-scale spatial abilities that 
rely on the use of different spatial frames of reference in study 1 (chapter 2), the use of 
different navigation strategies in typical development in studies 2 and 4 (chapters 3 and 
5, respectively), and the relationships between small- and large-scale spatial abilities 
across development in study 3 (chapter 4), provided an important basis on which to 
understand atypical development.  An analysis of the visuospatial profile of individuals 
with partial genetic deletions within the WS critical region (WSCR) in study 5 (chapter 
6) also contributed to current discussions regarding the role of specific genes as well as 
their combinatorial effects on different components of visuospatial ability.  This served 
to further highlight the multifaceted nature of spatial cognition, and inform an 
understanding as to the uneven cognitive profile in WS, even within the domain of 
visuospatial functioning. 
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This discussion chapter will provide an overview of the experimental outcomes 
presented throughout this thesis.  Performance on tasks in TD children in studies 1-4 
will be considered in light of the current understanding of developmental changes 
between 5 and 10 years of age in the ability to encode and use spatial information at 
different scales.  The performance by groups of individuals with WS compared to TD 
children on these tasks will then be discussed to underline the specific levels and areas 
of impairment and atypical visuospatial processing in this disorder.  This will be 
considered in respect to known cortical atypicalities in WS, although the speculative 
nature of defining brain-behaviour relationships in this manner are acknowledged.  
Furthermore, efforts to understand the nature of the large-scale visuospatial deficits in 
WS by examining genotype-phenotype relationships will be discussed in view of the 
findings from two individuals with partial WSCR deletions.  Limitations of the 
experimental research conducted throughout this thesis will be addressed.  The need for 
future research to take a multilevel and developmental approach to examine in-depth 
visuospatial phenotyping in WS will also be acknowledged.  Finally, implications of the 
current findings for training and interventions for individuals with WS, as well as 
proposals for future research directions will be presented.   
7.2 Performance in TD children on studies throughout this thesis 
Together the findings from the studies presented in this thesis provide new 
insight into the development of large-scale spatial cognition, and particularly the way in 
which more complex cognitive processes that underlie spatial knowledge are acquired.  
For instance, the findings from studies 1 and 2 suggest that an adult-like pattern of 
performance in both small- and large- scale space is supported by the development of an 
ability to shift between egocentric and allocentric spatial frames of reference and 
translate spatial information from one frame of reference to another.  This was seen to 
occur between 8 and 10 years of age.  Firstly, an adult-like pattern of performance on 
the visual perspective-taking tasks that required the cooperative use of these two 
reference frames was not seen until this age in study 1.  Secondly, only 8 and 10 year-
 
 
 209 
olds were able to flexibly switch to the use of an allocentric strategy to navigate when 
required to take short-cuts in study 2.  These findings suggest that the ability to flexibly 
integrate different spatial frames of reference may underlie the development of more 
global representations of space and the ability to draw on and switch between different 
cognitive processes dependent on the task demands.  These findings are in line with 
recent developmental studies that suggest there is a transition in the spatial frames of 
reference that children use for reorientation in both small- and large-scale environments, 
with an increase during the early school years both in the ability to use each spatial 
reference frame independently and the ability to use them cooperatively when required 
(Bullens, Iglói, et al., 2010; Moraleda, Broglio, Rodriguez, & Gomez, 2013; Nardini et 
al., 2006). 
Of note here is that this suggests there may be a number of non-navigational 
contributors to navigational learning and the use of appropriate spatial frames of 
reference.  As mentioned in 2.1.2 and 4.4, executive functions undergo a protracted 
course of development (Davidson et al., 2006; Diamond, 1990) and may underlie 
difficulties in flexibly shifting between spatial reference frames in younger children. 
The addition of tasks examining executive control, particularly inhibition and task 
switching, in the studies throughout this thesis would therefore have provided further 
insight into the extent to which these abilities are related to online navigational 
performance. Indeed, studies previously examining the relationship between small and 
large-scale visuospatial abilities have found that significant correlations are mediated by 
executive control (Purser et al., 2012). 
Traditional behavioural frameworks of the development of large-scale spatial 
knowledge (e.g., Siegel & White, 1975) propose both an ontogenetic and a microgenetic 
shift from landmark knowledge to route knowledge, and finally to survey knowledge; 
with qualitative differences between each stage.  Although this classification system has 
been somewhat debated, it has provided an important basis on which to understand 
spatial navigation and only few recent attempts have been made to propose alternatives 
(e.g.  see, Chrastil, 2013; D. R. Montello, 1998).  Even then, these alternative 
frameworks only hypothesise the advancement of spatial knowledge in typical adults, 
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without consideration for changes across development.  The studies in this thesis 
therefore contribute to our understanding of the nature of the development of large-scale 
spatial abilities, suggesting that there are a number of cognitive processes underlying 
the use of each stage of navigational knowledge, and that these may be subserved by the 
use of different spatial frames of reference and have distinct neural correlates. 
Prior to the studies in this thesis, there was limited acknowledgement in the 
literature as to the way in which the use of different spatial frames of reference (i.e., 
egocentric and allocentric) relate to the different aspects of large-scale spatial 
knowledge as laid out by hierarchical theories of cognitive development.  That said, it 
has generally been considered that landmark and route knowledge are associated with 
the use of an egocentric reference frame, and survey knowledge with an allocentric 
frame of reference (Wen, Ishikawa, & Sato, 2013).  Integrating these levels of 
understanding (spatial frames of reference and stages of large-scale spatial knowledge) 
has provided insight into the flexible and dynamic nature of visuospatial cognition, and 
also the possible constraints on using different aspects of spatial knowledge across 
development.   
Study 1 examined the ability to mentally manipulate a representation of either an 
object or the self to a different imagined location or viewpoint, respectively.  TD 
children demonstrated an increase in both of these abilities (object-based (OB) mental 
rotation and visual perspective-taking (VPT)) between 6 and 8 years.  This was in line 
with previous findings in TD children of similar age (Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973; 
Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 1992).  Moreover, TD 5 and 6 year-olds presented with a 
different pattern of performance to TD 8 and 10 year-olds, with the older groups 
showing a pattern more in line with typical adults1.  As mentioned above, this was 
particularly so for performance on the VPT tasks.  For instance, a linear decline in 
accuracy with greater degree of required imagined displacement of the self (particularly 
between 90° and 180°) is not seen in typical adults (Zacks et al., 2000).  This has been 
attributed to the use of an alternative strategy by adulthood, such as employing ‘blink 
transformations’ to immediately mentally transpose the self to an alternative perspective 
                                                
1 Based on previous research in typical adults on comparable tasks (Zacks, 2008) 
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(Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Wraga et al., 2000; Zacks & Michelon, 2005). This was a 
similar pattern to that observed in the TD 10 year-olds in the present study, suggesting 
an adult pattern of performance emerges by this age.   
Object-based mental rotation requires the use of an allocentric frame of 
reference, by which an understanding of the relationships between items in an array or 
between parts of an object is required (Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001).  On the other 
hand, VPT tasks are thought to rely on the use of an egocentric reference frame to 
determine the location of an object relative to the intrinsic axis of the observer (Wraga 
et al., 2000; Wraga et al., 2005).  Not only do typical adults present with a different 
pattern of performance on VPT tasks compared to OB rotation, behavioural studies have 
found an advantage for self-rotations (VPT) both in terms of accuracy and reaction 
times (e.g., Amorim & Stucchi, 1997; Creem et al., 2001; Wraga et al., 2000).  
Neuroimaging studies have shown that activation of the parietal-occipital sulcus, 
including the retrosplenial cortex, positively correlates with self-rotation performance 
(Lambrey et al., 2012). This region is also associated with the spatial updating of 
egocentric locations within an allocentric frame of reference (e.g., Burgess, Becker, 
King, & O'Keefe, 2001).  Lambrey and colleagues (2012) therefore suggest that the 
ability to translate between an egocentric and allocentric reference frame (and therefore 
perform automatic ‘spatial updating’ of a viewpoint as a consequence) underlies the 
advantage for VPT compared to OB rotations in some adults.  Despite the use of 
different spatial frames of reference for the mental rotation of objects (OB) compared to 
imagined self-rotations (VPT), a similar age of development for these two abilities was 
observed in study 1, with improved performance between 6 and 8 years.  However, the 
later development of an ability to switch successfully between the use of an egocentric 
and allocentric frame of reference (Nardini et al., 2006; Nardini et al., 2009) may 
underlie the advantage for VPT in older children and adults, but not for younger 
children.  This was supported in this study, with an adult-like pattern of performance on 
the VPT task not evident until 8-10 years of age.  
The findings from study 2 are further indicative of this later development of an 
ability to switch between spatial frames of reference when required for large-scale 
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navigation.  In this study, when spontaneously navigating through a familiar virtual 
environment, TD children predominantly followed the same previously-learnt pattern of 
body turns to reach the goal; namely, a sequential egocentric strategy.  When required to 
rely on the use of an allocentric spatial reference frame in order to find a short-cut 
however, a change was seen from youngest to oldest TD children.  Only TD 8 and 10 
year-olds demonstrated a significant difference in allocentric ability between 
spontaneous and enforced allocentric trials.  This is in line with previous research in 
children of comparable chronological age in large-scale environments (Bullens, Iglói, et 
al., 2010).   
Successful performance on the complex navigational task of finding short-cuts 
therefore requires the ability to understand the location of landmarks in relation to other 
landmarks, as well as being able to continuously mentally update the location of the self 
within the broader context of the environment.  These findings also correspond to more 
recent cognitive frameworks that propose the nature of large-scale spatial knowledge in 
typical adults is flexible and multidimensional (Chrastil, 2013).  Chrastil (2013) 
proposes that the ability to transform between ego- and allocentric perspectives relates 
to a cognitive sub-process associated with both graph knowledge (an understanding of 
how locations are connected to each other, but without necessarily containing metric 
information) and survey knowledge, and is supported by hippocampal, parahippocampal 
and retrosplenial cortices.  In sum, both studies 1 and 2 of this thesis have shown that 
the ability to understand the location of a goal in relation to the self and other 
environmental locations, and to continually update this when walking through the 
environment, requires the successful translation between an allocentric and egocentric 
frame of reference, and begins to emerge from 8 years of age. 
In adults, small-scale VPT ability and performance on large-scale navigation 
tasks that require updating self-to-object representations following movement are 
moderately correlated (Kozhevnikov et al., 2006; Palermo et al., 2008).  This is 
indicative of shared underlying processes associated with performance on tasks at these 
different spatial scales.  Relationships between OB rotation ability and navigational 
performance, on the other hand, are more negligible (Hegarty et al., 2006; Hegarty & 
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Waller, 2005).  Moreover, previous developmental studies have found only marginal 
correlations between small- and large-scale spatial tasks in children, if any (Quaiser-
Pohl et al., 2004).  Any significant correlations in TD populations are found to be 
mediated by other cognitive factors such as inhibition (Purser et al., 2012).  The positive 
relationships in TD 10 year-olds between VPT ability and large-scale allocentric 
knowledge in this thesis (study 3) provides support for a developmental increase in the 
use of common underlying cognitive processes to perform these tasks by this age.  Such 
associations were not evident in TD children younger than 10 years of age.  Given that 
TD 8 year-olds in studies 1 and 2 also demonstrated an ability to switch between 
reference frames however, it would be expected that correlations between these tasks 
would also be seen in this group.  It may be that the results reflect an issue of limited 
statistical power (as indicated in results of power analyses reported in Chapter 2), 
warranting the use of larger TD sample sizes to verify these findings. The small group 
sizes in these studies are particularly emblematic of studying individuals with rare 
genetic disorders (an issue that is similarly reflected in the need to select a large age 
range of individuals within the WS population, given the limited sample).  This may 
have been a greater issue in other analyses that require greater sample sizes. For 
instance, one-way ANOVAs and repeated measures ANOVAs for 5 groups, used 
throughout the studies in this thesis require sample sizes of 15 – 40 participants per 
group (based on a priori power analyses; α 0.05, effect size 0.50, 1-β at 0.8). The 
smaller sample sizes reported here may therefore have resulted in type-2 errors.  To 
account for this, stringent Bonferonni corrections for multiple comparisons were not 
included, even for multiple correlational analyses.  Of course, this however may have 
inadvertently resulted in significant findings being the result of type-1 errors, and so 
without more adequate sample sizes and correctional analyses, the results should be 
considered tentatively. 
As an alternative to the non-significant findings in the youngest TD children 
being due to limited statistical power, the results may indicate that below 10 years of 
age, performance on tasks at different scales are supported by different cognitive 
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processes, even though the flexible use of different spatial reference frames for small- 
and large-scale tasks independently is seen by 8 years of age. 
As well as the changes in TD children in the ability to flexibly use spatial frames 
of reference, the type of spatial information used by TD children was also examined in 
this thesis.  Results from study 4 showed that during route-learning, TD children aged 
5-9 years do not only obtain spatial information about the location of landmarks, but are 
able to simultaneously acquire sequential body-based information.  This is not fully 
accounted for in hierarchical models of spatial knowledge, which propose a stage-like 
process in the types of information gleaned from an environment following experience.  
This is more in line with recent frameworks of large-scale spatial navigation (e.g., 
Chrastil, 2013), that indicate sequence learning and response learning are dissociable 
aspects of the broader category of route knowledge.  In this study, sequential route 
information of a large-scale environment (sequence learning) was encoded implicitly in 
TD children, alongside the more explicit learning of an egocentric response-strategy 
(response learning) that related to learning associations between a particular 
environmental location and a required action.  It should be noted however that sequence 
learning may be further split into two sub-processes; the ability to remember an ordinal 
sequence of landmarks compared to the ability to recall a sequence of body turns in an 
environment without landmarks.  This is discussed later (see 7.3) in relation to different 
cortical regions that may be associated with these processes. 
In sum, the development of the ability to flexibly shift between the use of 
different spatial information and reference frames may underlie the observable 
developmental changes in strategy use and proficiency on spatial tasks.  The results 
from TD children in this thesis suggest that performance on mental transformation tasks 
(both OB and VPT) improve significantly between 6 and 8 years of age.  However, an 
adult-like pattern of performance on VPT tasks does not occur until between 8 and 10 
years, in line with the development of an ability to flexibly switch between an 
egocentric and allocentric reference frame (although the addition of tasks examining 
difference elements of executive functioning, such as task switching and inhibition, 
would have been beneficial in substantiating these claims).  This was further supported 
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by the later use of an allocentric reference frame to update the location of the self, 
following movement in a large-scale environment only by 8 and 10 year-olds.  Stage 
theories may be somewhat useful for understanding behaviour and the main categories 
of mental representations that can be formed in large-scale space.  However (as seen in 
study 4), there are likely to be different underlying cognitive processes and sub-
processes involved within each main category of spatial knowledge, which are not 
accounted for by traditional frameworks.   
7.3 Visuospatial abilities and navigation strategies in WS 
The exploration into the development of large-scale spatial cognition and 
navigation strategies in TD children throughout this thesis provided an important basis 
on which to examine atypical development of large-scale spatial abilities in WS.  In the 
studies presented here, groups of individuals with WS performed at the level expected 
based on non-verbal ability (in line with TD 5-6 year olds) on a number of tasks.  
However, on some aspects of the tasks and under certain conditions, individuals with 
WS scored below this level and demonstrated an atypical pattern of performance.  The 
results are informative not only to the syndrome-specific areas of relative strengths and 
weaknesses within the visuospatial domain, but also speak of the multifaceted nature of 
visuospatial cognition.     
In study 1, the WS group were at chance level for all imagined rotations on the 
OB monkey task (requiring the mental transformation of an image), and at chance on 
imagined rotations of the self (greater than 90°) around an array (VPT circle task).  
However, the WS group scored above chance on imagined rotations of the self to 90° on 
the VPT path task.  Given the specific spatial frames of reference required for 
performance on these tasks (as mentioned above), these findings are indicative of 
profound impairments in WS in the use of both egocentric and allocentric reference 
frames to perform mental transformations.  This is in line with other small-scale studies 
that report; impairments in both these spatial reference frames (Bernardino et al., 2013); 
impaired mental rotation (Farran & Jarrold, 2004; Stinton et al., 2008); and poor VPT 
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(Farran et al., 2010) in this group.  A recent developmental trajectory study into OB 
mental rotation and VPT in WS found an improvement in OB rotation in WS with 
development (between 6 and 33 years of age; verbal mental age range 3;3 – 11;1 years; 
months), but no changes in VPT ability (Hirai et al., 2013).  The authors concluded that 
OB rotation ability develops slowly in WS, whereas processes involved in VPT such as 
theory of mind are particularly impaired leading to more a severe detriment to this 
ability.  This pattern was partly reflected in study 1 in this thesis in the positive 
relationship between age and score on the OB monkey rotation task in the WS group, 
with no correlations found between VPT scores and age in the WS group.  Similarly, 
WS verbal ability (BPVS) correlated with monkey rotation score, although this was 
driven by chronological age.  Of note however, no correlations between age and OB 
circle task in WS were found in study 1, which may be indicative of the different levels 
of difficulty in the two OB tasks used (OB monkey and OB circle task). 
In contrast to the findings in study 1 on the OB monkey task, Hirai and 
colleagues found above-chance performance in the WS group on OB mental rotation, 
suggesting that the images used in the present study may have been more challenging to 
rotate.  For this reason, it may be difficult to make robust conclusions regarding the 
extent of difficulties mentally rotating images in WS from this study, as the OB rotation 
scores may be below that of the true ability level in WS.  This may also have 
implications for the TD data on these tasks, suggesting that with a less complex rotation 
image, TD children may perform at a higher level, and reach above-chance levels at a 
younger age than observed here.  Furthermore, both the WS group and TD 5 year-olds 
in the present study performed at floor level and so any true differences between the 
groups on mental rotation ability may have been masked. 
Even though performance in the WS group on rotation tasks was in line with TD 
5 year-olds, the results of study 1 demonstrate an atypical pattern of performance in the 
WS group compared to TD children.  A propensity to approach rotation problems using 
one’s own stationary viewpoint and failure to transpose this reference frame resulted in 
a disproportionate number of egocentric errors in the WS group.  This was the first 
indication in this thesis that individuals with WS may approach spatial tasks in a 
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different way to TD individuals, and do not just display a delay in the development of 
their abilities.  In essence, individuals with WS may be failing or succeeding on tasks 
for different reasons than TD individuals.       
The navigational strategies used in large-scale environments in WS were 
examined in studies 2 and 4, and the extent to which performance on large-scale tasks 
can be accounted for by small-scale task performance was examined in study 3.  Results 
from studies 2 and 4 demonstrated that individuals with WS have difficulties not only in 
the use of an allocentric reference frame, but also in the use of a sequential egocentric 
strategy to navigate.  Impairments in WS in the use of an allocentric strategy in large-
scale space had been previously demonstrated in real-world environments (Farran et al., 
2010).  The VE studies in this thesis extend these findings to demonstrate that 
allocentric knowledge in WS does not develop even following extensive experience in 
an environment or when participants are directed to take into consideration the layout of 
an environment in order to take short-cuts (study 2).  Instead, individuals with WS were 
found to rely on the use of an inflexible and relatively inefficient visual-matching 
strategy to navigate, associating individual landmarks with a specific body-based 
response.  This was a finding further substantiated in study 4.  On the tasks in study 4, 
TD children were able to resort to the use of their memory of the sequence of body turns 
through a maze when required (i.e., when no landmarks were present or when 
landmarks were removed), which may have been learned implicitly alongside more 
explicit association-response learning between landmarks and direction decisions.  In 
contrast, the WS group relied more heavily on the presence of landmarks than TD 
children, resulting in significantly greater detriment to performance following the 
removal of these visual cues. 
Navigation in a real-world environment allows for internally-generated 
idiothetic cues such as proprioception, vestibular feedback, and optic flow to be used to 
support learning and processing of different spatial frames of reference (particularly an 
egocentric frame) (Boccia, Nemmi, & Guariglia, 2014).  Given the lack of actual 
movement in desktop virtual environments such as those used here, it may be that this 
was a limiting factor in the successful development of spatial sequential learning in WS.  
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However, given that TD children were able to develop an understanding of the sequence 
of body turns throughout a route, and successfully switch to using this strategy when 
other environmental cues were no longer available, it is unlikely that the lack of 
idiothetic cues was a substantial contributing factor to the difficulties in WS.  For 
further limitations in using VEs to assess spatial knowledge in WS, see 7.5.3.  
An association-response strategy relies on the use of an egocentric frame of 
reference, as the navigator encodes an association between their viewpoint and a given 
action.  The parietal cortex plays a role in the representation of space using an 
egocentric frame of reference (Galati et al., 2000; Shelton & Gabrieli, 2002, 2004).  
This brain region has been shown consistently to be atypical in structure and function in 
WS (Eckert et al., 2005; Kippenhan et al., 2005; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004).  The 
results in study 4 are indicative of a relative strength in egocentric response-learning in 
this group, suggesting that not all parietal lobe functions are equally compromised in 
this disorder.  The use of a sequential egocentric strategy is, however, impaired in WS.  
On examination of the different types of egocentric strategies used in large-scale space, 
neuroimaging studies have shown that although egocentric response strategies are 
associated with preferential activation in the caudate and parietal cortex (Hartley et al., 
2003; Marchette et al., 2011), the learning of egocentric spatial and temporal sequences 
in an environment depends on the integrity of the hippocampus (Foster & Knierim, 
2012; Iaria, Petrides, Dagher, Pike, & Bohbot, 2003; Iglói et al., 2010; Kumaran & 
Maguire, 2005; Maguire et al., 1997). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
calcarine sulcus and lingual gyrus also play a role in the successful encoding of 
sequences in large-scale space (Nemmi, Boccia, Piccardi, Galati, & Guariglia, 2013).  
This suggests that there may be a network of brain areas involved in the encoding and 
storage of sequential information.  For instance, the encoding of the order of landmarks 
throughout a route may elicit activity in different cortical areas to those involved in the 
implicit encoding of the sequence of body turns required to navigate through a given 
route.  Given these may be separate processes, it is therefore not reasonable to assume 
that each egocentric strategy would be equally impaired in WS. 
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Atypical structure and functioning in the hippocampal formation in WS (Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2005) may be associated with difficulties in using a sequential 
egocentric strategy as seen in these studies.  Throughout the thesis, difficulties with 
allocentric processing both on small- and large-scale tasks in WS have been similarly 
attributed to atypical development of the hippocampal region.  This is based on findings 
from typical adults that implicate the role of the hippocampus in allocentric processing 
on small-scale rotation tasks (Lambrey et al., 2012), and the development of 
environmental relational knowledge (Burgess, 2008; King et al., 2002).  However, the 
brain imaging studies in WS cited above have similarly focused on cortical 
abnormalities in adolescents and adults.  It may be important therefore to take into 
account a developmental view of atypical brain development in WS before more robust 
inferences regarding causality can be made. This will be discussed in more detail in 7.5.   
A response strategy such as visual-matching used in the WS group (as evidenced 
and discussed in study 4) could alternatively be considered a non-spatial strategy, which 
does not require knowledge of the order of landmarks or any distance and directional 
information that connects different aspects of the environment.  Instead this could entail 
independent learning of the response to each environmental landmark using verbal 
coding, and without consideration for the location of the landmark in relation to other 
parts of the route.  Relative strengths in verbal abilities in WS may therefore support the 
use of such strategies.  Indeed, Farran, Courbois, Van Herwegen, and Blades (2012) 
found that verbal labelling in WS improved knowledge of the sequence of turns, an 
aspect of route knowledge.  That said, it cannot be concluded from study 4 which 
elements of the visual scenes individuals with WS were using, and whether they were 
able to encode configurational knowledge within the scene to support recognition and 
decision-making.  Therefore, further research is needed to examine the nature of using 
visual matching in WS, to elucidate the processes involved.    
The reliance on a visual-matching strategy would have important connotations 
for individuals with WS when traversing through an environment that contains a 
number of similar-looking or identical landmarks.  If additional spatial information 
including the order in which a given landmark came in a sequence is not successfully 
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coded, then an incorrect response may be executed.  For instance, if a route contains two 
post-boxes, one at which a right turn is required and the other a left turn or to continue 
straight, without accurate information regarding the sequence in which these two post-
boxes had been experienced, an incorrect decision could be made.  Further research is 
required to examine this, and whether individuals with WS would be able to use verbal 
coding to support any conflicts in the required body-based response. 
In relation to cognitive frameworks of large-scale spatial cognition (e.g., Siegel 
& White, 1975), results from previous navigation studies suggest that individuals with 
WS have difficulties in developing survey knowledge (Farran et al., 2010), but are able 
to successfully learn a route and use environmental landmarks (Farran, Courbois, Van 
Herwegen, & Blades, 2012), albeit only to a level expected based on non-verbal ability.  
This is in line with successful use of an egocentric (viewpoint-dependent) reference 
frame but not allocentric (viewpoint-independent) on small-scale tasks in WS (Nardini 
et al., 2008).  The results presented in this thesis however suggest that navigational 
abilities cannot be categorized simply into landmark, route and survey knowledge as 
three separate components.  Here, individuals with WS were found to be impaired in the 
use of both allocentric and egocentric spatial frames of reference, although some 
cognitive processes relating to route knowledge that use an egocentric reference frame 
may be more impaired than others.  Indeed, there may be a variety of cognitive 
processes that require egocentric knowledge.  This may be related to the different brain 
regions that support the use of these different egocentric sub-processes, as highlighted 
above.  In brief, the ability to learn a route through an environment on the basis of a 
simple response strategy requires the use of a viewpoint-dependent egocentric reference 
frame and knowledge of the specific action required at that location.  Individuals with 
WS were relatively unimpaired on this compared with sequential egocentric learning, 
which entails knowledge of the ordinal relationships between the navigator and parts of 
the route.  
According to a recent taxonomy by Chrasil (2013), the difference between route 
and graph knowledge (graph knowledge being situated between route and survey 
knowledge, see 1.2.2.1 Table 1) is that graph knowledge entails an additional ability to 
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understand the location of landmarks relative to other places within the larger 
environment, and also the ability to flexibly shift between an egocentric and allocentric 
perspective.  This is in turn different to survey knowledge, which requires additional 
metric information about distance and angles, allowing for more complex and complete 
large-scale spatial knowledge.  If large-scale spatial cognition in WS was limited to 
difficulties in flexibly switching between both perspectives (as observed in TD children 
above), this could relate to executive functioning impairments in WS (Carney, Brown, 
& Henry, 2013; Costanzo et al., 2013), although Menghini et al. (2010) found that 
shifting ability in WS is relatively unimpaired compared to other executive functions.  
However, deficits in the independent use of both of these spatial frames of reference 
suggests that switching difficulties would not fully account for the extent of the 
visuospatial impairments experienced by individuals with WS.  That is to say, 
impairments in both egocentric and allocentric strategies alone would lead to deficits on 
complex navigation tasks, regardless of whether a task requires the flexible integration 
of the two perspectives.  That said, the inclusion of tasks examining cognitive flexibility 
may have provided insight into the extent to which this ability plays a role in navigation, 
and particularly how this compares to the pattern seen in TD children.  
Results of correlational analyses reported in study 3 found no significant 
relationships between performance on small- and large-scale spatial abilities in WS.  
This suggests that, although the findings in studies 1, 2, and 4 show that individuals 
with WS may be impaired in the use of both spatial frames of reference, the underlying 
cognitive processes involved at different scales are not necessarily related.  Floor level 
performance on some tasks and wide-ranging variability on other tasks in the WS group 
may have contributed to these non-significant findings.  However, given the lack of 
correlations in TD children below 10 years of age on most tasks, this implies that 
performance on spatial tasks at different scales in WS and young TD children are 
dissociable, and should be treated as such.  This has important implications for making 
inferences about environmental abilities in WS and TD children based on table-top 
measures of visuospatial ability.  Together these findings suggest that visuospatial 
cognition is multifaceted.  This was further supported in study 5 in an examination of 
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the genetic contributions to the WS visuospatial phenotype.  This study concluded that 
there may be multiple underlying influences on outcomes of distinct visuospatial 
abilities and at different spatial scales.  This is discussed further in the following section.     
7.4 Genotype-phenotype correlations in WS 
Given that WS arises from an identifiable genetic deletion, it is appealing to 
search for direct gene-behaviour mappings in order to elucidate which of the WS genes 
play a role in the visuospatial impairments associated with the disorder.  An in-depth 
phenotyping of visuospatial abilities in two patients with partial genetic deletions on the 
WS critical region (WSCR) of chromosome 7 (study 5) provided some insight into the 
candidate genes associated with visuospatial impairments in WS.  The results pointed 
towards a role of the telomeric general transcription factor (GTF) genes, and their 
possible combinatorial effects on different aspects of visuospatial cognition.  This was 
in line with other work that has found more severe cognitive impairments are associated 
with the deletion of the genes telomeric to ELN, that include the three GTF genes 
(Frangiskakis et al., 1996; Heller et al., 2003).  This is unsurprising given that the three 
GTF genes in the WSCR in particular (GTF2I, GTF2IRD1 and GTF2IRD2) code for 
proteins that activate or repress the expression of other genes (Young et al., 2008). 
In the study presented in this thesis, one participant (HR) was haploinsufficient 
for 24 out of the 27 genes in the WSCR, although she presented with a profile in line 
with TD children on a number of tasks.  Of note is that HR was haploinsufficient for 
one of the GTF genes (GTF2IRD1), and yet this alone was not sufficient to result in a 
WS visuospatial profile.  Even from the in-depth phenotypic investigation in this thesis, 
the role of individual WSCR genes on specific spatial abilities remains elusive.  Indeed, 
conclusions regarding whether each GTF gene plays an equivalent role in coding for 
visuospatial functioning could not be met.  One finding from the other participant (JB) 
however, indicates that genes telomeric to GTF2I are not implicated in mental rotation 
ability.  This was demonstrated as JB was deleted for these genes and yet demonstrated 
relatively strong mental rotation ability, even in the face of severe general cognitive 
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impairment.  Further tests of mental rotation in this individual would be favourable to 
help confirm these findings.  
The discussion of study 5 accords with conclusions of previous chapters as to 
the multifaceted, and divisible nature of visuospatial cognition.  Although it is clear that 
the visuospatial cognitive profile in WS (as well as other phenotypic traits) arises from 
the haploinsufficiency of genes within the WSCR, it is likely that different genes play a 
role in the expression of distinct aspects of visuospatial cognition.  These may in turn be 
modulated to different levels by the GTF-family genes.  Although visuospatial abilities 
may be somewhat overlapping, changes from childhood to adulthood in the extent to 
which visuospatial tasks are correlated (both between and within different scales) are 
indicative of the dynamic nature of gene expression and cognitive functioning over 
developmental time.  Furthermore, some spatial abilities may have a stronger genetic 
component than others, suggesting that a concurrent examination of genetic, brain, 
environmental and developmental factors is crucial.  This is the case not only for 
understanding the nature of deficits in WS, but also for understanding changes in 
visuospatial cognition throughout typical and atypical development.   
 
7.5 Approaches to examining the WS visuospatial profile 
7.5.1 Using a multilevel approach 
The studies presented in this thesis have, for the most part, examined large-scale 
visuospatial cognition in WS at the behavioural level.  Although the relationships 
between genotype and visuospatial phenotype in WS were addressed, further analysis of 
the nature of visuospatial impairments in this disorder at different levels (brain, genes, 
cognition and behaviour) would be an important extension of this work.   
An examination of the neural correlates of large-scale spatial cognition in WS 
was beyond the scope of this thesis.  Instead, known abnormalities in brain structure and 
functioning in WS were presented as possible indicators to the specific spatial 
difficulties that would be encountered in this disorder.  It is important to note therefore 
 
 
 224 
that in the same way that attempting to make direct genotype-cognitive phenotype 
mappings is problematic (see also, Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif, & Thomas, 2002); drawing 
conclusions regarding one-to-one mappings of brain to behaviour may be questionable.   
Imaging studies have revealed a reduction in overall brain volume in WS by ten 
to fifteen percent, with some areas such as the parietal-occipital lobes disproportionately 
decreased (Chiang et al., 2007).  In fact, findings have consistently pointed to reduced 
grey-matter density in posterior parietal and occipital areas in WS (Eckert et al., 2005; 
Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004; Reiss et al., 2004).  Reduced volume in these visual-
spatial processing areas are often taken to infer an altered level of cortical integrity.  
However decreases in brain volume may not necessarily equate to a reduced level of 
functioning.  In line with this, Menghini et al. (2011) argue that interpretations of brain 
imaging studies in WS when images have been transformed by normalisation strategies 
to fit standardised templates, should be made with care.  Some studies however, have 
examined relationships between structural and functional changes in the brains of 
individuals with WS.  For example, work by Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2004) found that 
hypoactivation in the parietal dorsal stream and reduced grey matter in parietooccipital 
and intraparietal sulcus contributed to functional abnormalities on spatial construction 
tasks.  Another study by this group found reduced metabolism and activation of the 
anterior hippocampal formation in response to visual stimuli in WS, a finding that was 
in line with an altered structure of this region (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005). 
Findings from the studies presented in this thesis suggest that reduced 
functioning in the use of both egocentric and allocentric frames of reference in adults 
with WS may be related to the structural and functional changes in the cortical areas 
associated with these tasks in typical individuals.  However, despite these findings 
being in line with neuroimaging studies in adults with WS, the same may not hold true 
across development.  The notion that there are individual cortical regions compromised 
in WS while other brain areas remain intact may be simplistic and does not take into 
account the dynamically changing nature of the brain or the different influences of 
genes and environment over developmental time (Karmiloff-Smith, 2012).  For instance, 
there are likely to be a number of downstream effects of atypical brain maturation on 
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connectivity and the integrity of different cortical areas (Karmiloff-Smith, 2006).  For 
this reason, it does not suffice to say that impaired visuospatial abilities and atypical 
navigation strategies in children with WS are entirely a result of compromised parietal 
and hippocampal regions, as it may be that atypical development of spatial cognition 
itself drives abnormal functioning in these brain regions.  Indeed, there may be some 
brain regions more vulnerable to disruption from atypical development than others.  
Therefore, inferences about cognition across the lifespan based on adult WS brain 
morphology and vice-versa, should be taken cautiously.  
Although research examining atypical cortical structure and function in WS can 
inform our understanding to some extent of the types of visuospatial deficits in adults 
with WS, little is known about the actual neural correlates of spatial processing in WS, 
particularly during navigation tasks.  Future studies would therefore benefit from the 
use of functional neuroimaging techniques to examine whether the same cortical regions 
are preferentially activated in WS as TD individuals during tasks where there are 
impairments, but also where behaviour is at a comparable level, or where similar 
strategies are used.  Indeed, that which presents as being intact at the level of behaviour 
may not involve the same neural substrates as seen in typical individuals (Karmiloff-
Smith et al., 1997).   
Given this, and the previous discussion into examining genetic contributions to 
spatial deficits in WS, it is important to take into account a multi-level perspective of 
visuospatial impairments in WS.  In addition, the role of the environment, including the 
role of education and parental support in learning to navigate and the extent to which 
this would have an impact on the strategies and performance in WS are important 
factors to consider.  Furthermore, it is essential not just to look at different levels of 
description, but also the way in which these interact throughout development.  An 
examination of visuospatial impairments in WS within a developmental framework is 
best placed to delineate the causes of change with maturation and over time. 
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7.5.2 Using group comparisons 
Throughout this thesis, groups of individuals with WS were compared to TD 
children between 5 and 10 years of age.  This age range of the TD groups incorporates 
the ages at which there is a significant progression in performance on these tasks to 
adult levels.  In each experimental study, the WS group was in line with the oldest TD 
children (TD 9-10 years) on measures of verbal ability and in line with the youngest TD 
group (TD 5 or 6 years) on measures of non-verbal reasoning, representing the strongest 
and poorest cognitive abilities in WS, respectively.  Therefore, any differences between 
the WS and TD groups on any experimental measures could not be accounted for by 
level of general intellectual impairment.  Previous research has shown consistently that 
adults with WS usually perform at the level of TD 4 to 6 year-olds on visuospatial tasks 
(Farran & Formby, 2012).  This finding was reflected in a number of tasks conducted in 
this thesis, although on some tasks the WS group performed below the level of non-
verbal ability of the youngest TD group, or with a different pattern of performance to 
TD children.   
The findings from the experimental work presented here provide insight into the 
specific impairments that adolescent and adult individuals with WS have on a variety of 
spatial tasks, and the types of spatial mental representations used during large-scale 
navigation in this group.  Studies examining the developmental course of visuospatial 
abilities in WS typically indicate that cognitive measures are better predictors of 
developmental progression than chronological age in this group (J. Atkinson et al., 2006; 
Nardini et al., 2008).   In studies 1 and 2 however, a large age-range in the WS group 
was used and age-related changes were observed in WS on the OB mental rotation task 
(study 1).  This finding may be indicative of plasticity even in the adult WS brain, a 
time in development that is often noted as remaining relatively unchanging in the level 
of cognitive functioning in WS (Howlin et al., 2010).  However, the inclusion of such a 
wide age-range in the WS group may have resulted in variability in this group that was 
more related to task-related difficulties in the youngest and oldest individuals such as 
understanding the task or associated motor requirements.  Therefore, as a precautionary 
measure in study 4, the age range of the WS group was truncated relative to the 
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previous studies to account for this.  Although individual differences were still be 
expected in the WS group in study 4, these may have related more to variability in level 
of cognitive functioning.  
Despite the limited changes with age in adults with WS, the dynamic nature of 
development and brain plasticity during the early years suggests that there may be 
profound changes throughout development in the extent to which different visuospatial 
abilities are divergent in WS.  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there are likely to be 
changing influences of genetic deletions on the visuospatial phenotype over 
development at different levels of functioning (for example; metabolic, cortical, and 
behavioural) (Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Osborne, 2012; Scerif & Karmiloff-Smith, 2005).  
To examine developmental changes in visuospatial abilities in WS and not just the ‘end-
point’ level of ability in adulthood, future research would benefit from more 
longitudinal, developmental designs (Thomas, Purser, & Van Herwegen, 2012) in order 
to examine how these processes develop, and why this may result in specific 
impairments.    
A primary focus of this research was in the changes with age across TD groups 
in the ability to use different navigation strategies and to switch successfully between 
spatial frames of reference.  As this is not considered a linear process, but occurs within 
a short timeframe, trajectory analysis would not have been appropriate in this instance 
and group comparisons were therefore conducted.  Further to this, adults with WS were 
at the level of the youngest TD group (5 or 6 year-olds) in studies 1 and 2 (albeit 
presenting with a different pattern of performance on some tasks), and even performed 
at floor-level on some measures.  Therefore, the inclusion of children with WS in these 
studies would not have been additionally informative.  Equally, the fine-motor demands 
of the VE tasks would not have allowed for the TD range to be extended younger than 5 
years of age.  The inclusion of children with WS on measures of visual-matching (e.g., 
in study 4), however, may provide insight into the developmental trajectory of this 
ability in WS.  For instance, it is not clear from the current study whether children with 
WS are similarly able to use a visual-matching strategy to support navigation in the 
same way as adults with WS.  It would also be informative to examine changes in the 
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pattern of errors and strategies on similar tasks from childhood to adulthood in WS.  
That said, a linear development of these abilities would not be anticipated, and so would 
not necessarily benefit from a trajectory analysis.  
The use of group comparisons throughout this thesis therefore provided insight 
into the changes in TD children between 5 and 10 years of age in the types of strategies 
used to navigate through large-scale environments.  The level of ability in adults with 
WS compared to TD children was also easily examined using this approach.  Such 
group comparisons also demonstrated where navigation strategies were atypical based 
on what could be expected for the level of verbal and non-verbal ability in WS.  That 
said, there is scope for future research to investigate the emergence of visuospatial 
abilities in this neurodevelopmental disorder in order to better understand the syndrome-
specific pattern of impairments.    
Counter to the strengths of using a matching approach such as that indicated 
throughout this thesis, the comparison of adults with WS to TD children on these spatial 
navigation tasks has potential limitations. As mentioned in 1.2.1, current theories 
advocate the role of experience in the development of spatial knowledge, both at an 
ontogenetic and microgenetic level. As such the comparison of adults and children, who 
have differing levels of navigational experience may have connotations for the 
interpretation of some results. Therefore, the inclusion of a second adult developmental 
disorder group (e.g., Down syndrome or adults with ASD) in a cross-syndrome 
comparison approach may have provided important insight into the role of age in the 
development of such spatial abilities in atypical groups. Indeed, if performance across 
the two atypical groups of comparable chronological age and intellectual (particularly 
non-verbal) ability is found to be divergent, this would suggest that the specific spatial 
abilities examined here are not solely attributable to general intellectual ability or age, 
but indicative of different, syndrome-specific constraints on development. 
 
7.5.3 Using virtual environments (VEs) to examine spatial knowledge 
As discussed in section 1.6, there are great advantages to employing the use of 
VEs to examine large-scale spatial knowledge both in typically developing children and 
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individuals with developmental disorders.  This is particularly so regarding the 
attainment of extensive experience in an environment and the prospect of manipulating 
the environment to maintain a consistent experience for each experimental participant. 
Research suggests that VEs may be suitable equivalents to real world environments 
(Richardson et al., 1999), with shared neural activity associated with learning in both 
conditions (Mellet et al., 2010).  That said, there are potential limitations to using VEs 
to approximate real world navigational experience.  Firstly, in the real world, there exist 
greater attentional demands that may have implications for generalising some of the 
findings presented in this thesis to navigational strategies that would be employed 
within a naturalistic setting.  This may be so for the findings that suggest a reliance on 
visual matching in WS, when other navigation strategies are not available to them.  It is 
not clear whether in a real-world environment, the more extensive number of 
multisensory distracters, may have a negative impact on the ability of individuals with 
WS to use such a strategy. For instance, Péruch and Gaunet (1998) assert that VEs do 
not support naturalistic interactions between the sensorimotor systems. 
Secondly, as mentioned previously, navigation in the real world involves 
translating and updating between egocentric and allocentric frames of reference (e.g., 
Vann et al., 2009), and proprioceptive feedback following actual movements through 
the environment (Ekstrom, 2010; Maguire et al., 1999). Although VEs provide real-time 
interactivity with an environment and greater subjective feeling of immersion compared 
viewing static images of environmental locations along a route, the extent to which VEs 
result in the same level of cognitive processing is questionable. However, it should be 
noted that within the VEs presented throughout this thesis, a number of participants 
(particularly TD 8 and 10 year-olds) were able to develop a holistic spatial 
representation of the environment that may approximate the knowledge acquired from 
traversing in a real environment.  This suggests that such VEs may be suitable measures 
of investigation into navigational strategies, particularly when used as complementary 
to real-world navigational studies.        
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7.6 Implications of results for individuals with WS 
7.6.1 Everyday living  
Difficulties in mentally rotating objects or the self in WS, as reported in study 1, 
suggest that everyday tasks that require this aspect of spatial processing; for example, 
setting a table from a single viewpoint, would be problematic.  Importantly, in relation 
to large-scale spatial abilities, impaired mental rotation has an impact on the specific 
remediation strategies that can be used for individuals with WS during navigation.  For 
example, the use of maps that require the navigator to mentally transform the spatial 
information from a table-top viewpoint into the first-person perspective, is likely to be 
particularly challenging (e.g., Farran et al., 2010).   
The findings presented in studies 2 and 4 inform our understanding of not only 
the impairments individuals with WS demonstrate on large-scale spatial tasks, but also 
some of the navigational strategies predominantly employed by individuals in this group. 
Without the time and physical constraints imposed by learning in a real-world 
environment, the use of VEs demonstrated how individuals with WS are able to learn to 
make appropriate responses at decision points along a route.  Relative strengths in 
learning a fixed route and a reliance on visual matching in order to successfully learn 
and retrace such a route may have profound implications for learning to navigate 
independently and for quality of life.  That is, the need to take a detour or getting lost 
would be particularly problematic as complex navigation strategies are challenging for 
individuals with WS.  Given a reliance on visual matching for navigation, individuals 
with WS would need to learn the appropriate action to take at each individual decision 
point along a route.  This would certainly be more arduous than the use of other 
navigation strategies, although points towards a focus for training in WS.  For instance, 
the use of verbal strategies may be used to support sequential organisation of route and 
landmark information, akin to the use of Aboriginal song-lines for navigation (Norris & 
Harney, in press).  
Even with extended experience in an environment, the findings in this thesis 
indicate that individuals with WS are unlikely to develop a holistic mental 
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representation of an environment.  Furthermore, an impairment in the ability to switch 
between an egocentric and allocentric perspective in order to mentally update one’s 
position along a route would also have implications for reorienting one’s self after 
getting lost, or trying to reach one’s goal from a different starting place.  Difficulties 
with such tasks are likely to have a profound impact on levels of confidence.  Similarly, 
an impaired ability to relocate one’s self following an incorrect turn would increase 
levels of anxiety for independent travel, which are already reportedly higher in WS than 
in the typical population (Leyfer, Woodruff-Borden, & Mervis, 2009).   
 
7.6.2 Training and intervention in WS 
Given the level of impairment in large-scale spatial navigation in WS, the need 
to devise suitable methods of training and intervention for individuals with this disorder 
is vital.  The use of VEs to examine spatial abilities in this group was demonstrated to 
be a useful tool; however, the extent to which such devices can be used for training was 
not approached in this thesis.  That said, the finding that individuals with WS are able to 
learn a route using a visual-matching strategy implies that VEs that are designed to be 
representative of real-world routes could be a valuable method of developing familiarity 
with a given environment and knowledge of the responses that need to be made at 
certain decision points.  Training in VEs that are equivalent to real-world spaces in 
typical adults (Rose et al., 2000; Wallet et al., 2009) and in individuals with physical 
disabilities (Foreman et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 1996) has been found to transfer 
successfully to the real world.  However, little is known about whether there would be 
an equivalent transfer of spatial information from virtual to real space in individuals 
with intellectual difficulties.  This is particularly so considering the additional 
distractors that would be present in the real world.   
The use of interactive web mapping technology that can be easily accessed at 
home and provides a street-view perspective (for example, Google Maps) could be a 
useful resource for parents of individuals with WS to point out key landmarks along a 
route, and for teaching individuals with WS to associate a response with a specific 
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location.  Although the use of such methods would not result in individuals with WS 
developing a ‘cognitive map’ or advanced relational knowledge of the environment, 
they may help to alleviate some of the anxiety related to learning their way around a 
new place such as a school (using a VE) or a route to the shops (using Google Maps).  
Similarly, the use of smartphone apps that inform the navigator of the required direction 
of movement in real-time as well as provide metric and distance information could be 
particularly beneficial to individuals with WS. 
Examining the use of such methods may be an interesting possibility for future 
research.  Further to this, as mentioned above, an advanced understanding of the way in 
which visuospatial difficulties develop in WS by examining impairments at the level of 
gene expression, brain, cognition and behaviour across development would further 
inform our understanding of early interventions that may help remediate some deficits, 
or at least allow for the training of alternative navigation strategies.   
 
7.7 Future research 
Some avenues for future research have already been referred to above.  For 
example, using neuroimaging to examine the specific neural correlates of large-scale 
navigation in WS compared to TD controls.  In particular, future research should 
examine the extent to which hippocampal and associated regions are involved in 
processing environmental information in WS compared to TD children and adults.  
Given that a few individuals with WS were able to use an allocentric spatial frame of 
reference, does this depend on the integrity of the hippocampus and retrosplenial cortex 
in the same way as it does in typical adults?  Future research would also require a more 
detailed examination of the neural correlates of different cognitive processes and sub-
processes involved in spatial navigation within a typical developmental framework.  It 
may be that there are changes in the cortical regions that subserve spatial processing 
from childhood to adulthood, even in typical development.  Indeed, different networks 
of activation have been reported in TD children compared to adults during other 
cognitive tasks such as numerical processing (e.g., Ansari, Garcia, Lucas, Hamon, & 
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Dhital, 2005). These findings would have important implications for understanding 
atypical development and neural correlates of spatial processing in WS. 
Different patterns of performance between individuals with WS and TD children 
were reported within this thesis, highlighting specific areas of atypical spatial 
functioning.  For instance, the detriment on 180° trials on OB rotation was only evident 
in the WS group, showing that unlike TD children they did not use an alternative 
strategy to perform these tasks.  On VPT, the WS group errors were predominantly 
egocentric compared to the left-right reversal errors in TD groups.  Furthermore, on 
large-scale tasks, the WS group primarily relied on a mixed strategy to navigate and 
seemed to depend on the presence of landmarks to a greater extent than TD children.  
Further examination into the specific pattern of performance in WS compared to TD is 
therefore important.  This would help delineate whether some visuospatial deficits in 
this disorder cannot simply be attributed to poor level of non-verbal ability.  The use of 
eye-tracking technology would greatly enhance this work to identify diverse patterns of 
behaviour in this disorder.  This would be of particular use during large-scale VE 
navigation tasks, to examine the specific environmental features attended to and gaze 
patterns in WS compared to TD individuals.   
A question not answerable from the present studies, is whether the pattern of 
large-scale spatial processing shown in WS would also be observed in other 
neurodevelopmental disorders, particularly in individuals of comparable general 
intellectual ability.  Given the previous discussion about difficulties in linking 
individual genes to higher-level cognitive functions, the specific genetic origin of WS 
does not necessarily suggest that the pattern of deficits presented is syndrome-specific. 
As mentioned in 7.5.2, cross-syndrome comparisons would therefore provide another 
important addition to the work carried out here.  For instance, comparing the pattern of 
performance and particular strategies used in WS compared to individuals with Down 
syndrome and ASD would highlight whether atypical processing on these navigation 
tasks are specific to WS or a hallmark of atypical development in general.  
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7.8 Summary and concluding remarks 
The experimental studies presented in this thesis comprised two main strands of 
investigation.  The experimental work presented here, firstly provides insight into the 
changes with maturation that drive the use of more complex navigation strategies in 
typical development.  Secondly, the research in this thesis informs our understanding of 
the specific large-scale visuospatial difficulties and predominant navigation strategies 
used in individuals with WS.  These studies highlight the nature of large-scale spatial 
deficits in this disorder at the level of behaviour, and the genetic contributions to the 
WS visuospatial profile.  Together, these findings provide insight both into the dynamic 
nature of visuospatial cognition, and the atypical visuospatial phenotype in WS.  
In TD children, improvements in performance on both small- and large-scale 
spatial tasks were seen between 6 and 8 years of age, with an adult-like pattern of 
performance occurring by 10 years of age on many tasks.  This advanced level of 
performance with development was attributed to the emergence of the ability to 
successfully translate between different spatial frames of reference.  In particular this 
referred to the ability to continuously update an egocentric representation of the self 
(involving viewpoint-dependent information about the direction of required movements) 
within an allocentric frame of reference (involving an understanding of the viewpoint-
independent relationships between locations in an environment).  This is in line with the 
maturation of cortical areas that subserve these types of spatial processing, reported in 
neuroimaging research (Gogtay et al., 2006; Pine et al., 2002).  Measures of the ability 
to manipulate and transform a mental representation of objects or the self were used to 
examine underlying processes associated with large-scale navigation abilities.  Reliable 
correlations were only seen in TD 10 year-olds, suggesting that there may be different 
processes underlying performance at different spatial scales in younger TD children and 
individuals with WS.  The divergent effects of genetic deletions within the WS critical 
region (WSCR) on different components of visuospatial ability also demonstrated the 
fractionated nature of visuospatial cognition.  An in-depth phenotyping of the 
visuospatial domain from small- and large-scale tasks spoke of the significance of the 
genes at the telomeric end of the WSCR – particularly the general transcription factors – 
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and their effects on the WS profile.  For instance, although the preservation of most 
GTF genes were associated with a high level of navigation ability (albeit with atypical 
features) in one individual, a contrasting deletion of these telomeric genes in another 
case did not result in impaired small-scale mental transformation abilities.  This study 
provided insight into the combinatorial and dynamic role of the genes within the WSCR, 
emphasising in particular the complex nature of the search for direct genotype-
phenotype mappings.  Moreover, these findings highlight the need to examine the 
effects of genetic deletions over development and the interaction between genes, brain 
and environment on the resulting WS cognitive phenotype.   
Individuals with WS demonstrated profound impairments in spatial processing 
at different spatial scales.  However, the studies presented in this thesis are indicative of 
a particular pattern of relative strengths and weaknesses in WS within the visuospatial 
domain.  Although individuals with WS demonstrated impaired allocentric processing, 
and difficulties with some elements of coding spatial information using an egocentric 
frame of reference, group performances showed an ability to learn a route in line with 
level of non-verbal ability.  In addition, individuals with WS demonstrated an atypical 
reliance on an egocentric association-response strategy of visual-matching to 
successfully learn a route and for subsequent way-finding.  This has important 
implications for navigation in WS.  Navigation in daily life rarely requires the use of 
short-cuts or taking novel routes, but instead predominantly consists of retracing 
familiar routes to and from school or work and other salient locations.  These findings 
therefore suggest that when navigating through routes that have few distinguishing 
visual features (e.g., school corridors), or when a change occurs in the environment such 
as the removal of a key landmark, this is likely to have a profound impact on the daily 
navigational tasks in individuals with WS.   
The nature of visuospatial cognition is dynamic and multifaceted.  The pattern of 
impairments within this domain in individuals with WS, particularly with reference to 
large-scale navigation abilities, is reflective of this complexity.  From the findings in 
this thesis, some conclusions can be drawn regarding the types of intervention 
techniques that could alleviate some large-scale navigation difficulties in WS.  However, 
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more research is needed to delineate the genetic and neural underpinnings of 
visuospatial cognition even within typical development before more targeted and earlier 
interventions and training approaches can be proposed in WS.  The use of a 
multidisciplinary approach to examining visuospatial cognition and within a 
developmental framework in future research would therefore further compliment the 
findings presented in this thesis. 
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8. Glossary of Terms 
Array comparative genome hybridisation (arrayCGH): A technology for the rapid detection 
of DNA sequence copy number changes (amplifications and deletions) across the entire 
genome at high resolution. The procedure also allows for simultaneous mapping of 
these sites within the genomic sequence (Yagihashi et al., 2014). 
Allocentric: A representation of space encoded relative to an external frame of reference and 
the object-to-object relationships within the environment. These representations involve 
defining the location of an object relative to other objects and are therefore 
environment- or object-centred. 
Centromeric/centromere: The section of DNA that occurs towards/at the point where each half 
of the chromosome join during mitosis.  
CYLN2/ CLIP2 gene: A gene within the WSCR that codes for the membrane-microtubule 
interacting proteins that are found in neurons of the hippocampus, piriform cortex, 
olfactory bulb and inferior olive (Schubert, 2009). 
Egocentric: A representation of space or the location of objects encoded in relation to a body-
based frame of reference. These representations involve an understanding of self-to-
object relationships based on a body-centred coordinate system. 
Elastin (ELN) gene: A gene located within the WSCR that codes for proteins rich in 
hydrophobic amino acids, the deletion and mutations of which cause SVAS, 
hypertension and soft-tissue changes (Pober, 2010).  Haploinsufficiency for one ELN 
gene is the basis for a genetic diagnosis of WS. 
Environmental frame of reference: An allocentric spatial frame of reference that is based on 
the relationships between locations within an environment.  For instance, during a task 
where participants are moved around an array (e.g., Nardini et al., 2006), they are not 
able to use a body-based frame of reference, or a frame of reference intrinsic to the 
array, but must use their knowledge of spatial relationships between the array and 
features within the surrounding environment. 
Fluorescence in-situ hybridisation (FISH) test: A specialised chromosome analysis technique 
that uses a DNA probe for the elastin gene and is the standard method for genetically 
diagnosing WS (Metcalfe, 2012). 
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General transcription factors (GTFs): (e.g., GTF2I, GTF2IRD1, and GTF2IRD2). A family 
of genes that are located at the telomeric end of the WSCR, which code for proteins that 
act as transcriptional activators and/or repressors.  They are thought to have diverse 
effects on the expression of other genes (Hinsley et al., 2004; Osborne, 2012). 
Haploinsufficiency: Only a single functional copy (one allele) of a gene exists, and where the 
result is a reduction of gene function (only half the gene product is produced leading to 
insufficient function). It is related to hemizygosity. 
Hemizygosity: The state of having only one of a pair of alleles transmitting a specific character. 
Intrinsic frame of reference: An allocentric frame of reference centred on an array of objects, 
such as the specific layout and shape of an array. This is needed to solve tasks in which 
only an array moves and body-based and environment-based coordinates remain fixed 
(e.g., Nardini et al., 2006). 
Lim domain kinase 1 (LIMK1): A gene that is located near the centre of the WSCR that 
belongs to a protein kinase family involved in brain development, and may play a role 
in synapse formation and maintenance (Scott & Olson, 2007).  
Low-copy repeat (LCR) blocks: Duplicated blocks of repetitive sequences of genomic DNA. 
Deletions in WS arise as a consequence of misalignment of these repetitive sequences 
during meiosis (due to the high similarity of the LCRs) (Schubert, 2009). 
Megabase (Mb) pairs: A unit of length of nucleic acids (equal to one million base pairs). 
Object-based (OB) mental rotation:  Tasks that involve imagining what an object would look 
like from a different orientation, without the need for actual movement. The mental 
transformation of the location or position of an object or array of objects is conducted 
relative to a fixed object- or environment-centred spatial frame of reference. 
Single copy gene region: The region within the WSCR between the low-copy repeat blocks C 
mid and B mid and spans a region of ~1.2Mb. 
Spatial frame of reference (FoR):  The coordinate systems used to encode where things are 
located in space. 
‘Sequential egocentric’ strategy: The understanding of the temporal order of relationships 
between the self and decision-points within an environment; for example, the order of 
body-turns (left-right) to reach a particular location. Thus, these body-based 
representations or egocentric frames of reference are used in navigation that involves 
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understanding the temporal, sequential order of movement along a route (Iglói et al., 
2009; Rondi-Reig, Petit, Arelo, & Burguiere, 2005). 
Supravalvular aortic stenosis (SVAS): A heart defect associated with WS and caused by 
mutations or deletions of the elastin gene. It results in the narrowing of the large blood 
vessel (just above the aortic valve) that carries blood from the heart to the rest of the 
body. 
Telomeric/telomere: The segment of DNA that occurs towards/at the end of a chromosome. 
Viewpoint-dependent representation: The use of a coordinate system that is based on the 
observer’s particular viewpoint such as a ‘mental snap-shot’ of a scene. Recall of the 
layout can only be done using the same viewpoint as time of encoding. This relies on 
the use of an egocentric reference frame. 
Viewpoint-independent representation: The use of a coordinate system based on the external 
environment or objects within an array that takes into consideration the spatial 
relationships between places within an environment. For example, a cognitive map 
would be considered viewpoint independent, i.e. uses an allocentric reference frame. 
Visual perspective-taking (VPT): Tasks that involve imagining what a scene would look like 
from an alternative viewpoint or perspective, without the need for actual movement. 
The mental transformation of the location or position of the self is conducted relative to 
a fixed allocentric spatial frame of reference.  
Williams syndrome critical region (WSCR): The region on chromosome 7q11.23 that is 
commonly deleted in WS, spanning 1.55 Mb (~95% of cases) to 1.84 Mb (~5% of cases) 
of genomic DNA. 
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